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REPRESENTATION

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I

IN these days, when, if the words of constitutions can be trusted, sovereign Parliaments based on manhood or adult suffrage are rapidly extending their sway over the greater part of the world, there is surely no conception more deserving of the attention of the political theorist than that of Representation. There was a time when government for most men meant monarchy, when ruler meant king or king's minister. To-day for most men ruler means Parliament or ministers responsible to Parliament, and government means representative government. In those former times the political theorist would naturally take the king or prince for his centre-piece, and devote himself to expounding the nature and attributes of the office. "For from the prince, as from a well spring, cometh the flood of all that is good or evil upon the people" (Sir T. More). In our own day he would perhaps do well to devote himself first and mainly to reflection on the meaning of this term representation, standing as it does for something which is taken by general consent to constitute the distinctive feature of the normal modern type of government. He may run the risk of speaking merely for his own day; but he should at least be sure of remaining near the centre of his subject.

Representation may be taken in a very wide sense—so wide that any and every form of government must be allowed to possess a representative character. By a characteristic *tour de force* Thomas Hobbes enabled himself to describe his absolute ruler, authorized once for all in the original contract, and endowed with plenary powers to decide for ever every matter of common concern, as the representative of his subjects. He acted with their authority, and

they took his act as theirs. But whatever the justice of this conception may be, it would include far too much for the purpose of the present discussion. The term must be limited more narrowly, and it will be restricted, I think, suitably to our ideas of representative government if we impose a double limitation. Presuming that the body represented is a people, and that the representative is the government (or part of the government) of that people: (1) the representation must be multiple, so that there is a representative body consisting of a number of persons, each of whom is a representative; (2) the relation between the representative and the represented must be such as not to be exhausted in the bare statement that the representative has been authorized to act by the represented; or, positively, the representatives collectively and individually must feel themselves to be in some degree dependent on the good pleasure of those whom they represent. By these two limitations the Hobbesian sovereign is excluded. The first alone would merely exclude his king; but the second excludes also his Assembly, for it excludes the possibility of once-for-all unlimited authorization. The provision by which in constitutions such dependence is legally secured (so far as it can be legally secured) is that of the terminable representative mandate. This secures indirectly that the representatives shall feel themselves dependent on popular opinion; and without this there would be no obvious point of connection between representation and democracy.

The central question for me is that of the precise nature of this second limitation. This is the question on which I want to concentrate the present discussion. My reason is the reason already suggested, that we have here the link, if there is one, between representation and democracy. Now it is in the name of democracy that the modern world is asked to accept representative government; and if there is no such link, the modern world is grossly deceived. In that case it must seek for other forms in which to embody its democratic ideals. But with possible alternatives I am not here concerned. I wish to confine my view to the representative parliament, the generally accepted basis of government in modern Europe, with a view to discovering in what its representative character consists, in the hope of diminishing or removing some of the confusions which beset modern politics, and especially those confusions which attend the use in this connection of the term democracy and its cognates.

As to the word democracy itself, I would make one preliminary observation. It would, I imagine, be quite possible and legitimate to give the word a precise legal or constitutional significance. Government, one might say, is democratically organized so far as it is directly and constitutionally dependent on the acts of the general body of adult citizens. In this sense of the word typical democratic

provisions are those for the election of a president by popular vote, or for the submission of a law, which has received the assent of Parliament, to the citizens generally for endorsement in what is known as a Referendum. But the share which the citizen body can take in the work of government by these and other devices is very limited, and can never be sufficient by itself to justify the description of any government as generally and fundamentally democratic. It is best, therefore, to empty the word of all constitutional significance, and to make it stand rather for an end or ideal with reference to which constitutional arrangements may be assessed and adapted. The end need not be accepted; there may be other ends which temporarily or even permanently have precedence over this; but there is this end, to which, at least since the eighteenth century, men of all countries have persistently and often passionately devoted their thoughts and energies. It is the idea of a nation which is master of its own fate, which manages its own affairs. This is not a constitutional notion at all, though it has at various times tended to identify itself with certain special kinds of constitutional provision. It involves certainly the notion of the people as sovereign, but not necessarily in the sense which the constitutional lawyer gives to that term. The kind of sovereignty claimed, or hoped for, is more ultimate and more axiomatic, constitutive of the constitution itself, and penetrating into the farthest dim detail of government. Such sovereignty cannot be secured, though it can be furthered, by appropriate constitutional provisions.

Thus my question as to the relation of representation and democracy is not a question as to the mutual relation of certain constitutional features, but as to the serviceability of a certain type of constitutional provision for the end of self-government, in the name of which it is commonly recommended.

II

Let us now collect and compare some influential opinions as to the meaning to be attached to representation. Round the roots of Parliaments, stretching far back into the Middle Ages, we find the ground scattered with traces of recurrent controversy as to the status of the representative. The question was, how far was he free to commit those who sent him and in whose name he spoke? It seemed reasonable that the delegants (to borrow the French word) should have the right to bind their delegate by definite instructions. Both in England and in France we find kings, incommoded politically by this practice, exerting themselves to secure the maximum freedom for the representative. The growth of the legislative responsibilities of Parliament, in England at least, exerted pressure in the same direction. In the

eighteenth century the freedom of the member of Parliament to decide any matter that might come up at his unfettered discretion was amply established. In 1774, when Burke made his famous speech at Bristol, the King's writ might still confess to a doubt on the point by asking that burgesses should be given unrestricted powers; but in fact Burke was correct in saying that "authoritative instructions" and mandates binding on the member were "unknown to the laws of this land" and foreign to the "order and tenor of our constitution."

This conception of what the Continental textbooks of the present day often call *free representation* (as opposed to tied representation) found classic expression in a number of decisions reached not without opposition by the French Revolutionary Assembly and Convention of 1789 and the following years. In the form then given to it, it has become a foundation-stone of modern parliamentarism. The French Constitution of 1791 laid it down that "the representatives elected in the departments will not be representatives of a particular department, but of the whole nation, and they may not be given any mandate." Similarly the German Constitution of 1919, repeating with an unimportant variation a provision of the Constitution of 1871, states: "The deputies are representatives of the whole people; they are subject only to their conscience, and are not bound by mandates" (*an Aufträge nicht gebunden*). More bluntly the Swiss Constitution of 1874 says: "The members of the two Councils vote without instructions." More bluntly still Czechoslovakia in 1920 ordains of members of Parliament that "they shall not receive orders from anybody."

It will be noted in these examples that so far as a reason is given or suggested for the prohibition of instructions, it is one typical of French revolutionary sentiment. Instructions are feared, not because they might impede or delay the work of government, but because they might threaten the unity of the nation. But that this was a commonplace before the French Revolution began is proved by Burke's speech at Bristol, in which this very point is made with what might even seem unnecessary emphasis. Whatever the source, however, the tenor of the principle is plain: the unity of the nation precludes that section of it which is a constituency from tying its representative by definite instructions.

In the French revolutionary debates, from which this principle emerged triumphant, an alternative view was advocated, in avowed connection with Rousseau, for instance by Pétion and Robespierre. They argued that the member of Parliament is the agent or mandatary of his constituents, and is therefore subject to the will of those who give him his commission. On this ground Robespierre in 1793 urged the right of recall not merely for members of Parliament, but

for all public officials, as a formal recognition of their continuous "physical" responsibility. "A people," he said, "whose mandatories are responsible to no one for their conduct has no constitution . . . if this is the meaning of representative government, I accept all the anathemas which J. J. Rousseau pronounced upon it." The principle behind this is, of course, the idea of self-government as a condition of freedom. "In a free state," wrote Montesquieu in 1748, "any man who is considered to possess a free soul ought to be governed by himself: therefore the people as a body ought to hold the legislative power. But this being in large states impossible, and in small states in many ways inconvenient, the people has to do by its representatives whatever it cannot do by itself." Montesquieu goes on to ask that the representatives shall receive only general instructions, but he asks this in the name of expediency, because of the delays and postponements which detailed instructions would necessarily entail.

This opposed view did not speak in the name of democracy, because that word was commonly taken to stand for the direct democracies of antiquity, and representative government was therefore conceived as a substitute for it. It spoke in the name of popular or national sovereignty, and argued that the decision of Parliament cannot be the decision of the people unless the behaviour of the member of Parliament is controlled, at least in general, by the constituents to whom he owes his membership of Parliament. To them the high-sounding phrase, that he is to consider himself the representative of the whole nation, is a mere evasion. Burke said to the Bristol electors: "You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of *Parliament.*" To which the obvious reply is that the antithesis is false. The ordinary description of members of Parliament, current in Burke's own day, is sufficient to show this. The Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke would naturally be described as Member of Parliament for Bristol. A special relation to a part does not necessarily hinder or preclude service of the whole; and in any case it is Parliament as a whole that is entitled to speak of itself as representing the nation, not any individual member of Parliament. The contention is that this special relation involves, or ought to involve, some degree of dependence on the side of the representative.

In modern times the opponents of free representation have never been silenced. Few responsible theorists have given their cause any countenance; the weight of learning and experience has indeed been thrown heavily in the scale against them. But in spite of this they have gained ground in practice, and experienced observers like Bryce note with regret the tendency for the representative to become more and more of a delegate. Their practical successes have not been in the direction foreshadowed by Robespierre—that of tying the

individual member more closely to his constituents by defining the terms or diminishing the length of the mandate, or by providing opportunity of revocation; but rather in the direction of securing a greater responsiveness on the part of Parliaments generally to extra-Parliamentary opinion, and this less by any legal enactment than by the increasing prevalence of certain practical conventions. The increasing popularity of the Referendum is the chief legal development which comes into question here, since the demand for annual Parliaments collapsed; but the Referendum has not yet secured a footing in England, and far more important than the Referendum for the future of representative government is the increased tendency of the English House of Commons to look to "the country," as manifested in general elections, by-elections, petitions, or the public Press, for general instructions as to the work that needs doing and the manner in which it should be done. Our elder statesmen have again and again protested and shaken their heads. In the early years of the twentieth century Conservatives and Liberals and Constitutional Lawyers united in deploring this "modern theory of the mandate." But nevertheless each party in turn has found itself obliged to make concessions to it; the protests have now ceased, and it has become a generally accepted convention of Parliamentary Debate that, though the individual member may be as free as air, Parliament as a whole is, not indeed legally constrained but morally obliged to conform in all important decisions to the wishes, or as is sometime said to the will, of the people, so far as this can be ascertained. In this form the general thesis that the representative relation requires a certain subordination of the will of the representative to those he represents has succeeded in establishing itself as a principle of practical politics.

Meanwhile other voices have made themselves heard. Disappointment with the fruits of Parliamentary government has naturally led to fundamental criticism of the principle of representation itself. Mr. G. D. H. Cole's criticism will serve as a specimen of this line of thought. "The idea of democracy," he tells us, "has become tangled up with a particular theory of representative government, based on a totally false theory of representation. This false theory is that one man can represent a number of others, and that his will can be treated as a democratic expression of their wills."[1] To this he objects, that "no man can represent another man, and no man's will can be treated as a substitute for or representation of the wills of others." But it turns out that he has nothing really to put in place of representation. The real vice of the situation for him is the omnicompetence of Parliament, with its corollary that a representative is a representative for all human concerns. Divide these concerns up along

[1] *Social Theory* (1920), p. 103.

the natural lines of division and appoint separate representatives for each; make representation, as he puts it, specific and functional instead of general and inclusive, and the vice of representation will disappear. "It is impossible," he says, "to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness: it is quite possible to represent (though with an element of distortion which must always be recognized) so much of human beings as they themselves put into an associated effort for a common purpose."

In view of such arguments as this we must add to the questions requiring an answer this fundamental one—whether and in what sense it is legitimate to speak of persons as represented at all?

III

Mill starts his discussion of the functions of Parliament from the question, "What kinds of business a numerous body is competent to perform properly?" This too frequently neglected question is really the fundamental question for democratic theory. The question should not be confined to Parliament, and the word "properly" is unnecessary. It should be asked at each and every stage of delegation, the ultimate delegant being conceived as the people or general body of voters, from which in the last resort all authority is held by delegation. The word "properly" is not wanted, because it tends to complicate primary with secondary issues. The first question is what such a body *can* do. What it cannot do itself, it must, as Montesquieu said, arrange to have done otherwise. Thus under this head we might hope to show that certain kinds of delegation are necessary, *i.e.* are inevitable if government is to exist at all. If we ask what things such a body is "competent to perform properly," we introduce the further question whether certain things which it can do itself would not be better done otherwise, and here we are apt to find ourselves baffled by a surd in the democrat's belief in the intrinsic value of self-government. It is best to postpone that question, and even to assume at the start, at least for the sake of the argument, that whatever the general body can and will do for itself, it should do for itself and not delegate to the more restricted body. Some such presumption as this seems to be characteristic of the democratic attitude, and the best procedure is to accept the principle in its simplicity and see where it leads.

When I call the act by which authority is constituted an act of delegation, I only mean to assert the principle that the general social body, the community, is the source of all authority within it; that the body or person enjoying authority, however it may in fact be appointed, considers itself to be empowered finally by and responsible finally to the general body of citizens. A king, for

instance, like ours, who owes his position historically to complications of tradition, conquest, and Acts of Parliament, is properly conceived not in terms of such derivation, but in his dependence on the attitude of the community in which he holds office; and it is this dependence which the word delegation is intended to mark. It will be observed, further, that much of what is most commonly called delegation is excluded by the terms of the question above propounded. Many, if not most, of our delegations empower other people to do things which we are legally and otherwise competent to do ourselves; but the delegations referred to above empower the delegate to do only what the delegants themselves cannot do. In the one case authority may correctly be said to be passed on or handed over from delegant to delegate; in the other case it cannot be. Much confusion of thought is caused in political contexts, in which delegation is normally of this second type, by the use of terminology proper only to the first type. Thus Lord Brougham sees the essence of representation in this, "that the power of the people should be parted with and given over for a limited period to the deputy chosen by the people, and that he should perform that part in the government which, but for this transfer, would have been performed by the people themselves."[1] This is wholly artificial. What is this power of the people, and when was it, or could it be, used? Plainly the institution of a Parliament is the *creation* of an authority which did not exist before.

After these preliminaries, let us now confront ourselves in thought with our problem in its simplest form. Here is this British population of about 48 million men and women and children living unevenly dispersed on its north-westerly island. What, we have to ask, can it do for itself? Its mere size dictates the answer, nothing. The members of such a multitude cannot even, except in the most confused and superficial way, become aware of the multitude of which they are members. Yet, as we know them now under government, their unity is a pretty solid fact, of some weight in the world, and expressed for themselves in a multitude of complicated activities, touching the lives of every individual inhabitant in innumerable ways; and they would tell you, if you asked them, that in the main they govern themselves, that the general distribution and character of these activities is not settled for them by benevolent outsiders, but settled by them in the light of their own wisdom and with reference to their own interests. How has this miracle happened, and how is it maintained? How is this unwieldly mass, incapable in itself of any action whatever, converted into a living, active, self-organizing social body?

The device on which we mainly rely for the maintenance of this standing miracle is the device of the representative assembly or

[1] *Br. Const.*, p. 33.

Parliament. The principle of the device is simple. By division into more or less artificial smaller groups, each of which has the right of sending one or more delegates to a central assembly, the 48 million inhabitants (or rather the 29 million adults) are induced to express themselves without remainder in a body of some 600 persons, on which thereafter the main responsibility for all affairs of common concern rests. No one is left out; everyone has his spokesman in this general assembly. The assembly is large, but not so large that all may not be able to see and hear anyone who speaks to it, nor so large that each member may not have a reasonable chance of saying what he may wish to say. In it the multitude is incorporated, achieving unity by representation; it becomes now, though only by a fiction, a single body, a people capable of decision and action. For the decisions of this assembly are not the decisions merely of the persons who happen at the time to be members of it, nor even merely of the body of which they happen to be members, an ancient body, perhaps, with ancient and powerful traditions of its own. The decisions are conceived by those who take them as taken in the name and on behalf of the community as a whole, and the public outside accepts them in this sense. It is not just Parliament which so ordains, but Parliament as spokesman of the speechless multitude—Parliament, in short, in its representative character.

There are two points here to which I want specially to direct attention. First, it is fundamentally erroneous to think of a people as possessing a unity which political institutions merely express and register. There are, of course, numbers of different unifying principles at work in any given geographical area, but neither separately nor in combination will they produce political union, or determine its limits and extent. The relevant unity in every case is produced and maintained by the institutions in which we describe it as expressed. Secondly, the situation necessarily involves a fundamental fiction which no agility of metaphysical analysis and no intensity of political life can finally expel. The people of England is taken to be present in Parliament, where it is plainly not present, and the decisions of Parliament are taken as its decisions, whereas there is plainly no guarantee that anyone outside the walls of Parliament has devoted a moment's thought to the question at issue at all.

I want to say a little more about these two points, which seem to me to be fundamental. If all that happens at a general election—and in whatever other activities there may be by which Parliament is constituted and maintained—is that feelings or thoughts or wishes or other vital phenomena already in being in the obscure masses of the population are recorded and brought to light, the result may be instructive and interesting. One can imagine, for instance, that it would be exceedingly helpful to a wise ruler with policies of his

own, who wished to pursue them in ways acceptable to the population committed to his charge. But the creation of a political authority, of a body or person authorized to take decisions on behalf of the population as a whole, would not be brought any nearer. The election would not be a contribution to government as such. Actually an election is a lively interchange, marked by give and take on both sides, between two disparate forces and activities. On the one side are governors and would-be governors with national policies which they recommend for acceptance; on the other side are the mass of the governed, willing to be governed, and choosing between these policies in the light of their needs and desires and of the pressure of daily circumstance upon them.

Consider the Parliamentary constituency, which is the basis of political organization on a national scale. Its normal size on a basis of equal single-member constituencies is arrived at easily by dividing the total number of adult inhabitants by some such number as 600, this being about the largest practicable number for an effective deliberative assembly. For Great Britain this gives a constituency of about 40,000 men and women. This group has only so much unity, cohesion, and corporate life as its legal function of returning a member to Parliament enables it to develop. No individual in it has more than a fraction of his attention to devote to political issues. The summons to record a vote comes at rare intervals, and takes most voters by surprise when it comes. Left to themselves, invited merely to record an opinion, these 40,000 voters, with insignificant exceptions, would be wholly at sea. Some few hopes or grievances or demands would agitate them vaguely; but, if these were stated, analysis would probably show that they largely cancelled one another out, and mostly rested on demonstrable errors of fact. But the voters are not left to themselves. Devoted and enterprising agents of organized groups of would-be governors clamour for their attention, besieging their eyes and ears day and night with explanations and promises, developing the germs provided by these chaotic hopes, fears, and wishes into something resembling a coherent plan of action. And these agents have in view the whole field of political action, not merely the portion of it in which they happen to be operating. They are essentially parliamentary groups, with programmes devised in view of parliamentary actualities and possibilities. They are therefore compelled to work on a national basis and to frame proposals which are likely to win as much support as possible in any and every constituency.

So far as this organized collision between the Parliamentary rulers and their faithful subjects is genuine and intense, so far it is bound to be fruitful. The Act of Parliament—and here I come back to the fiction of representation—the Act of Parliament is the act of *Parlia-*

ment, and expresses the will of Parliament, if it expresses any will. Ask a scientist, as Bishop Barnes invites us to ask a scientist about the wafer used in the Communion Service: he could give no other answer. But yet this will, like all will, is the child of desire, and the desires on which the deliberations of Parliament turn are not those merely of its members; they are rather those of the masses whom its members represent. It is true that the desires of the mass of citizens, or of groups among them, cannot be truly said to pass into will and action through Parliament by any genuine continuous process like that by which the desire of an individual becomes eventually the principle of his action. There is a break. The decision and the first step towards execution are freely taken by Parliament, and hence the element of fiction must always remain. It is true also that the desire and opinion to which Parliament appears to submit are evoked by the Parliament which submits to them. But if there is genuine contact between the voters and their representatives, it will be fruitful in providing material for the deliberations of Parliament; the constituencies will provide, to some extent at least, the matter to which Parliament gives political form. To the extent to which this happens, the fiction that the people is present in Parliament, and that the decisions of Parliament are its decisions, ceases to be a mere fiction. In regard to major issues, at least, the fiction may become merely the slight exaggeration of a fact.

The reason why I labour these points is this, that in my view the chief vice in arguments about democracy, both in those which defend and in those which decry it, is their tendency to proceed on the assumption that democracy involves complete passivity on the part of those invested with political authority. Any government, of course, has to govern, and in that aspect the most democratic authority will be expected to act forcibly on those committed to its charge. But there is a tendency to assume that if the government is genuinely and completely democratic, in such action on the governed it will be merely transmitting a force which it has received from them in their capacity of active citizens. Against such a view I argue that the activity of the citizen is not and cannot be a simple fact, existent in its own right; but that it is something requiring to be evoked, and that it cannot be evoked except by a correlative counter-activity on the part of the political authority, or of those who seek to have a share in it. Democracy depends on the fruitful collision of two forces, one being of the type of a responsible public official with a policy which he wishes to recommend, the other of the type of a private citizen with domestic and other interests which he wishes to safeguard and develop. Pure receptivity on the part of the constituted authority is so far from being the ideal of democracy that it is demonstrably unattainable in a body of any considerable

size, and clearly pernicious in any body small enough to make it possible.

If this contention is admitted and its significance fully appreciated, the chief practical effect would, I think, be an increased hesitation to adopt certain typically "democratic" constitutional devices, such as the election of officials by popular vote, proportional representation, the referendum and the initiative, the right of recalling the representative. I do not suggest that my argument has proved these devices to be pernicious. In its place any one of these devices may in fact be valuable. But I do claim that in the light of my argument most of the pleas put forward for these arrangements are shown to be, at the very least, inconclusive, because they fail to attend to the crucial problem of democratic government, that of transforming the chaotic impulses of masses of men and women into a coherent policy of common action. This problem is not peculiar to the representative system; it exists equally in organizations in which a direct democracy is aimed at. But increased numbers make it more difficult, and the interposition of the representative body makes it more visible.

IV

In conclusion, I come back to the representative and to the problem of his relation to the represented, which I stated at the outset. We saw that the orthodox view maintains the principle of free representation; it therefore excludes anything of the nature of binding instructions from the constituency to the representative, and it is very unsympathetic to proposals for giving constituencies the right to recall their representatives. On the other hand, in practice, Parliament tends increasingly to emphasize its dependence on public opinion, especially as expressed, or construed as expressed, at the polls. It does not claim absolute freedom; on the contrary, its organized groups "seek a mandate," as they often put it, for this or that; and a Government is nettled by the taunt that it has no mandate for a major legislative proposal. Mr. Baldwin in 1923 arranged a general election with a view to securing a mandate for fiscal protection. Despondent critics see in these practical developments a slippery slope, likely to end in full surrender of the principle of free representation: they fear a future in which the prestige and responsibility of Parliament will be destroyed because its members will have become the mere delegates and dependents of the electors.

Opinions on both sides are advanced with some heat, but it is often hard to be sure how far the difference is merely one of interpretation, and how far it is of practical significance. There was not in Burke's day in England, and there is not in our own day, any considerable body of opinion in favour of imposing legal restrictions on the

freedom of the representative. And if legal restrictions are excluded, the issue is apt to seem unreal. Hume's words, from an essay published in 1742, referring to a similar contemporary dispute, are very much to the point. "The present political controversy," he said, "with regard to instructions is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any decision, as it is managed by both parties. The country party pretend not that a member is absolutely bound to follow instructions, as an ambassador or general is confined by his orders, and that his vote is not to be received in the house, but so far as it is conformable to them. The court party again pretend not that the sentiments of the people ought to have no weight with every member, much less that he ought to despise the sentiments of those he represents. . . . And if their sentiments be of weight, why ought they not to express these sentiments? The question then is only concerning the degree of weight which ought to be placed on instructions." He goes on to say that this is a question which in the nature of the case cannot be settled precisely, and that in a national Parliament it is further complicated by the different importance of different localities. "Totness," as he puts it, ought not to have the same weight as London.

All this is true and to the point. And yet I feel that the issue, in the form in which we have inherited it, is a substantial one, an issue of practical importance, on which, just because fundamental questions of interpretation are involved, political theory should be capable of throwing light. I submit the following considerations:—

(1) The meaning of the term Representation has sometimes been appealed to as providing a conclusive argument for one side or the other. This it cannot do, for its necessary implication is only this: that the decisions of a small body, appointed by a great number of persons, are to be taken as equivalent to the decisions of that great number. A representative assembly is a select body which by a legal fiction stands for a whole community from which it is selected. The further implications of the term will be different in different contexts, varying according to the actual relations which obtain between the conduct of the representative body and the conduct and opinion of those whom it represents; but under the stress of the democratic demand the tendency is always for the representative body to recognize certain moral (not legal) limitations on its freedom of decision, and to claim at least a general harmony between the line of policy adopted by the representatives and the desires of the represented.

(2) While every form of government must rest ultimately on the consent of the governed, representative government is distinguished as asking for the express consent of the governed. Even if the voters were as inactive and unenterprising as the shareholders are in a

normally successful and prosperous limited company, of whom few attend to the policy of the directors at all, yet the political governing body could at least claim with a show of justice that in each periodical reappointment they receive authority to continue in the line that they have hitherto pursued. In fact, however, attempts are energetically made, largely by means of party groupings inside the representative body, at effecting more than this. Attempts are made to offer the electors a choice between rival developments of policy, and the actual policy adopted in the name of the community not only takes its general colour from the reception of this offer, but is also continuously influenced by contemporary evidence as to the attitude of the electors to the detail of the programme as it works itself out.

(3) Such a relation between the representative body and the represented does not, as we have seen, imply passivity on the part of that body. However receptive Parliament is to the desires and complaints of the citizens, the responsibility remains with it to formulate a national policy relative to these. The private citizen may and should criticize the adequacy of the policy to the situation, but can only do so from outside, as an irresponsible layman or outsider. To such criticism, again, the representative body is sensitive. Of this also it must take account; but it is not called on to surrender at discretion. It has to face its own responsibility and rely on its own wisdom. In the last resort the public will in good time have a legal opportunity of making their resentment effective and reversing the direction of policy.

(4) Though some writers, especially in France, seem to think it possible to assert a general dependence of Parliament on public opinion, while denying any similar dependence of members of Parliament on the public opinion of their constituencies, this combination does not seem to me to represent a workable or durable political convention. A Parliament is a representative body in which every member is himself a representative, and the inevitable tendency is to construe representative in the two cases, so far as possible, in identical terms. The identity clearly can only be partial; for while it is indubitable that Parliament has the right to decide for the nation, it is far from clear that the member of Parliament has in the same sense the right to decide for the constituency. Parliament is a deliberative body which discusses before deciding, and its work would be stultified if its decisions were merely the registration of a number of separate decisions already taken in the constituencies. Any claim by the constituency to give its representative binding instructions is a claim to decide the national issue to the extent of its fractional power. Such a claim is proved illegitimate by the simple fact that the constituency cannot hear the voices of the other constituencies.

These considerations justify the exclusion of the imperative mandate; but it is a question whether the imperative mandate should not also be excluded in considering the proper relation of Parliament as a whole to the nation generally; and in any case they do not justify us in rejecting roundly all dependence of members on their constituencies.

(5) Allowing for this fact that Parliament decides, while the member of Parliament is merely a contributor to the decision, I should argue that the representative rôle of the member is in principle the same as the representative rôle of Parliament. For him, as for it, representation does not mean the mere expression of something already existing. What he brings to London is not a certified replica of his portion of the provinces. He went to the constituency as a responsible official, seeking support for a policy in which he believed, and to which in general he was already committed. It was not his policy alone, but that of a Parliamentary group to which he belonged. His contacts with the constituency should be productive on both sides: for the voters, in transforming sporadic desires, projects, and grievances into widely accepted plans of action; for the member, in suggestions for detailed modifications and extensions of the proposed policy, and for the relative emphasis and urgency of its several items. In his constituency the member proves his representative character by seeking the fullest contact with it and evoking the maximum activity from it, by patience in listening to all sections of opinion, and ingenuity in devising means of satisfying them. In Parliament he proves it, by making the most of the fiction that in his person the constituency is present, by placing the material he has there collected at the disposal of the national council, together with his suggestions as to the best way of dealing with it. He may voice his constituents' desires, though he does not vote at their order.

(6) The proper fulfilment of this rôle by the individual members, as by Parliament generally, requires, I believe, a high degree of legal freedom. General elections at intervals of one year would, for example, be fatal to its proper discharge. The interval must be sufficient to give a policy a chance of working itself out in some detail, but also not so great that the country feels impotent against a majority in Parliament and goes to sleep between elections. Provision for elections at maximum intervals of three to five years is in these circumstances the natural provision, on which most modern constitutions agree. England is probably wise in refusing to qualify the freedom of Parliament and its members by providing for the referendum or the recall, or for dissolution of Parliament on popular petition. But in giving the voter only the right of declaring a preference as between candidates once in five years, or possibly rather more often, English

practice gives the citizen more restricted opportunities of overt action than any modern constitution, even that of France, gives him. France at least guarantees an election once in four years.

(7) This legal freedom is necessary as the formal declaration of the full responsibility of Parliament and its members for national decisions. In accepting limitations on the use of this freedom, as by the mandate doctrine discussed earlier, Parliament does not and cannot divest itself of its responsibility. Limitations of this kind the individual member accepts in two main forms. First, there are the pledges he has himself given at the time of his election, which form, as it were, in his mind the terms of his appointment. Secondly, there are the influences which reach him during his membership of Parliament and his reactions to them, out of which occasionally new or qualifying obligations arise. Of these two kinds of commitment the former, the electoral pledge, is far the more prominent and familiar. Its nature has been a good deal discussed, and critics have often pointed out its dangers. J. S. Mill, as a candidate for Parliament, refused to give any pledge, except to follow generally the policy of which he submitted an outline. This may be an impracticably heroic course of action, but it seems to be correct in principle. When the interest in proceedings in Parliament is genuine and widespread, contemporary influences giving rise to obligations of the second type tend to encroach upon, and even at times to overshadow, those arising from the electoral pledge. And this is probably a development to be welcomed. For though it is clearly necessary that a politician shall declare in advance the line of policy which he proposes to follow, and though it is right that he should regard himself as morally bound to act in the sense of that declaration, it is also essential that Parliament should preserve its freedom to deal with emergencies as they arise. The principle of democracy refutes itself if it asks Parliament to act with reference to the situation as it was at the time of the last election, and not as it is to-day; and representation refutes itself, if it excludes all influence on government policy except what can be forced through the narrow passage of the ballot-box.

Finally, in answer to those who object to representation in principle, or who, like Mr. Cole, see a fundamental vice in general political representation, I would say this. I would ask them whether they are not forcing on to the word some predetermined meaning and then condemning the facts because they do not conform to this. Representation is a political device, and the main evidence for what it can do is what it does. We have no business to force an analogy with artistic representation, and on that ground claim that its essential aim and test must be the degree of resemblance between the representative and the represented bodies. Equally groundless is the appeal to map-making or cartographical representation, which

assures us that the House of Commons is intended to be a map of the country on the scale 1 : 40,000. Mr. Cole's argument seems to rest on some such unavowed preconception of the meaning of the term. "To represent me" means only in this connection "to take political decisions with my express authorization on my behalf," with the further complications that I am only a fractional part of the represented, that he is only a fractional part of that which decides, and that the overriding problem, to which all else is or should be subordinated, is the problem of creating by means of such authorization a democratic political authority, strong and flexible, and infinitely responsive to the hopes and fears of those subject to it. It is no doubt arguable that the responsibilities of Parliaments are too wide, that some subdivision may be advisable; but I cannot see that experience justifies the assertion that representation is in fact more effective in organizations, such as Trade Unions, in which common concerns are more narrowly limited. In any case there must be some ultimate power of decision in any community which has to operate on the widest possible reference; and a Parliament of representatives elected on a geographical basis is in this present age the generally accepted device for constituting such a power. The nature and purpose of this device has been my subject in this paper. I do not claim that it is the last word of human wisdom; only that there is nothing impossible in its aims and nothing unsound in its conception, if these are properly understood.

INTERACTION AND COSMIC STRUCTURE

PROFESSOR JOHN E. BOODIN

IT is a momentous venture to attempt to frame an hypothesis of the universe. But if we reflect upon the meaning of life, we are forced to make such an effort. The only way we can escape the responsibility is to be guilty of the great refusal—the refusal to think. If we frame an hypothesis, it should be such as to assign the proper significance to all the facts of human experience—not merely the physical facts, but the biological and mental as well; not merely our scientific interests, but our æsthetic, ethical, and religious interests as well. And it should do so in the simplest possible way. It would be futile and impossible to examine all possible solutions. Henri Poincaré proved long ago that if there is one explanation of a class of phenomena, there are an infinite number of explanations. We must follow the example of science and work out from the significant efforts in the past. We must try to discover the hypothesis which is most probable. In general we may say that the theories of the universe fall under two fundamental types. One type starts with the assumption that the world is a shifting heap of elements, which arrange themselves by external relations. This type of theory denies any guiding whole, whether in the small or in the large. The opposite type of theory presupposes that the events in the universe are guided by form or pattern. In a broad sense it assumes that the universe is in some sense organic, *i.e.*, that the activities of the parts have reference to one another and to the whole in such a way as to supplement one another and to promote the continuity and harmony of the whole.

We may assume the doctrine of evolution "in the broader sense of the continuity of the physical universe throughout all time, and the orderliness of the processes of change which go on unceasingly. Every physical unit which we recognize in nature—electrons, atoms, crystals, cells, stars, galaxies—has at some time come into existence, and at some time in the future will pass out of existence; and furthermore, the manner of their coming and going is quite orderly, and, within certain limits, is even predictable." [1] But we must keep in mind that nature is not just one evolution "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, with the corresponding dissipation of motion," as Herbert Spencer conceived it, and as it has been the custom to conceive it. Even S. Alexander, in his *Space, Time, and Deity*, thinks

[1] Professor W. D. MacMillan in *A Debate on Relativity*, Open Court, 1927, p. 118.

of evolution as one process, where everything, including Deity, emerges from an original matrix of Space-Time. Alexander's God is an earth-born God. To conceive of evolution as one process is to think of it as a finite drama, where the curtain is rung up on an original distribution of elements—however they be conceived—and is rung down with the dissipation of the available energy. This leaves the beginning and the end in the dark. Evolution as science conceives it, on the basis of the available facts, is multiple. There are an indefinite number of cosmic histories at various stages of integration. In some way these histories must sustain a give-and-take relation to one another, so that the available energy is kept constant. For we do not conceive of the cosmos as running down, though we know that individual parts run down. The cosmos must be conceived, not merely as a dynamic equilibrium, but as a living equilibrium of such structure or "curvature" that the loss of available energy in one part is compensated for by an equal increase elsewhere. This conception of equilibrium must apply to the organization of energy as well as its intensity. Energy apart from organization is an abstraction. There is not then just *one* evolution, but an indefinite number of local evolutions, with compensations amongst them. This is implied in our conception of the universe as a going concern.

The real question then is not, What does evolution in general mean? The cosmos, as a whole, does not evolve. The question is, What does local evolution mean? And the local evolution of which we are a part, viz. the evolution of our earth, has naturally a special interest for us. The theory of "strict emergence" holds that new forms, characteristics, events, arise from a state of affairs in which these novelties did not exist; and this happens without any guidance whatsoever, immanent or transcendent. According to the probability of chance, if you shuffle certain elements, any combination can occur in infinite time. To be sure, science does not allow infinite time for the cycles which it studies. On the contrary, evolution in any one cycle, including an astronomical cycle, takes place in a finite and calculable time. But the emergenist points to the fact that the configurations in question, with their novel characteristics, have occurred. On our earth such configurations as possess the characteristics of life and mind do exist. All we need to do is to examine what sort of configurations give rise to such properties as life and mind. In this respect emergence is merely descriptive. It must be owned that if we take a local point of view, the history of our earth, the theory looks plausible, but it is not possible, I think, to account for the order of emergence on the basis of accident.

The theory of emergence need not commit itself to any special conception of world-stuff. It may, like W. K. Clifford, start with mind-stuff. It may assume with Haeckel that the simplest matter is

endowed with soul. But the emergence theory now in vogue calls itself "materialistic emergence," which means that everything emerges from "configurations of matter." This theory owes its precision to the fact that it assumes the nineteenth-century conception of matter and mechanism. Just now it would not be so easy to say what is meant by matter and configurations of matter. It is certain at any rate that the billiard-ball model of the seventeenth century is no longer applicable. "It is absurd to speak of a mechanical explanation of life and thought when we have found ourselves in such difficulties that we no longer know what we should mean by a mechanical explanation of phenomena not involving life."[1] But, as Hegel with great sagacity observed, when philosophers arrive on the scene, the owl of Minerva has taken its flight.

We may say that "materialistic emergence" owes its plausibility to the fact that it is built on an antiquated science. The conception of the world which is implied in the science of to-day gives the lie to the idea that the world as it is can be accounted for on the probability of chance. On the contrary, it makes necessary the conception of *cosmic control* or *cosmic structure*. The quantum of radiant energy is absolutely measured. The electron carries a constant charge throughout the cosmos. The shifting of an electron from one energy level to another is constant for the various elements. Hence the identity of the spectra of the various elements wherever observed. The organization of matter is the same everywhere. The atoms have the same patterns and fall into the same natural order everywhere, when the conditions permit. The only difference (aside from mass) between our earth and the sun, and between our sun and other stars, is a difference in temperature, permitting the organizing process to take place. Matter, moreover, has no privileged character. Matter and the patterns and laws of matter emerge in the various local histories. But there is correspondence amongst emergent histories, and such universal correspondence cannot be accounted for on the probability of chance. The postulate of the uniformity of nature may be predicated throughout, from nebulæ to the most advanced types of organization, such as human intelligence. Any *ad hoc* hypothesis which violates the law of the uniformity of nature must be treated as suspect. But the uniformity of nature is possible only because of a universal cosmic control. Moreover, if the stages of nature, which we are able to observe, are universal, we are justified in holding that this uniformity of nature holds for evolution at all the stages, though we must allow for variations due to local conditions.

Our information in regard to the structure of nature outside our earth is scanty enough. We have established the law of the uniformity of nature only within the realm of inorganic matter. We have no

[1] Professor R. D. Carmichael in *A Debate on Relativity*, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

direct evidence of the appearance of life outside our earth, unless it be on Mars. But the implications of the evidence, which we do possess, are far-reaching. The universality of the structure of matter, within the limits of our scientific observation, shows that the cosmic control which we must postulate operates as mathematical genius. This means that the laws of logic hold for our entire universe. The human intellect is at home in nature. "Even inorganic matter," to quote Trystan Edwards, an artist, "is everywhere subject to the laws of logic which are essentially intellectual." Moreover, the architecture of nature is such as to give æsthetic satisfaction. The principles of æsthetics, whatever they are, may be said to be universal. Cosmic control operates not only as mathematical genius, but as æsthetic genius. A scientific hypothesis, to be acceptable, must satisfy not only the demands of convenience, but our æsthetic demands as well. Art has its claims as well as logic, and indeed possesses a logic of its own. While the human mind is a local emergence, it finds that its structure is universal, *i.e.*, it applies not only locally but everywhere. This is no accident. The emergence of mind locally is due to temperature conditions, but its relevance is universal. Hence we must conclude that it owes its character to cosmic genius. We are justified, I think, on the basis of present science in ruling out emergence by accident, *i.e.*, without cosmic guidance, as impossible. The uniformity of the constituents of matter and of the structure of matter could not result on the probability of chance.

If we assume *guidance* in the evolutionary process, we must try to see how this guidance operates. We need not here consider fiat creation, such as has been attributed by theologians to the first chapter of Genesis, since such an hypothesis cannot be regarded by philosophers as a living option. There are two types of hypothesis of interest to us—one is that of preformation, and the other that of creation by interaction. Strict preformation means that the structure of a process in its actuality, as Aristotle would say, *i.e.*, in its complete stage, must be present somehow in the process from the beginning, in order to guide the development towards the observed outcome. Preformation, like emergence, takes a local view. It fastens its attention on the particular history and holds that the form or structure of the final stage must have been immanent throughout the history. The philosohper, who is usually regarded as the author of the hypothesis, had in mind exclusively embryology. For Aristotle, species are eternal. Evolution, therefore, means individual genesis or ontogeny. Even here individual characteristics emerge in the process. It is the formative impulse which is present from the beginning. Aristotle is not a strict preformationist even in embryology. Hans Driesch has tried recently to revive the Aristotelian conception by holding that we must assume an entelechy as

guiding the genesis of the embryo. Driesch, like Aristotle, limits the hypothesis to embryology. He is no clearer than Aristotle as to how the individual entelechy originates, though of course in some way it has reference to heredity. Preformation, as a special scientific hypothesis, must be fought out in the realm of science. We are interested in the emergence of structure. This means the relation of the emergence of structure in the individual to evolution generally, not merely the origin of species and other structural characteristics of life, but the emergence of life from matter and the emergence of matter itself as we know it.

Is it possible that the whole evolution of life, with its branching and radiations and its progressive manifestation of structure, is latent in the first life-compounds, and not only in these but also in inorganic matter back to its conditions? The Stoics were the only consistent preformationists in ancient times. The seeds or germinal reasons are latent from cycle to cycle, when everything returns to fire and emerges from fire again. But they do not show how the seeds could be latent. Leibnitz in modern times developed a thoroughgoing preformism both in cosmology and embryology. But in cosmology he required a *deus ex machina* to make his theory possible; and in embryology the microscope has refuted the presence of a homunculus or miniature man in the early stages of embryological history. A recent vitalist, Henry Bergson, has unintentionally, I think, offered a suggestion of universal preformation: "Life," he says, "does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division."[1] Everything is thus present in the original vital impulse. It is like a rocket shot up in the air, which, owing to the resistance of matter, splits up into its manifold inherent impulses, thus giving us the display we see. But matter for Bergson is not real. It is the mere downward trend of life. Reality is fundamentally life and consciousness. Bergson, however, has not seemed to see the implication of his theory of dissociation, or he would have seen its inconsistence with his idea of evolution as creative synthesis. The solution is probably to be found in his pantheism. In a later statement he professes " the idea of a God, creator, and free; the generator at once of matter and of life, whose creative efforts as regards life are continued through the evolution of species and the constitution of human personalities."[2] Bergson has not yet shown us how he would account for evolution on this basis. What is the relation of God to the evolutionary process? Does God emerge? If so, the theory has all the difficulties of the theories of materialistic emergence. No guidance is provided. If God is eternal, what is his relation

[1] *Creative Evolution*, p. 89.

[2] Letter from H. Bergson, in the *Nation* (London), January 4, 1913. Quoted by Sir Francis Younghusband in his beautiful book, *Life in the Stars*.

to evolution? It was easy for Hegel to say that the absolute is present in the beginning, wherever you begin, because reality is fundamentally a system of dialectical implication, and hence eternal. But that does not account for evolution.

We may say, I think, that there is not at present a theory of strict universal preformation, *i.e.*, a theory attempting to account for real evolution from nebula to man on the basis of a structure latent somehow in the process from the beginning and only waiting to be called forth under specific conditions. Even if we could conceive of such preformation in individual histories, we should still have to account for the intersupplementation of such histories into a cosmos. Leibnitz, who did conceive of reality as made up of an infinite number of preformed individual histories (every history having its own entelechy or inner principle of development), was obliged to add the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony to account for the correspondence of these histories. God, like a clock-maker, constructed the monads so that they would run in unison. But such an appeal to God to make good our failure in scientific theory is out of fashion now.

The theory, which I have advocated, is that of creation through interaction under cosmic control. I view the cosmos as a sort of superorganism. The conception of reality as an organic whole is not new. It was advanced by Plato in a mythological fashion in the *Timæus*, and in a simpler and more dogmatic way in the tenth book of the *Laws*. It was stated by Aristotle in terms of a teleological hierarchy, which is also an astronomical hierarchy, in which God is the supreme and final cause. Aristotle's cosmological scheme was revived in scholasticism and formed the framework of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, but its astronomy has given place to the Copernican theory, and its rigid hierarchy of forms has melted into Darwin's origin of species. It does not meet the demands of the epoch of evolution. In modern idealism the essential wholeness of reality has indeed been emphasized. But the wholeness contemplated is that of an eternal, inclusive psychological ego. Modern idealism has been afflicted with psychologitis, and in spite of its great contribution to the interpretation of human institutions, has failed to connect with the main current of modern thought. We cannot banish the galaxies of stars and their space-time relations by retreating within our own subjective world and declaring matter, time and space to be mere appearances. So far as I know, I am the first one to try to state the meaning of an organic whole in terms of modern science.[1] No day-dreaming can undo the fact that we have emerged in the history of

[1] Paper on "Cosmic Evolution" read before the Aristotelian Society, March 7, 1921, and republished as Chapter I, *Cosmic Evolution*, Macmillan, 1925.

the earth, which in turn is part of the sun, which in turn is a member in one of multitudinous galaxies of stars. If we are to understand the meaning of our existence, we must understand it in terms of the whole of which we are a part. And if reality is an organic whole, the unity involved must be as wide as the galaxies of stars; and it must show the interrelation of the multitudinous cosmic histories, in one of which our life figures.

An organic whole requires both a control—a genius of the whole—and interacting parts. To illustrate an organic whole, we may use the human organism as a type. In the human organism we have a hierarchical organization of levels of control in which the lower levels are subject within limits to a dominant control. Through this control the parts of the organism are regulated so as to serve one another and the whole. This wholeness of the organism is made possible by the interaction of the parts under the guidance of the dominant control. This interaction is effected through two kinds of "messengers" or energy patterns—neural patterns and chemical patterns—which carry determining influences from part to part. That neural currents communicate patterns of behaviour to the various parts of the organism has been known for some time. Chemical patterns are carried by the hormones, probably through the blood, to regulate the growth and stimulate the energies of parts consistently with the life of the whole. But a human being is not merely a physiological organism. It is an organism endowed with mind. Its actions are in part meaningful or purposive, not merely mechanical. This means a whole-control by mind. The development of mind in turn involves a milieu of social relations—the interstimulation of individuals by means of language and other signs. The environment of mind is a social organism. Within this there is an overlapping of generations, so that the new generation may develop its life under the nurture of older generations. This is admirably provided for in the family. There is also the contact of various cultural groups with their varying advance and varying quality of culture. In human life, therefore, there is a level of spiritual control as well as various levels of organic control. And this spiritual control is made possible by the communication of energy patterns—determinate social influences to which the individual responds. The response, in the case of interaction on any level, depends not merely upon the character of the stimulus which is communicated, but also upon the organization and plasticity of the responding individual. The response is a synthesis of the communicated influence and the character of the responding individual. The control in society consists partly of the consolidated structure of custom, but also involves, at a higher level, the criticism of the social sanctions in the light of reason. The relation of the individual to society is not a

closed control, but is open through reason to revision from a broader relation to the genius of universe.

Now let us think of this vast starry world as a superorganism of some sort, with a dominant control and with the interrelation of parts by means of interaction. The interstimulation from part to part, in the cosmic, as within the physiological and social organism, must be by means of energy patterns carrying determinate influences from part to part. These determining influences have to do with all the levels—material, vital, mental, spiritual. So far as the universe is one, it must be one by such intercommunication. Every part sends out characteristic impulses to the other parts in space under the control of the whole, and no influence is really lost, though the motion at the other end is determined in part by the state of affairs at that end. Thus, while the correspondence between the various cosmic histories seems absolute on the level of atoms, the correspondence must become more generic and variant as the degrees of freedom increase. This we find illustrated in the more complex reactions on our earth, and especially in human interactions. I am taking for granted that, when energy is communicated from part to part of the cosmos, it is not just energy in general that is communicated—this is meaningless—but that characteristic or patterned energies are somehow communicated. The energies we are able to observe from other parts of the cosmos are specific types of material energy or of radiant energy. And within the earth-field of communication we know that the communication of energy is always the communication of patterned energy, whether in material or spiritual communication. This I have already shown to be the case in the human organism and in society. So spiritual patterns, as well as material patterns, are broadcasted over the ether and contribute to the steering of things in space-time.

We must get over the false notion that unless we are cognitively conscious of the communicated patterns they cannot be real. Neural messengers and chemical messengers do their work whether we know it or not. It is not long that we have known of neural messengers, and it is only within a few years that we have known of the existence of chemical messengers. Within the psychological realm suggestion may operate all the more effectively when we are not attending to the stimulus. Moreover, since spiritual influences are energies, they must produce effects in the steering of matter even though there is no organization to respond to them in kind. The patterned impulse of sound has a characteristic effect on matter, even though there be no one to understand its meaning. As it is by hearing good music that one becomes musical, so it is by responding to stimuli of a higher level that a lower level eventually becomes tuned to them. As it is through the influence of air-waves that the organism is

brought to construct an ear, by means of which we may respond by *hearing sound* instead of merely getting its electrical impact, so one part of the cosmos is stimulated to advance by the influence of other parts upon it, though it cannot become conscious of these influences in kind until the proper organization has been perfected for the specific response. And even then we may not be intellectually conscious. For intellectual communication a common medium of signs is necessary.

All this may sound like poetry. But conceptions need not be less true because they are poetical. I challenge any one to form a conception of the universe as an organic whole in any other manner than I have stated. Cosmic control there is, and it must operate through the interaction of parts. In the part of the world of which we know most, cosmic genius is mediated by the interaction of parts—in chemical synthesis, in the origin of a new individual, in the cultural development of individuals. I believe that this is the way in which development is mediated in the life histories of stars and of galaxies of stars. And here, too, as in the earthly relations, the response is due to the character and initiative of the responding agent as well as to the stimulus.

The possibility of distant parts influencing one another has been made clearer to us through the quantum theory. The radiations sent out by means of matter over the ether are communicated as quanta or constant finite pulses of energy. They act as the same quanta over any distance when there is no interference. The number of quanta depends upon the wave-length, or rather constitutes the wave-length. Each individual impulse, when it strikes matter elsewhere, exerts its original force. A particular impulse of soul may occur at a distance of a million light years, and yet exert its energy undiminished when it strikes matter in any stage of organization elsewhere. We have no idea of the penetrative character of mental radiations. We do know that the power of a mental impulse in social communication is not affected by the sense medium. If it passes the threshold of sense at all, it effects its characteristic results. Good news or bad news has its characteristic effect, though the sound be weak. We do not know the effect upon our mood and attitude of all the spiritual influences which we do not sense. Here lies the real power of the Weltgeist. In the curvature of cosmic space no influence is dissipated. The quality as well as the quantity of energy is conserved. This is what the law of conservation of energy means in the last analysis.

What is the nature of the whole-control? May it not be merely the automatic result of interaction? Of late great emphasis has been placed upon the function of the ductless glands, especially the pituitary and thyroid glands, in regulating the growth, proportions,

and tone of the organism. It has been assumed that the secretions of these glands furnish a sufficient explanation. But the growth, proportion, and health of the organism cannot be merely the result of the automatic interstimulation from part to part within the organism. There must be a control by the whole which regulates the production of glands with their secretions and their rôle in the whole. Else how can the glands know how to grow, what amount of secretion to send out and where to send it? In the material universe there must be a control which determines the size of the quantum of radiant energy, the charge of the electron, the organization of electrons into atoms, of atoms into molecules, of molecules into crystals. The whole cosmic situation with its dominant pattern is a factor, though ordinarily a neglected factor, in every transaction. There must be the genius of the whole in all creative synthesis. In our attempt to comprehend nature, this genius must be conceived as mathematical and æsthetic. The history of science shows that the hypotheses, which are most effective pragmatically in the prediction and control of nature, are also the most beautiful.

The hypotheses of cosmic control and of compensatory interactions between the parts do not conflict, but on the contrary imply and supplement one another. We cannot account for the constituent elements of nature or their structure without assuming cosmic control, nor can we account for the behaviour of nature without assuming a plurality of individuals. On the level of matter it is the electro-magnetic field which proximately determines the constancy of the electric charge, and also prescribes the levels at which an electron can appear. These levels are statable as integral numbers. But we cannot predict absolutely at what level the electron shall appear, though it must appear at one of the levels prescribed by the field. It is clear that there is both determinacy and indeterminacy in nature—a certain determinacy of structure and a certain indeterminacy of individual "preference." This duality of determinacy and indeterminacy holds throughout nature. There is a determinate pattern of relations according to which we must live if we want to live healthfully and efficiently. But we need not obey this pattern even when we know it. We cannot say that nature is indeterministic microscopically (*i.e.*, on the primary levels of nature) and deterministic macroscopically (*i.e.*, on the complex levels of nature). This misconception has arisen from the fact that macroscopically we deal with nature by the method of statistical averages, as we do in insurance tables. But statistical averages are not normes of nature. They are merely conveniences for dealing with large numbers where we cannot follow the individual transations.

We may think of the cosmos as a hierarchy of fields. We are familiar with such a hierarchy in the human organism. There are the fields

of the lower centres of the nervous system; there are also the cerebral fields and the psychological fields. The cerebral fields give definiteness and organization to the lower neural fields, as we see in the difference between precise and quantitative reactions when the cerebrum is in control and the indefinite all-or-none reactions when the cerebrum fails. The cerebrum with its habits in turn is controlled by dominant interests which give direction and purpose to our activity as contrasted with the chaotic reveries when psychological control is weak. In the cosmos we must suppose a far greater range of fields—electromagnetic fields, gravitational fields, chemical fields, organic fields, psychological fields—and over and above them all the supreme spiritual field, which prescribes the architecture of all the subordinate fields—each with its variant individual factors. The measure and structure, which we find in matter, is not due to matter alone. Matter, by itself, would be as chaotic as the old mechanistic theories pictured it. But it is no longer possible to picture the material world as a world of chance. It is a work of genius. We must not, however, make the ridiculous mistake of looking for this genius in the amorphous background of nature, call it ether or what you like. The genius of nature must not be sought in its raw material. It is somehow akin to the spiritual activity, which we know as creative genius in man, but vastly nobler. The beauty of matter and the beauty of art are intimations of its activity, but it is beyond these—ever and everywhere present in activity and essence to create and to heal, but passing in quality all that is created.

God is the spirit of the whole, which, in the words of Clement of Alexandria, "gives spiritual tone to the universe." For moral and religious purposes we need a cosmic Presence which answers our craving for companionship and communion. This the æsthetic conception of Aristotle did not do, and therefore it must be redefined to meet the aching need of the human heart. The God we discover as cosmic control, as mathematical and æsthetic genius, is also a God to whom we can pray and whom we can worship. He must be capable of giving love for love, and be willing to pity and pardon our failure. No other idea of God will serve. A universe, which meets our intellectual demands, shall not fail us in meeting our moral and religious demands. We must remember, however, that this organic conception of the universe places a momentous responsibility upon us for the influences we send out. Even now, by sending out noble impulses, I may help to save a soul somewhere in the Orion—not to mention someone nearer.

DEFINITION OF VALUE

H. OSBORNE, M.A.

ANY attempt to construct a philosophy of Value must presuppose some general understanding of what Value is. And so it might seem natural to begin with a precise definition of the concept we are about to investigate. What, we might ask ourselves, is the characteristic peculiar to all those situations in the description of which we are accustomed to use the word "value" or its cognate terms, and distinguishing them as a class from all those situations to which we do not apply the word? Proceeding empirically in this way, from an inspection of the "field of application" of the *word* "value" we might reasonably hope to discover a "highest common factor" of all the data, which would be the required definition of the *concept* "Value." But we should be met at the outset by radical differences of opinion about the scope of the relevant data. Some writers have thought that there is no state of affairs that may not under appropriate circumstances acquire value, or even that there is no state of affairs that is ever entirely neutral in respect of value. Others have held that only states or qualities of human persons, or concrete situations containing such states as constituents, can be appropriately assigned an index of value. And there are wellnigh innumerable stages of opinion ranging between these extremes. All such delimitations of the field of application of "value" presuppose a specific definition of the concept Value, because it is impossible to discuss where any word may, and where it may not, be appropriately applied, except on the basis of antecedent agreement as to its connotation. The only alternative would be to accept *every* application which "value" has in everyday and non-philosophical language.

In operation, therefore, the empirical method will at once lead us into a dilemma. Either we must distinguish among the actual uses of "value" as right or wrong, philosophically appropriate or inappropriate—and that is to abandon empiricism; or, if no discrimination is made, our study will be purely philological. And in the case of a word which has come into accepted use in so many and various contexts—from mathematics and logic on the one hand, to religion, art and economics, on the other—any common content that may be discovered would be likely to prove so general and abstract as to be quite useless to the philosopher. The more varied the denotation of a word, the poorer will be its connotation. Since its introduction into philosophy by Plato, the method of verbal definition by the inspection

of concrete instances has been invaluable for the illumination of unrecognized differences of opinion, and quite barren of constructive results.

Philosophers have therefore been forced to adopt a compromise between arbitrary selection among the data and loyalty to the empirical method at the expense of insignificance in the result. Mr. Perry[1] has expressly defined the purpose of a "General Theory of Value" to consist in the identification of a common principle underlying all special spheres of value. By this means the social sciences, theory of knowledge, æsthetics, philosophy of religion, together with the particular "values" of everyday life and social intercourse, are to be "unified and distinguished." His general concept is "biological interest." But Mr. Perry has limited his "field of application" to objects standing in direct relation to animal or human "interest." He makes no mention of the uses of the word "value" in mathematics, logic, chemistry, or that relation between *any* two existents called by J. Laird (after Francis Bacon) "natural election," or Professor Whitehead's "prehension." Thus his definition is really latent in the selectivity of his data. Meinong,[2] again, has attempted a philological classification of the applications of "value," in which he includes its mathematical sense. But the intellectual contortions by which he extracts therefrom a common underlying notion are more interesting as a philosophic curiosity than as a genuine contribution to knowledge—as, indeed, he himself implicitly admits, by his immediate return to a more concrete conception of Value. And finally, the "experimental method" (*i.e.* the word-test) was introduced into the philosophy of Value from experimental psychology by Th. Haering.[3] It is superficially obvious that the psychological definition of Value which he professes to have proved experimentally depends either upon his own subconscious assumption of that definition in arranging his tests, or upon the uncritical verbal habits of his subjects, or upon a combination of these factors. It is impossible to prove any philosophical doctrine experimentally; and in this case no more could be proved than that "value" is widely co-ordinated with interest, desire, pleasure, etc.—which no philosopher would wish to deny. It is bad science and bad philosophy to hold an experiment valid of negative results, unless it could also have shown positive results.

And a further and more serious danger attends the empirical method of definition in the case of anything known to exist at different levels, or in a variety of forms which are admitted to

[1] *General Theory of Value.*

[2] *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie,* 1923.

[3] *Untersuchungen zur Psychologie der Wertung* (*Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie,* 1913); cf. W. Gruehne, *Neuere Untersuchungen zum Wertproblem.*

constitute a hierarchy. For we are necessarily driven to define in terms of the lowest and most rudimentary grade, and a formula which will fit *all* instances must preclude any principle that might enable us to interpret and understand the higher grades. Mr. Perry, endeavouring by universality to avoid the sin of arbitrariness, has given his consent to a biological definition of Value. Having therefore adopted and established this definition on the grounds of generality of application, and yet being unwilling simply to reduce the "higher" values such as those presented in religion, æsthetics, or social obligation to physiological attraction and repulse, he is condemned by the strict logic of his position to a stupendous camouflage. For the simple and universal principle of biological reaction can "explain" none of the more complicated activities of human personality except by reducing them to complications of biological response; it cannot generate a new principle or give birth to a new grade of reality. In the preliminary account of the scope of his work Mr. Perry writes: "It would be the task of such a theory of value first to bring to light the underlying principle common to these sciences [*scil.* the sciences of the special fields of value], and then to employ this principle for the purpose of arbitrating between them." Such a profession naïvely foreshadows the fundamental inconsistency of his method. A "minimum definition" can neither sufficiently describe nor arbitrate between the members of an hierarchy, and a common principle cannot be a principle of discrimination. Hence the levelling tendency of those "naturalistic" theories of Value which start from below.

The preliminary problem in Philosophy of Value is, then, to discover agreement about its subject-matter, and not, as has been thought, to circumscribe and define a concept about the locus and function of which all are agreed. In so far as definitions of value are arbitrary and dissimilar, Theories of Value are concerned with different things, and their only source of contact is the common use of one set of terms to which they severally ascribe different meanings. Argument between theories thus initially separated cannot advance beyond persuasion, and discussion becomes objurgation. From the habitual presumption that the use of a common set of terms implies a common content of ideas—the confusion of verbal with conceptual definition—derives in large part the "trostlos Bild"[1] of Value-philosophy to-day.

A glance at some of the scattered definitions and epitaphs upon Value and values will amply illustrate the maelstrom of current theories. The science of Value, we are told by the more conservative, embraces, while at some points extending, the field of traditional

[1] The phrase is used by W. Strich, *Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart.*

Ethics.[1] "Value" is synonymous with "good and evil," and to be preferred because of its freedom from the theological and transcendental implications of those words in the older philosophy.[2] More broadly, values are ideals; and the Absolute Values are the Absolute Ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.[3] From ideal, the definitions advance along the path of generality to "purpose," and thence to that vague and vagrant word "meaning." With more definiteness we get a group of "psychological" definitions. Value is "satisfaction," "enjoyment," an "attitude taken up towards an object which is valued." Whole theories have been built up upon the definition of Value as the property of "being an object for feeling, or conation, or affective and conational disposition." Distinct from such individualistic conceptions is the group of "social" definitions, falling roughly into two sub-classes: either, Value is the object for socially approved ideals or purposes; or, it is conduciveness to the prosperity of society. Intellectually entirely unrelated to the foregoing are the metaphysical definitions such as Whitehead's, which conceive Value to be the concreteness of sensible as opposed to conceptual existence. And finally, the Realists think Value to be undefinable and unanalysable—a simple and intrinsic quality of things.

And confusion is worse confounded by a laxity of language such as must long ago have been held up to public shame for an intolerable scandal in any other branch of science or learning. With the bewildering virtuosity of a conjuring trick, "Value," "values," "spheres of value," and the rest, undergo in each single writer successive metamorphoses of meaning, from adjective to substantive, from substantive to relation, and from relation through mental activity back to adjective.

We hear of "natural values" and of "Ideal Values," although I am unaware that anyone has yet advanced a principle of discrimination by which they could be contrasted as species without being isolated as unrelated genera. The plural, "values," must denote indiscriminately subordinated species of the summum genus "Value," differentiated groups of objects which are severally asserted to possess Value, or particular "bearers of value." We are not told whether economic values, religious values, truth values, social values, etc., refer to sections of Reality in which the same general property

[1] Sorley, "The Philosophical Attitude" (*Int. Journ. Eth.*, vol. xx, p. 159, 1910). "General theory of value might, perhaps, by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it."

Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 46. "Value, worth, and goodness seem all to be names for the same character of objects."

[2] J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, pp. 15, 93.

[3] W. P. Montague, *Ways of Knowing*, p. 25. "Theory of value is concerned with the nature of ideals and with the way they may be made actual."

J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 107.

inheres, as pillar-boxes, pictures, and politicians may all be "red"; or whether we are meant to understand a reference to so many determinate qualities under one determinable, as red, blue, and green fall under the determinable "colour." Even after a clear-cut relational definition of Value has been propounded and defended, the reader will be certain to find the word "value" applied not only to the relation in question, but frequently to both terms of that relation. Distinctions simple and obvious enough, in all seeming, at the origin are turned into snares for the unwary by the singular linguistic fatality that dogs the Philosophy of Value. So "actual and potential," "intrinsic and instrumental," become specifications of the superordinated characteristic "Value." But why "instrumental *value*," when all that apparently can be meant is conduciveness to the production of things valuable?

We return to the *imbroglio* of Value-theory. If we were asked soberly to believe that all the presumptive definitions or indications of the nature of Value which are to be met with in the writings of serious students endeavour to define or to indicate the *same thing*, we should be involved in a veritable philosophical nightmare in which nothing was itself rather than another thing, and anything might seem to be anything at all. It is as phantastically irrational to suppose that the same object should be taken by so many observers to be the relation between a desiring person and the object of his desire, social aspirations, and a simple non-relational property, as it would be to suppose that three men confronted with the same object would describe it severally as a four-legged mammal, a rack for the drying of clothes, and a nursery toy. In order to preserve our mental sanity we must accept the obvious conclusion that the theories of Value are about different things, and not, as they profess, about the same thing. And this conclusion is put beyond doubt by the consideration that the various writers have not only given different and apparently unconnected definitions of Value, but detect its presence in as widely different fields If two men looking in opposite directions describe differently the contents of their fields of vision, it is comparatively unimportant that they should employ the same word to indicate the totality which they observe. Whence then the discord? And how is it to be solved?

Theories of Value carry with them immediate implications about the nature of Reality. Indeed, they are primarily asseverations about the nature, or an aspect of the nature, of Reality, and only secondarily concerned to define and locate "Value." This is the centre of contention. The word "Value" has strong and widely ranging emotional associations from which philosophers are no more exempt than any other class of men. And although emotional considerations should be strictly banished from objective science, they inevitably exert a

powerful, and sometimes a decisive, influence over the choice of vocabulary. Hence the philosophers have not been "philosophical" enough to waive the terminology while insisting upon the content.

Fortunately it is no longer necessary or useful to build up a theory of Value *ab initio*. Existing theories may be classified into a few main types according to the conceptions of Reality which they involve. And from the basis of such a classification and comparison a new theory should emerge, unless one or another of those which have been advocated seems satisfactory.

If the *principium divisionis* is to be the essential implication of Value theories for *Weltanschauung* or theory of Reality, one must commence from Dr. Broad's bifurcation of ethical theories into naturalistic and non-naturalistic. In his own words, "The first and most fundamental problem of pure ethics is whether these characteristics are unique and peculiar, in the sense that they cannot be analysed *without remainder* in terms of non-ethical characteristics. . . . Those theories which hold that ethical characteristics *can* be analysed without remainder into non-ethical ones may be called *Naturalistic Theories*; those which hold that they cannot may be called *Non-Naturalistic Theories*."[1] For Value Philosophy, that is the question whether "Value" connotes a concept which is unique and *sui generis*, or whether it does not. The importance of our choice between these alternatives in determining the kind of metaphysics we must adopt can hardly be over-estimated, and will not be entirely without distant reverberations in the practical arrangements of life. The differences of opinion on this issue, whether latent or overt, have been a predominating source of discord and mutual denigration among the pilosophers of Value.

Professor A. E. Taylor has demurred from the exclusive importance assigned to this distinction on the ground that it may become ambiguous in application.[2] Both Plato and Spinoza would assent to the definition of virtue as the efficient performance of the "activities of the species to which you belong." And nevertheless, Spinoza should, and Plato could not, be classed as a "naturalist" in respect of Value, if the distinction between naturalist and non-naturalist is to retain any significance at all. But the ambiguity lies not in Dr. Broad's distinction, but in the definition of virtue, which in Spinoza's case is meant to be understood biologically, and when used by Plato would imply reference to an absolute and non-analysable ideal of Good. No classification could hope to be superior to the ambiguities in the definitions which it is intended to classify—which does not detract from its usefulness as a classification.

We are now in the position to pick the bone of contention out

[1] *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 257.
[2] Review of the above in *Mind*.

from the ambiguous dust-heaps of axiological literature. If the Naturalists are right, it follows that the Non-Naturalists are talking about an *Unding*—something which does not really exist at all, but which they have mistakenly supposed to exist. "Value" is in their mouths a meaningless term, their value-theories simply emotive noise. If, on the other hand, the Non-Naturalists can justify their contentions, the Naturalists have failed to detect a particularly important characteristic of Reality, and have constructed their theories as though no such characteristic existed. Either they will be convicted of axiological colour-blindness, as it were, or the Non-Naturalists are the subjects of a peculiarly virulent delusion which unfits them for the task of metaphysics. This is the essential meeting-point around which debate should centre, and apart from it *the two types of theory have no point of contact.* We will take as an example the psychological theory of Value as it is propounded by Professor Urban.[1] "Value" is asserted with the minimum of argument to be the property of being an object of the non-cognitive mental act which he calls "Valuation." His book is a profound and intricate explanation of the psychological ramifications and development of Valuation. If his initial conception of the nature of Value is right, his theory of Value is all that could be desired, and the Non-Naturalists are in fact deluded. If, however, they have discovered, and are calling attention to, a real characteristic of things, then Professor Urban's theory remains good psychology, and may be admitted to be good philology nine-tenths of the way; but his metaphysics of Reality resulting therefrom would be flagrantly fallacious, because they would neglect the important aspect of Reality with which theory of Value should be concerned. And hardly the most desultory attempt is made to show that this is not the case. For once a definition of Value has been assumed, there is no way of justifying the assumption by elaboration upon it, and no way of proving it by the consequences which may be deduced. Every writer is bound by his initial definition, and the issue between Naturalism and Non-Naturalism must be faced directly. Professor Sorley has complete justification in his protest against the philosophic hustling in which the Naturalists are fain to indulge: "The method of psychological inquiry is misconceived, and its results are misinterpreted when these are allowed to take the place of an independent investigation of value. The experiences and judgment of value are undoubtedly mental facts, and psychology may trace their rise and history; but it does not touch the question of their validity, any more than the validity of mathematical judgments is affected by the history of their formation."[2] Unless, therefore, the issue between

[1] *Valuation, Its Nature and its Laws.*
[2] *Moral Values and the Idea of God.*

Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic theories has already been decided, the elaboration of the consequences of a theory belonging to either class runs the risk of being proved to be irrelevant—Non-Naturalistic theories of being mere word-play and about nonentities, and Naturalistic theories of talking about facts which might equally well be described without having resource to the terminology of Value, while neglecting the realities with which theory of Value has to do.

As many of the less careful writers have the habit of introducing a definition of Value implicitly into their presuppositions before allowing it overtly to intrude into the argument, it has been easy for the protagonists on both sides to give to their conclusions something of the factitious obviousness of the truism. The Naturalists tend to describe circles with the inevitability of children on the roundabouts. While the Non-Naturalist, preferring the swings, indulges in recapitulated assurance, hoping to gain by importunity that which he is unable to prove by reason.

The Naturalist has to prove that the concept of Value *sui generis* is an unwarrantable inference from the structure of language, or else that it derives from antecedent metaphysical presuppositions which are false. Practical thinking, it is well known, tends to identify personal conviction with objective validity (hence the *argumentum baculinum* so common in theological and political debate); and language is accordingly incurably "objective." And certain philosophers have been systematically trained to mistake the grammar of language for the grammar of Reality. Indeed, it cannot very well be denied that, despite the grammatical form of the proposition which attributes Value objectively to the object of the proposition, the great majority of the value-judgments in common speech are simply records of personal and private reaction to objective situations. And the ready acceptance by most philosophers of such a phrase as "instrumental value" hints in the same direction. For if the value-judgment attributes an intrinsic property "Value" to the object, "instrumental value" is an absurd misnomer, the origin of which could not easily be explained. Something which is conducive to the coming into existence of valuable situations may be also valuable in its own right, but its "conduciveness" is not a new species of valuableness. Nor do we call money "instrumentally pleasant" because it is conducive to the acquirement of pleasure. On the other hand, the "transference" of an emotion from the object upon which it was primarily directed to the "instrument" is a well-known psychological happening.

But the same arguments cannot be applied with any direct cogency against Naturalistic definition of the "values" of goodness and beauty. McTaggart's stricture[1] certainly applies to many of the

[1] See *infra*.

less careful thinkers. But the confusion to which he directs attention is by no means inherent to the Naturalistic position as such. The definition of Value, for instance, as the "property of being an object of desire" may imply a failure to perceive an aspect of Reality which is of paramount importance (that has to be argued), but it is not logically ambiguous. The relativity and conflicts of judged values and the fluctuations of valuation constitute a strong *a priori* bias towards Naturalism, which has already been pressed to breaking-point. And yet even in the turmoil of varying valuations of everyday existence there is discernible a principle which demands explanation from the Naturalist. In æsthetics I recognize that my judgments of beauty are not *worth so much* as those of the trained and gifted artist; his are more "right" than mine. As Dr. Tennant has put it, (good or bad) *Taste* is not the same thing as personal *tastes*. And I should not think myself conceited to assume that my ethical judgments are on the whole more "right" than those of the untutored savage. Is the "social" theory of Value competent to account for this discriminating principle of "rightness"? Or is that principle a collective delusion depending upon a combination of social snobbery and the tendency to assign universal "validity" to the most cherished reactions of one's own personality? Are all subjective valuations really on a level?

The first and most fundamental problem in the theory of Value is, then, to decide between Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic definition. And that decision is inseparably connected with metaphysics of Reality. Value theory cannot be made separable from speculative *Weltanschauung*. The attempt to discuss it in isolation has been one of the prime causes of the present confusedness and misapprehension which seem to preclude solid advance. Until the possible alternatives shall have been clearly envisaged and professed, discussion can but defeat its own purpose.

Some Non-Naturalists, in turn, have professed to think that Naturalistic theories depend upon a rather elementary logical confusion between the following two propositions: "(*a*) The ethical characteristic E *synthetically entails and is entailed by* the non-ethical characteristics N_1, N_2, . . .; and (*b*) The ethical characteristic E is *analysable without remainder into* the conjunction of the non-ethical characteristics N_1, N_2, ..."[1] McTaggart has written: "It is generally admitted that it is impossible to define good and evil in terms of anything else. Any assertions that this is possible are due, I think, to a confusion between definition and a universal synthetic proposition about the thing defined."[2] In other words, it is asserted that the would-be definitions of Value do not really define, but refer to

[1] Broad, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

[2] *The Nature of Existence*, vol. ii, p. 398.

some other characteristic which is always associated with Value. And that is a very different thing.

There is, I think, a logical confusion inherent to those "pragmatic" theories of Value which, while defining Value naturalistically, hold that Truth is "a value." F. C. S. Schiller attributes value to a situation or object as a result of that practical attitude or "active taking up of a position," which he calls "valuation." Valuation is a practical orientating of the mind to its objective environment or to some situation in its environment. He would then argue that "truth" and "fact" and "validity" are simply terms of Value. "All truths are values, or, if by 'truth' we mean truth-claim, value-claims." "Facts" are also "values."[1] It is incontestably true, as Professor Sorley has said, that the apprehension of truth and the knowledge of facts are valuable states of consciousness. It is also true that all thinking is directed and therefore the result of purposive and selective psychological attitudes. But selection is controlled by, and thinking is directed towards, an ideal of truth which is independent of the purposiveness of the psychological process of getting to know. The notion of a "normative" science—and Schiller admits that logic, ethics, and so on, are "normative" sciences—implies a "norm" which is itself outside and unconditioned by the subjective and individual "valuations" which are "evaluated." If "fact" is "value," it will follow that the fact that "I value this" corresponds to an "attitude" in some person's mind; and that fact will demand a third attitude; and so on with no end. And so with Truth. Thought in its very nature entails an ideal of absolute truth transcending the psychological processes of knowing. The behaviourist who asserts that thought is conditioned reflex movement in the laryngeal region virtually contradicts himself. For his own assertion, equally with the opposing assertion of the traditional logician, is the result of such conditioned reflexes. Nor has he left himself any principle of distinguishing one reflex from another in value. And these assertions in turn result from conditioned reflex movements in the writer's larynx.

Both Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic theories are of many varieties, seposed by disagreement on minor, or sometimes upon issues of far-reaching, metaphysical importance. The numerous divisions and subdivisions of Naturalistic theories are all of minor philosophical import. In general they serve to express and to emphasize the writer's antecedent attitude towards the empirical world. A thinker of behaviouristic tendencies will define "Value" as a biological principle, and extend that principle to include all professed instances of valuation, thus calling attention to his conviction of the continuity or identity, as the case may be, of psychological with

[1] *Logic for Use.*

physiological phenomena. One who is convinced of the uniqueness or importance of consciousness (human consciousness or the social factor in human consciousness), while admitting genetic continuity, will emphasize and express his conviction by limiting his use of value-terminology in an appropriate way. In a word, philosophers have introduced Value at that point in their systems which seemed to have particular significance and to be in need of a certain emotional underlining. Thus Professor S. Alexander, after some wavering, seems to have employed "Value" to indicate the emergence of a new "quality" or level of existence. Professor Whitehead uses it of the "concretion" of the abstract into the particular, etc. These differences are, then, linguistic and not significant to the philosophy of Value. Where there is real philosophical difference, whether about interpretation of fact or about emphasis, that is primary and independent; so-called "value-philosophy" is secondary, lending emotional colour and persuasive force.

There are, on the other hand, two main types of Non-Naturalistic theories, divided upon an issue of far higher metaphysical significance. The division is based upon their interpretation of the fundamental value-concept as a pure quality or as an *a priori* relation. In order to avoid the cacophonous jargon of saying "Relational or non-Relational Non-Naturalistic theories," I propose to call the former "Idealistic" and the latter "Realistic" theories about Value. Realistic theories, then, hold that Value is a non-natural property of natural and existing states of affairs. The significance of "non-natural" is explained with exceptional lucidity and precision by Professor G. E. Moore.[1] Value is a pure or non-relational property, the specific value of any state of affairs depending solely upon the intrinsic properties of that state of affairs and not upon any relation in which it may stand to anything else in the universe. But though the value of anything is in fact determined by its intrinsic properties, value differs from other intrinsic properties in being logically separable without destroying the identity of a thing. From the *value* of things derives a normative relation to moral agents, in virtue of which any moral being *ought* always to act in such a way as to produce a valuable rather than a non-valuable, and a more rather than a less valuable state of affairs. There are thus two ultimate and irreducible concepts, "Value" and "ought," and a necessary synthetic relation between them.

Idealistic theories, on the other hand, acknowledge only one ultimate concept "oughtness," in terms of which "Value" is defined. "Oughtness" is an absolute and underived factor in the structure of Reality, such that some things are more "fitting" or "ought rather"

[1] In his essay "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" (in *Philosophical Studies*).

to exist than others. And where their existence or non-existence depends upon the voluntary action of a moral being, he is morally obliged to further the existence of that which is most "fitting" or "ought most" to exist. When a thing is said to be *valuable*, that means simply that it *ought* to be valued, or its existence ought to be desired, by moral beings. A thing is absolutely valuable when its existence ought under all circumstances to be desired by any moral being.

The distinctness of Idealistic from Realistic theories should be as apparent as it is important. In the one case "Value" is defined; in the other it is ultimate and indefinable. Idealistic theory acknowledges only one ultimate notion in Value-Philosophy, viz. "oughtness to exist," from which derive ethical obligation in respect of those things, the existence or non-existence of which is in the power of human volition to influence, and "ideal value" or "oughtness to be desired to exist." Realists need at the least two ultimates, neither definable in terms of the other. With them a particular *quality* is primary; the idealists start from the notion of ethical obligation which they make absolute and integral to the constitution of Reality. The history of the Philosophy of Value, however, has worked against the explicit recognition of this division. I believe that it has not been made before in so many words, and I know of no "Idealist" who has not also spoken as though he were a "Realist." Two reasons may be adduced. In the first place, Idealism and Realism have been compelled to present a united front against Naturalism, and in the manner of constant allies have become oblivious to their own differences. And secondly, a pure Idealism has not often been held distinct from Realism owing to a tendency of those who would otherwise have been pure Idealists to indulge in high abstractions which have led to a sort of Transcendental Pragmatism. The notion of "Ought" is not only ultimate in the sense of being indefinable and unanalysable, but it is the highest abstraction and the first Reality from which all other concepts derive. The confusion is in essence the same as that noticed in connection with Pragmatism on the Naturalistic plane. Selection, valuation, appreciation enter into the process of getting to know; and the acquisition of knowledge is guided by an absolute norm of rightness; our conception of the nature of Reality is necessarily coloured by our valuations in some sense. But that does not warrant the assumption that the notion of Reality is secondary to, and derivative from, the notion of "Ought." Pragmatism, whether psychological and Naturalistic, or whether it advances to the transcendental plane, is specious only so far as it can conceal the substitution of *ordo cognoscendi* for *ordo essendi* upon which it relies.

Basing our analysis upon ontological differences, and leaving on one side questions of epistemology and philology or linguistic appro-

priateness, we have discovered three main types of Value-theory demanding attention. They were Naturalistic theory and Non-Naturalistic theory, the latter subdividing into Idealistic and Realistic (Relational and non-Relational). And we have argued that as these metaphysical or ontological issues are of fundamental importance, so they must occupy the attention of Value-Philosophy explicitly and consciously. Only upon this fundamental basis can different types of theory about Value find any common ground upon which to exchange arguments. Once definitions of Value belonging to different types of metaphysic have been accepted or assumed by two philosophers, they are thereby debarred from exchanging anything more important than insults or witticisms. The advance of the Philosphy of Value from its present parlous confusedness depends upon its tardy recognition of this fact.

SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF[1]

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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THE Upanishadic thinkers arrived at the conception of the Atman—the self—through psychological reflection. By an analysis of consciousness, they concluded that the self was the primary reality. Further, they discovered that it was the same primary reality—the same principle—that formed the basis of the Universe. In this capacity the self was called the *Brahman*. This psychological approach to the problem of ultimate reality is characteristic of the Upanishadic philosophy. It is interesting to note that the writers of the Upanishads have also offered cosmological speculations which led them independently to the positing of absolute existence. A passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad says, "that from which all these beings come into existence, that by which they live, that into which they are finally absorbed, know that to be the eternal verity, the Absolute." [1] The writer of the Chandogya [2] Upanishad expresses this conception by means of one word, "Tajjalan," which means "that it is from the Absolute that the world has sprung, it is into it that it is dissolved, and it is by means of it that it lives." "It is indeed the power of the Brahman which manifests itself as the motion of the Soul in us and bethinks itself," [3] says the Kenopanishad. This Absolute existence posited by the Upanishads is identical with pure consciousness, which is the *Atman*. The identity of consciousness and existence from the point of view of pure reason is the most fundamental fact of the Upanishadic Philosophy. Absolute existence is Being which knows no determination. Vedanta starts with the concept of indeterminate Being in the solution of the ontological problem of reality. The philosophy of Spinoza also starts with the concept of indeterminate Being. The cosmology of the Upanishads is not a systematic and rational attempt towards the construction of the Universe. This task has been accomplished in greater details by writers of later Vedantic books. The Upanishadic thinkers were bold speculators, who lived in a free atmosphere.

[1] A part of a chapter in the writer's thesis on *Spinoza and the Upanishads*, approved for the Doctorate degree by the University of London.

[2] Taittiriya, III. 1 (Yato vā imāni Bhutāni jāyante, etc.).

[3] Chandogya, III. 14. 1.

[4] Kena, III. iv.

To them, creation out of nothing seemed an impossibility. Theirs was not the age of science. Yet the doctrine of creation of the Universe appeared to them to conflict with rational thinking. For Spinoza, too, the idea of creation out of nothing seemed absurd. His thoroughgoing rationalism would revolt against such a notion. The Upanishadic conclusion was that the Absolute was the source of the Universe. The indeterminate Being, which is absolute reality in Spinoza's system, was the substance which is self-dependent and unconditioned. All things depend on this Absolute. The manner of dependence of all things on substance and on the Upanishadic Absolute will be considered later on. Both the Upanishadic thinkers and Spinoza start with the conception of the self-dependent unconditioned Being which is the reality, and as such the ground of all things. What is this indeterminate Being? How is it related to the world? In what sense is it the source of all things? The possibility of an external creator being ruled out at the very outset, the explanation of the problems raised above, is given by Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers by making reality immanent. To Spinoza reality is all-comprehensive. It is the cosmic system itself.

The Spinozistic conception of cosmic Unity has a grandeur about it. It is not the grandeur of poetic fancy. Spinoza's conception of reality as "one organic cosmos" has its roots in the mystic vision, which, far from being hampered by scientific conceptions, was mainly based on them, especially on certain conceptions in physics and mathematics. He conceived "Reality as one organically interconnected Universe in which everything is and happens according to law and order, and not as the result of mere chance or mere caprice."[1]

Whatever was real was within the cosmos. The Upanishadic thinkers conceive reality as both immanent and transcendent at the same time. The reality in their view is not only immanent in the cosmos but at the same time also transcends it.

Although self-dependent and unconditioned Being was posited both by Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers, the former conceived it as a *Universe* systematically interconnected within itself, while the latter conceived it as the underlying principle—in man and the Universe.

"I maintain that God is . . . the immanent cause of all things, but not the transient cause. Like Paul, and perhaps also like all ancient philosophers, though in another way, I assert that all things live and move in God. . . . However, those who think that God and Nature (by which they mean a certain mass or corporeal matter) are one and the same, are entirely mistaken."[2] With such an explicit

[1] *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. II, p. 5, "Spinoza," by Professor A. Wolf.

[2] *Vide* p. 343, *Correspondence of Spinoza*, A. Wolf.

statement from Spinoza, the exact sense in which he can be called a pantheist cannot be misunderstood. God is not merely matter. Spinoza was a pantheist in the sense that "the one-and-all is God and God is the one-and-all" ; and the one-and-all is the cosmos which our intellect truly perceives as extended and as thinking. *Pan, i.e.* all, taken as the unique completeness of Being was God to Spinoza, not that "All" in the sense of every individual thing, was God. This conception of one-and-all was a positive one. It is a Being completely real and hence indeterminate. It must be conceived through itself as it is self-dependent. Things in this world are seen to depend on many other things, and these in turn depend on many another. The primary Being which must be self-dependent, and which could not have been created, must have also an eternal existence. Eternity is in fact existence itself.

One of the features of pantheistic thought is the positing of an impersonal reality. The God of pantheism is not conceived after human values. Spinozistic substance and Upanishadic self are both conceived impersonally. The popular human attributes of God, viz. love, power, greatness, etc., cannot characterize either. Not that either of them is lacking in any positive being. That cannot be, for they are perfectly real. They are impersonal in the sense that they are supra-personal. When Spinoza says that God is the immanent cause of all things and not transient, he accepts another feature of pantheistic philosophy. But let it be understood that this is higher pantheism. He does not equate matter with God. He does not deify nature, understood in the popular sense. Nature, in the sense of cosmic system whose attributes are extension and thought, *i.e.* physical energy and mental energy respectively, is God, and there is nothing real beyond the cosmic system. Hence God is not the transient cause of the world. Upanishadic position in this respect is different. The Self is both at the same time the immanent and the transient cause of the Universe. These two aspects of the Self, viz. immanence and transcendence, cannot be separated.

In Spinoza's philosophy we have seen that the one-and-all is God and God is one-and-all. This one-and-all is a system. The Upanishadic position is that the all, *i.e.* the cosmos, indicates the presence of the *One, i.e.* the self behind it. This *One* cannot be ("phenomenalized") reduced to many. For it is the presupposition of the "all." The presence and operation of the One are necessary to connect the "all" to it. And the "all" which is not of equal reality as compared to the *One* is, however, inseparable from the One. And as the One cannot be entirely reduced to many, Sankar, like Spinoza, says that it is wrong to identify individual things with Brahman.

The Brahman was not merely an empirical concept. It arose out

of a perception of "the manifold of the world" and "the diversity of Soul-functions," both of which indicated the Unity underlying them. The material world was conceived by the Upanishadic thinkers as filled by spiritual presence, as in fact "a manifestation of Brahman." The vexed question of the relation between matter and spirit did not, therefore, arise for the Upanishadic thinkers. The concept of Brahman, which is the all-pervading and all-producing Absolute, solves the problem of the relation between matter and spirit. This duality of matter and spirit was the stumbling-block of the Cartesian School. It was overcome by Spinoza more or less in the same way as by the Upanishadic thinkers. For the concept "substance" or "God" is also an all-pervading and all-producing Absolute.

The first notion of Brahman is that it is Existence. Since ultimate reality is existence, we cannot conceive the absolute as limitation of existence, for limitation is determination and determination is negation; Being and non-Being are utterly contradictory conceptions. Hence Being is Truth. True Being, therefore, is Absolute Being. It excludes all relativity. It denies all dependency. It is absolutely positive, *i.e.* without the slightest possibility of negation or limitation which would cancel absoluteness. With Spinoza also the first notion of substance is that it is existence. For Existence pertains to the essence of substance. Substance cannot be conceived unless as existing. It is, therefore, self-existent. And as its essence involves existence, substance is *all* being. That is to say, it is so completely real or positive that it cannot be determined by any other thing, for determination implies negation. It is, therefore, indeterminate Being.

Again, absolute Being or existence must transcend time. It is therefore eternal. This is the Upanishadic position. Spinoza understands "Eternity to be existence itself in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing." For him Existence and eternity were identical conceptions. Eternity to both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers was not indefinite duration. Both have conceived the ultimate reality as transcending the conception of time altogether.

Further, if Being is Absolute, it must be one, for the very conception of a multiplicity of absolutes is self-contradictory. For the positing of a Second Absolute negates the very essence of the absolute itself. Therefore Brahman is one and Brahman alone is. Spinoza, differing radically from Descartes, asserts that there can only be *one substance*. Substance being absolutely infinite, a plurality of Substances cannot be conceived. "In the nature of things," says Spinoza, "there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attributes. For if the substances are distinct, they must

differ either in their modes or states or in their nature or Attributes. But a difference in Attributes is excluded *ex hypothesi*. And if they differ only in their modes, then they are really the same, *i.e.* the same in their permanent nature, the same *qua* substances." The agreement here really depends upon the relation between substance and Attributes, as has been pointed out by Professor Joachim.[1]

The Upanishadic Brahman is not a system. It is the integral substance—a subtle and unmanifest essence underlying everything that is manifested. It is consciousness, for it is identical with the *Atman* or the self. It is the eternal subject of knowledge. It is not a thinking being, but thought itself. Spinoza conceives substance as a self-dependent Being whose essence is Thought and Extension, and upon whom the modes are made to depend. This Substance, therefore, is the "Unified totality of Attributes" with modes entirely depending upon it. Substance, of course, is conceived through itself; but that does not make the modes unreal; for substance must exist in a state of itself, and this gives a certain reality to the modes. Though the idea of substance is entirely self-dependent, the idea of a mode involves the idea of substance, "because the reality of a mode involves the reality of substance." Substance therefore is a reality that exists as *the system*.

At this stage the doctrine of causality in Spinozism and the Upanishads would have to be considered. What is the immanent causality of Spinozistic Substance? God is the immanent cause of all things, and Spinoza categorically rejects the view that God created the Universe or that God is the transient cause of all things. We have seen that the Upanishadic thinkers reject the theory of creation of the Universe. Creation out of nothing seemed absurd both to Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers. A self-subsistent Being is the only and the one Cause. So far the agreement between the two systems of thought is complete. When substance is stated to be the immanent cause of all things, the relation implied between substance and the modes has to be determined with due regard to the nature Spinoza ascribes to substance. Critics who interpret the immanent causality in Spinoza as indicating a geometrical relation between substance and modes have overlooked this consideration, and consequently, as Professor Wolf has pointed out,[2] Spinoza has been misunderstood. The frequent use Spinoza makes of geometrical figures to illustrate his philosophical conceptions seems to have misled these critics. The proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles can be deduced from the very nature of the triangle,

[1] *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 38.

[2] *Vide Proceedings* of the Aristotelian Society, 1927.

and Spinoza often uses this metaphor in support of the propositions he wants to deduce, as obvious from his fundamental philosophical conceptions. This has led to the supposition that for Spinoza there was only one kind of relationship in the Universe, namely the purely rational or logico-mathematical relationship. But nothing can be further from such a supposition, particularly when we take into consideration Spinoza's conception of matter. This is where he differs from Descartes, and differs so fundamentally that he cannot be called a Cartesian in any material sense. To Descartes matter was inert, and as for Motion, he brought in God to explain it. Spinoza's conception of matter is essentially dynamic. Matter was not inert. Matter which he termed as extension was physical energy expressing itself in the infinite mode of motion and rest. Substance or God, therefore, was a dynamic conception, not static. As Existence, so action too is the essence of God. "The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses, and consequently acts more."[1] Substance being a dynamic conception, its immanence in all things—the immanent causality of substance—cannot be taken as merely expressing a logico-mathematical relation. Substance or God as *the active or efficient, the dynamic cause of all things*, is immanent in them. Further, even the use of geometrical figures to illustrate his philosophical conceptions does not support the view that for Spinoza, only one relation, viz. the logico-mathematical, existed in the Universe. "The idea or definition of the thing should express its *efficient* cause." The really adequate definition of a circle therefore is that it is "the space which is described by a line of which one point is fixed and the other movable. Since this definition expresses the efficient cause, I know that I can deduce from it all the properties of a circle, etc."[2] It is clear from the above definition of circle that "Spinoza regarded geometrical figures as effects produced by certain movements."[3] The immanence of God in all things is therefore dynamic and not logico-mathematical.

The Brahman, which is both the immanent and transcendent source at the same time, of all things, is also conceived dynamically in the Upanishads. Sankar insists that the immanent and the transcendent aspects of Brahman as the cause of all things must not be taken separately. Brahman is both *the efficient* and *material* cause of the Universe (Abhinn-nimitta-Upādana-Karanam). It is obvious, therefore, that the Upanishadic conception of reality is dynamic. "If logical account is permitted, then we may say that the Brahman of the Upanishads is no metaphysical abstraction, no

1 *Ethics*, Part V, Prop. 40.
2 *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, Professor Wolf, p. 301.
3 P. 60, *vide supra*.

indeterminate identity, no void of silence. It is the fullest and the most real Being. *It is a living dynamic spirit*, the source and container of the infinitely varied forms of reality."[1]

Why is it that men fail to see the Reality—to know the Truth—which, as both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers have made out, is so very obvious? The Isopanishad tells us that truth is veiled in this Universe by a vessel of gold (Hiranmayen Patrena Satyasyāpihitam mukham).[2] The Kathopanishad [3] says that people live in ignorance and yet think themselves wise—blind leading the blind—they would have easily seen the reality had they "lived in know edge" instead of in ignorance. The Chandogya Upanishad [4] declares that knowledge is power, while ignorance is impotence. The Brihadaranyaka [5] compares unreality to non-Being. It is in these passages that the origin of the doctrine of Maya could be traced. Actually the word Maya is used in the Upanishads in more than one sense. In the Prasna and the Swetaswatara Upanishads the word Maya is used in the sense of illusion.

In the Swataswatara, again, Maya is used in the sense of "power." It was used in a similar sense in a passage in Rigveda quoted by Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Maya in the sense of *power* or "fields of Force"—God being described as having produced all things by His "powers"—very nearly approaches the Attributes of Spinoza as interpreted by Kuno Fischer.[6] These two senses in which the word Maya has been used in the Upanishads have been pressed into the service of their own theories by writers on vedanta. Gaudapada, the forerunner of Sankar, maintains that the world was not created at all!

He argues, "If there were a Universe, then only a question might arise whether it would hide from our view, but the Universe is not; duality is only Maya, *i.e.* illusion. Non-duality is the only reality." For Gaudapada, therefore, there are no degrees of reality, since the world does not exist at all. In trying to explain the Universe, he arrived at a position where the world itself was explained away. The knotty problem of the one and the many does not arise for him. To Sankar the world is real, but not *sub specie æternitatis*. The important distinction that Sankara draws between the "Pāramārthika" noumenal- and Vyāvahārika-phenomenal views of reality must not be lost sight of. The doctrine of degrees of reality is throughout implied in Sankara's philosophy. The world is real in the relative sense. Since it cannot be conceived independent of Brahman, it cannot be real in the sense in which Brahman is real.

[1] P. 172, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Radhakrishnan. [2] Isa. 15.
[3] Katha. 1–2. 4. 5. [4] Chandogya I. I. 10. [5] Brih. I. 3. 28.
[6] *Vide* Professor Wolf's paper on Spinoza in the *Proceedings* of the Aristotelian Society, 1927; Ranade, *Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 227.

Nor can it be said to be absolutely unreal or (a total illusion), since it is inseparably connected with Brahman. Sankara does not deny the existence of the world as such. He only maintains that it cannot be treated as separate from Brahman or as something self-existent and independent. It is an "illusion" to think that the world is an independent entity. It is entirely dependent on the underlying reality, and further is inseparable from it.

Maya in the sense of "power" of Brahman closely resembles the attributes of Spinoza. In a letter to Oldenburg,[1] Spinoza writes: "There exists in Nature an infinite power of thought." In the *Short Treatise* the attribute of thought is spoken of as "thinking power." The attribute of Extension is also considered as a power in Nature, which produces Motion and Rest[2]—effects which necessarily depend on the attribute of Extension. Attributes therefore are "powers," "lines of force"—in substance or Nature. So also Brahman, by its power (*i.e.* through Maya), produces all things which necessarily depend on its Maya. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the relation of the attributes to Substance and that of Maya to Brahman. Attributes are essentially related to Substance.

In some places Spinoza has used the words Substance and Attribute in identical sense. In a letter to De Vries[3] Spinoza writes: "By Substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose conception does not involve the conception of some other thing. I mean the same by attribute, except that it is called attribute with respect to the intellect which attributes such and such a nature to substance." In Ethics, however, he distinguishes attribute from substance. The former is only one aspect of the latter. That aspect, it must be noted, is *real* and *ultimate*. The Attribute is defined in the Ethics as "that which the intellect perceives of Substance, as constituting its Essence." Since, according to Spinoza, the intellect leads us to the knowledge of the real, the attribute—*i.e.* that which the intellect perceives of substance—is a real and ultimate aspect of Substance. Not that it is what only *appears* to our intellect, but is not in Substance. This interpretation after Kantian terminology is inapplicable to Spinoza's attribute. Substance is known by intellect as it exists in itself, as it really is. The unified totality of attributes—the togetherness of attributes—is substance. "Attribute, as the what of Substance, is not excluded from Reality." Attribute can be said to be the essential nature of substance. The relation between Brahman and Maya is not one of essence. We shall first see what the Upanishadic position is in this respect, and then proceed to Sankara's view.

[1] P. 212, *Correspondence of Spinoza*, A. Wolf.
[2] P. 120, *Short Treatise*, A. Wolf.
[3] P. 108, *Correspondence of Spinoza*, A. Wolf.

The Upanishads, as we have seen, use the word Maya in two senses, viz. (i) illusion and (ii) Power. The latter sense of Maya is predominant so far as the Upanishads are concerned. The world they explain is the effect of Brahman's "power" or Maya. Brahman, though an immanent cause of the Universe, is not identical with it. For Brahman is at the same time the transcendental cause of the Universe. When the transcendental aspect of Brahman as the cause is considered, Maya in the sense of "illusion" is made to explain the appearance of the many. *Though immanent in all things, Brahman must not be identified with the Universe, and though it transcends the Universe, the latter must not be separated from Brahman.* This can be said to represent the Upanishadic view. And although the Universe cannot be separated from Brahman, it does not mean that the relation between them is one of essence. Brahman is an independent reality. Its power, *i.e.* Maya, which is responsible for the appearance of the universe, is not essential for Brahman's reality.

From the point of view of logic, the Upanishadic position in this respect seems unsatisfactory. Sankara's view of the Maya doctrine is much the same. Only when pressed to explain as to why Brahman should have this concomitant of Maya, Sankar says "it is inexplicable" (Anirvachaniyam). "It is inexplicable because it is neither absolutely real (Sat, *i.e.* Brahman) nor unreal (*i.e.* something absolutely different from Brahman), and therefore it is inexplicable"[1] The world, therefore, is inexplicable.

Substance necessarily expresses itself in infinite attributes, but Brahman is not bound by any such necessity. Brahman is the source of all things both immanently and transcendentally at the same time. All things are effects of its power, but Brahman is not resolved into these effects, for it has transcendental existence also. Hence its "power" to produce all things, *i.e.* Maya, cannot constitute its *essence*, though it inseparably goes with it.

Spinoza's reality cannot exclude the attributes, since they express its essential nature, while the Upanishadic Brahman has no *essential* relation with Maya. The reality of Brahman is quite independent of Maya or the power (which is responsible for the appearance of the many). If the cosmic system is the reality for Spinoza, what is the position of individual things in Spinoza's reality? Individual things or modes depend upon substance. They are included within the reality. It is their relation with substance that we are now considering. The relation between Maya, *i.e.* the world, and Brahman, and that between modes and substance, afford an interesting comparison. We will thus know how the world of individual things is deduced from ultimate reality both in Spinoza and in the Upani-

[1] *Vide* p. 136, *Adwaita Philosophy*, K. Sastri.

shads. "Spinoza works on the hypothesis of modification as the Vedanta works on the theory of Maya."[1] The appearance of finite things, Spinoza takes as a *fact* much in the same way as Sankar looks to the fact that the world does appear. How it comes about that there is a world of finite things is "inexplicable," says Sankar. The inexplicability lies in the fact that the world is neither absolutely real nor is it absolutely non-real. Spinoza does attempt to explain the relation or dependence of things finite on substance.

The purpose of Spinoza's hypothesis of modification is the same as that of the Vedantin's theory of Maya. Both have the explanation of finite things in view. How does substance as the cause work?

Substance is the free cause of itself and of all things. It is a free cause because it is a necessary cause. It is necessary in the sense that it is the nature of substance to act. Its essence has action with it. Substance as the free causality of itself and of all things is *Natura Naturans*. It is the eternally-active absolute power that is acting in (infinite) all ways. And as the necessary consequent of its own free causality, substance is *natura naturata*, an ordered system of modes following with coherent necessity from *Natura Naturans*. *Natura Naturata*—God as the consequent of His own free causality—is not merely the world of sense-perception. God viewed as the eternal system of modes—a necessary consequent of His free causality—is *Natura Naturata*, and viewed as a free cause of itself and of all things is *Natura Naturans*. But Finite things, according to Spinoza, owe their coming to be and their persistence in being to God. That is God, the immanent and first cause is both the efficient and essential cause of all things. How does this causality of God work? God as *Natura Naturata* is not merely the world of individual things, world of sense-perception. There must be some way, therefore, by which the dependence of finite modes on God is explained. Substance as Extended and Thinking has to account for finite things. The infinite has to link the finite with itself, without losing its essence, and at the same time the finite must not be pushed out of the circumference of reality, for the finite is entirely caused by the infinite.

Spinoza links the finite to the infinite, the modes to the Attributes, by means of the conception of *infinite modes*. The corresponding conception in the vedanta, that attempts the linking of the finite with the infinite, is that of Maya. It has already been pointed out that Vedantic reality does not negate the world. The world is not an illusion. It is not false. It is relatively real. That is at least the Upanishadic view. And even Sankar cannot be interpreted to mean that the world is an illusion. Mr. Kokileshwar Sastri, in his book

[1] *Vide* p. 12, *Spinoza*, by Sorley.

on Adwaita philosophy, has shown that the falsity of the world was not maintained by Sankar. The realistic element in Sankar is very well brought out in the book which quotes original passages from Sankara's commentaries. The mediating link between the one and the many is Maya in the Upanishads and infinite modes in Spinoza. Spinozistic attributes of extension and thought would be also covered by Maya. The Upanishadic One, unlike Spinoza, was not conceived with attributes as its essence, and hence Maya covers the ground that is covered in Spinoza's philosophy by both the attributes and the modes. But in Spinoza the position between the attributes and modes is that between infinite and finite, and the mediating link of the infinite mode can therefore be said to correspond to the conception of Maya.

A direct product of an Attribute of Substance carries with it the character of infinity and eternity. This product, though a modification of the Attribute, is the *immediate* modification. Consequently it shares the nature of attribute in so far as it lies within the attribute's field. Motion, for instance, is an immediate infinite and eternal mode of the attribute of Extension, because it follows directly from Extension. There cannot be anything extended which is not in motion. All the modes of extension, therefore, are linked to the Attribute of Extension by the infinite mode of motion. When this attribute of Extension is modified by an infinite mode, anything that follows from the attribute under this modification must also be infinite and eternal. For "its being and its existence will be co-extensive with motion and rest, and so far with the Attribute."[1] This mode, therefore, though *mediate*, is eternal and infinite.

"The face of the whole Universe"—*Facies totius Universi*—is the mediate infinite eternal mode.[2] In the Scholium Lemma, VII, the idea is clearly explained. To conceive "the whole of nature to be one individual whose parts, that is to say all bodies, differ in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual," is to conceive the face of the whole Universe. The immediate modification of Extension is motion and rest, from which follows the conception of the whole of Nature as one individual. Both these immediate and mediate modes are eternal and infinite in so far as they lie within the attribute "Extension." We have now reached the stage of finite modes. Spinoza has so far prepared the ground for their explanation. The causality of God works through the mediation of these infinite modes; its consequences, therefore, must themselves be eternal and infinite. Individual things, therefore, which all are the effects of God's causality, are infinite and eternal—in a sense.

"Their reality in that dependence (on substance) is timelessly

[1] *Vide* p. 75, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, by Joachim.
[2] *Vide* p. 308, *Correspondence of Spinoza*, A. Wolf.

actual; their essence *in and through the modal system or the attribute* involves their existence; and in and through the modal system their essence is complete or infinite."[1] Individual or particular things, in so far as they are viewed under their modal system, are infinite and eternal. "Their timeless actuality, eternity, follows inevitably from the substance in which the essences of all particular things are sustained."[2] This view of particular things as infinite and eternal can be put in another way. We can say that all things are in God in so far as their essences partake of God's essence. This is not to identify God with all individual things. For not individual things but the cosmic system is God.

This real—infinite and eternal—aspect of particular things is, however, not generally comprehended. Things are taken out of the modal system, and we imagine that we shall thus understand them best. That is the reverse of truth. Particular things—when thus viewed—are finite and transitory. Not that the world of sense-perception is an illusion. Our imaginative experience is partially true. It must be realized that although the essence of particular things inevitably has to assert itself, that does not mean that particular things abstracted from their modal system can claim the same reality which would belong to them when viewed under the modal system.

The world of sense-perception is real according to Spinoza, for things are modifications *of the original reality*; but they appear to us as finite because of our partial understanding of them. If we overcome this defect in our understanding, there is no danger of our misconstruing them. The world, therefore, is no distortion of reality. We must understand things in the right perspective. The relatively real is a true modification of the original reality. We think it as relatively real because we tear it off from the modal system, and view it as substantial entity. If it is viewed from its proper place within the modal system, it is infinite and eternal.

What does the relative reality of the world in the Upanishads mean? The Upanishadic Brahman, we have seen, is not a cosmic system. It is both immanent and transcendent as the cause. One must therefore penetrate *beyond* the world of sense-perception to attain the real. Particular things, therefore, are real in so far as they depend upon Brahman. To view them as independent of Brahman is to err. They are the modes of Brahman, produced by its power—Maya. But Brahman cannot be identified with them, nor do they form part of Brahman, for Brahman is absolutely real and independent. The substance of Spinoza, though self-dependent, has to include within itself the modes, for it is a system. This is

[1] *Vide* p. 76, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, Joachim.

[2] *Vide supra.*

not the case with Brahman. Therefore the infinite and eternal, being attributed to particular things by Spinoza is inapplicable to them in the Upanishadic philosophy. The essences of particular things in Spinoza are sustained in substance, and only in this substance they are infinite and eternal. The essence of particular things according to the Upanishads is one and the same, that is, Brahman, which *underlies* them, and at the same time *transcends* them. The Upanishads do not regard the world as a mere human presentation by the genuine reality. It is objective and independent of the finite individual. The Kantian view of the world of ordinary experience is rejected both by Spinoza and the Upanishads. The relative reality of particular things is therefore admitted by both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers. But the causality of substance being thoroughly immanent, Spinoza's reality becomes a system that has a rightful place for particular things, and, in this light, a certain infinity and eternity attaches to these particular things. Here there is divergence between Spinoza and the Upanishads. The latter lay down a doctrine of causality which is both immanent and transcendent at the same time, and particular things therefore do not receive that importance which they receive in Spinoza's philosophy. The Upanishadic view taken here is the same as Sankar held later on.[1] There are passages in the Upanishadic literature which declare that all this is Brahman (Sarvam khaluidam Brahma). It will be wrong to identify Brahman with all things on the strength of this expression. Sankar expressly warns us against any such interpretation. Individual things do not constitute the Brahman. The causal reality is not identified with its effects. For the real nature of the cause is transcendental (Kootastha) in the system of Sankar, although the cause underlies all its products. Therefore the particular things (the world of sense-perception) are not given the same position as they are given in Spinoza *when viewed under the modal system.*

[1] *Vide Adwaita Philosophy*, by K. Sastri.

CAUSE AND GROUND

F. E. ENGLAND, M.A., Ph.D.

It is the true function of thought, Lotze said, to show "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." I do not propose to discuss the problem of mechanism *versus* teleology, but rather to point out and emphasize the importance of a distinction, drawn alike by Plato and Kant, between a narrower and a wider kind of determination, and to indicate the subordinate character of the former.

I

It is interesting to follow the way in which the antithesis involved in the notion of mechanical causality on the one hand and that of teleological causality on the other presented itself to Plato. Without acquiescing in the violent severance set up by the Eleatic thinkers between appearance and reality, he nevertheless regarded as fundamental the opposition between the perceptible world and the realm of Ideas. The Eleatic antinomy, which led him to the formulation of his own doctrine of Ideas, may be expressed in this manner: A real plurality is impossible without real units, and therefore admits no unity. We are accordingly compelled to regard either the plurality or the unity as mere semblance of reality. It seemed to the Eleatics that the doctrine of a plurality of reals was far more heavily encumbered with absurdities than the doctrine of an absolute unity. To Plato, on the other hand, it seemed that the antinomy was not incapable of solution. Ultimately, without doubt, the ideas of unity and plurality are incompatible; one cannot be many, nor many one. But in the world of sensuous things it is otherwise. Since the things of sense may have different qualities according to the relations in which they stand, a sensible thing may be in one sense *one* and in another sense *many*. In the *Parmenides* the relation between the world of sensible things and the realm of Ideas is conceived in terms of participation (μεθέξις). The world of sense exists by participation in the self-existent and separate Ideas. In the course of reflection, however, the notion of μεθέξις is developed in terms of resemblance, the participation consisting in this, that the transient sensuous thing is an imitation (μιμήσις) of the Idea. From this point of view the Ideas are regarded as eternal patterns or archetypes (παραδείγματα).

The question immediately arises as to their mode of being. Plato is alive to the danger of asserting their complete self-containedness and their separation from the world of sense, while at the same time maintaining the dependence of the sensuous world upon the realm of Ideas. The general upshot of the discussion in the *Parmenides* seems to be that if the procedure of thought is valid, it is necessary to recognize Ideas as the permanent and pervasive elements of reality, and not as absolutely separate and self-contained. The conception is that of a unity which exists and manifests itself only in that multiplicity.

The general line of argument in the *Sophist* and the *Timæus* indicates also that Plato did not regard the Ideas in so transcendent a sense as to preclude participation in them on the part of sensible things. Sensible things are said to contain no definite and permanent characteristics of their own, but are to be regarded as appearances or reflections (φανταξόμενα), which presuppose Ideas as their ultimate ground. In the *Timæus*, where Plato essays a theory of the natural world, he comes to the problem with a clear-cut distinction between being (οὐσία) and becoming (γιγνόμενα). The former is conceived as the timeless self-identical realm of Ideas, apprehensible only by thought with the aid of reason. The latter consists of imitations or copies of the Ideas, continually changing, and apprehended by opinion with the aid of sensation. What, we may now ask, constituted, for Plato, the nature of empirical things? Starting from the elements which the earlier φυσικοί regarded as constituting the original substance of things, Plato argues that it cannot be said of fire, water, air, or earth that it is a "this" (τοῦτο), for it is in a state of continual flux and has no permanent being. It is only a "such-like" (τοιοῦτον). As such, the four elements cannot be the fundamental principles of things, but require a "this"—a relatively permanent element by which the Ideas find ingression, as Whitehead would say, in an actual entity. For this purpose Plato conceives the necessity of what he figuratively calls "a nurse of becoming." By a now famous illustration from plastic art he shows that during a continual process of remoulding, the question "What is this?" could be answered only in terms of the material used. The shapes and forms would, in the course of making and remaking, change while they were being defined. "Even so is the nature which receives into itself all corporeal things. It is always the same—never departing from its function which consists in receiving all things into itself. It never takes on any form at all like the altering things that enter into it. As plastic material, such as soft wax or molten gold, it remains unaltered, and it is only informed by the entering shapes, and, owing to them, appears different from time to time."[1]

[1] (50 A).

The altering shapes which pass in and out of the receptacle are none other than the transient semblances of the eternal archetypes. But what is "the nurse of becoming"? It is described as a receptacle (ὑποδοχή), and it is distinguished as the permanent in contrast with the transient εἰσιόντα καί ἐξιόντα. But Plato's conception is not, of course, that the ὑποδοχή is something "into which" qualities come and "out of which" they go as water passes in and out of a reservoir. It is simply that wherein the γιγνόμενα emerge and vanish; and Plato's own simple designation of it is Space or Place. It has often been regarded otherwise. Because Plato expressly refers to it as a "this," as plastic material capable of being moulded into forms and of receiving patterns into itself, and so forth, it has been contended from of old that Plato meant a kind of stuff or material. But this view can be held only by pressing Plato's illustrations (meant to be mere εἰκότες λογοί) beyond the point of their relevance. Careful scrutiny of his argument shows that in the use of the term "this" (τοῦτο) he is merely contrasting the permanent with the changing, and in the figure of the "plastic material" he is simply referring to that "material" in its capacity for taking up what is new while itself remaining unchanged.

So far, then, we have two principal modes of being, viz., the timeless Ideas and the changing γιγνόμενα, together with a third entity, Space or Place. We are now in a position to examine Plato's teleology. The central feature of the material world is its coming and going, and in its "becoming" or passingness it in some way represents that which eternally is. But now the world is not wholly rational. The copies are not identical with their originals. Participation is never complete. Moreover, chaos preceded cosmos; out of disorder the demiurge brings order. And the teleological activity which Plato conceives as ever guiding the γιγνόμενα to the best end is not the only kind of causality. There is an element of necessity (ἀνάγκη) in the world, subservient indeed to νοῦς, for otherwise disorder would be greater than order in the world, yet withal concomitant with νοῦς. This conception of ἀνάγκη has sometimes been set over against νοῦς as an opposition of mechanical and teleological causality. But such, I think, was not Plato's real meaning if the term mechanical carries with it the notion of the inevitableness of the effect. But let us have Plato's own statement: "The generation of this universe was a mixed creation by a combination of ἀνάγκη and νοῦς. But whereas νοῦς governed ἀνάγκη by persuading (πείθειν) her to guide the greatest part of created things to the best end, on such conditions and principles, through ἀνάγκη overcome by reasonable persuasion, this universe was fashioned in the beginning. If, then, we would really declare its creation in the manner whereby it has come to be, we must add also the nature of the errant cause (πλανωμένης αἰτίας)

and its moving power." Here, as A. E. Taylor says, the function of the ἀνάγκη is that of an indispensable under-workman of νοῦς in the production of a good world. And although not herself purposive, she is responsive to intelligent purpose, since we hear repeatedly of νοῦς "persuading" ἀνάγκη. Furthermore, ἀνάγκη, being an "errant cause," is by no means to be regarded as the equivalent of scientific necessity. It describes not the necessary but the contingent element. It is not to be conceived as blind mechanism, but as a form of causality which is subordinate to νοῦς. We must distinguish, Plato says (69 A), two kinds of causality, one ἀναγκαῖον and the other θεῖον, the "necessity exists for the sake of the divine" (or rational). He further adds that without the former kind of causality, the latter could not operate. That is to say, ἀνάγκη is conceived as a subordinate causality requisite for the attainment of higher effects. We meet the same contention in 46 D and E, where Plato, dealing with the physical and physiological processes involved in vision, dream-presentations, etc., says that "all these things are among the secondary causes (συναίτιαι) which God uses to serve him in achieving the best so far as is possible. Ἀνάγκη represents, then, neither rigid mechanism nor an element of randomness working on its own account in the universe. What Plato intends is that it is an element, which, if left to itself, would produce causal effects (τὸ τυχόν), a supposition which is rendered untenable by reason of the superior control of νοῦς, which "persuades" ἀνάγκη.

II

Turning now to Kant's treatment of the problem, we are impressed by certain striking affinities with Plato's doctrine. Kant, too, in so far as his inquiries were metaphysical, viewed as antithetical the realm of temporal phenomena and the *mundus intelligibilis*. In his earlier writings he uses a terminology closely akin to Plato's in describing (*a*) eternal essences or notions (*ideæ puræ*) cognized in and through the *usus realis* of the intellect, these notions constituting a kind of pattern (*Perfectio Noumenon*) which serves as the common measure and intelligible ground of all realities; (*b*) the phenomena or things as they appear to sensuous cognition; and (*c*) the notion of universal absolute space as that which renders possible the existence of concrete things.[1]

Furthermore, at the outset of his metaphysical investigations Kant recognized those features of contingency and purposiveness with which Plato was concerned. "The things of the world, which reveal themselves to our senses, show clear marks of contingency as well as of order and purposive arrangement."[2] In the preface

[1] *Von dem ersten Gründe des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume.*

[2] *Beweisgrund.*

to the *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte* he declares that on the one hand "the general laws of nature are fruitful of their own consequences," and on the other, that matter, while determining itself by the mechanism of its own forces, "brings forth appropriate effects which appear to constitute the scheme of a Supreme Wisdom." He will not allow that the "natural procedure" by which matter is determined admits of any arbitrary interference. He is not prepared to admit that *exiguum clinamen*, by which Lucretius, after the manner of Epicurus, sought to leave a loophole for freedom in a mechanically determined world. The slight deviation of the atoms is explicable, he maintains, in the light of the Newtonian force of repulsion. But, like Plato, Kant argued that to suppose that chaos could develop its own order is to derive reason from the irrational. The element of order or "necessity" in matter presupposes the ultimate government of reason. "There is a God (or rational principle) just because nature, even in chaos, cannot proceed otherwise than regularly and according to order."

Kant here explicitly recognizes the two types of causality designated by Plato, *νοῦς* and *ἀνάγκη* respectively, but their express treatment was long delayed by the emergence in Kant's mind of the critical problem in its epistemological aspect, and the almost complete eclipse of the metaphysical issues. The manner in which the critical problem dawned in his mind predisposed him to devote himself primarily to the consideration of the phenomenon of connection from the side of the apprehending mind. The given presentations must be accepted for what they are, for we cannot go behind them to discover whether or not they are produced by concealed realities. They are brought into unity by the judgment, but judgment is not to be considered as a single process of bringing subject and predicate together, for the very problem of knowledge arises from the difficulty of justifying any assertion by linkage between subject and predicate. The ultimate principle of unity is the Synthetic Unity of Consciousness—a transcendental unity, *i.e.* a unity which must be posited if knowledge of objects is to be rendered explicable. It is the Unity of Consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of presentations to an object, and constitutes, therefore, their objective validity. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object; it is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me (B 138). All objects of our knowledge are determined in and through one or more of the categories or ways in which the transcendental unity of apperception expresses itself in relation to the given material in space and time.

Now the problem of causality is, for Kant, a problem as to what is involved in the fact of succession. Objective succession involves a determination of the order of temporal contents in accordance with

a universal and necessary rule or law of causality. That is to say, objective succession is a sequence which is necessary and universal, and such sequence is rendered possible because phenomena follow one another in accordance with the law of causality. All changes take place according to a law of necessary connection, and no event is a possible object of knowledge for intelligence such as ours unless it be determined in time by reference to causal connection. Kant's doctrine of causality is thus an application to temporal sequence of the general doctrine that objectivity means no more than necessary conjunction of the manifold in intuition and consciousness of such necessary conjunction. He declared Hume to be right in his contention that in all cases of what we recognize as causal relation we ascribe necessity to the relation, but he disputed the adequacy of Hume's subjective explanation of such necessity. He pointed out that in order to explain the subjective feeling of necessity Hume assumes that very objective connection for which the subjective feeling of necessity is called into account. Kant challenged Hume's right to the assumption of a knowledge of objective sequence. Hume failed to ask the question, How is knowledge of sequence (subjective or objective) possible? Kant's own answer is that consciousness of objective succession presupposes the principle of causality, that principle being a transcendental principle without which knowledge is not possible.

In reference to the actual nature of the causal connection, Kant vacillates. From his more subjectivist point of view, according to which presentations are "states of the identical self," those presentations are devoid of causal efficiency. Causality, from this point of view, is in no sense dynamic; it is merely the thought of necessitated (as contrasted with actual necessitating) sequence. Causality in the dynamic sense can be looked for only in the noumenal sphere. The phenomenalist view, on the other hand, according to which the objects apprehended are regarded as having an existence independent of the apprehending mind (a view implied rather than definitely stated), is that the causal relation involves genuinely dynamical activities in the objects apprehended. But it is one of the difficulties of Kant's position that he never renounces one view in favour of the other. Even in the *Third Analogy*, where the law of thoroughgoing reciprocity among substances is laid down, the substances in question are, of course, only phenomenal, and the question is left open whether or not their *Gemeinschaft* involves actual dynamical interaction. When Kant approaches the question of the ontological implications of his transcendental theory, the influence of his earlier metaphysical notions is clearly to be seen. According to the *Nova Dilucidatio*, the *commercium* of finite substances is due to their being "maintained by the common principle of their existence, namely, by

the divine intellect." This is practically the view of the *Dissertation*. Here the *mutuum commercium* of the many substances is said to imply the concept of totality. But except to say that the concept of totality is one of the *ideæ puræ* inherent in the intellect, Kant at this stage attempted no clear formulation of the problem of the relation of the unconditioned to the many finite substances. From the critical point of view the question of the ground of this *commercium* (an analogy of experience) is one that could not consistently be raised. But in the *Dialectic*, when the wide metaphysical problem comes to view, Kant recognizes that the apprehension of objective coexistence, involving as it does a *Verstandesbegriff* of reciprocal determination, likewise demands for its explanation the conception of a wider and more adequate ground of explanation. But as I have shown elsewhere,[1] Kant's formalism here led him sadly astray. With complete disregard of the thoroughgoing changes which the whole of the subsequent development entailed, he conceives the problem in precisely the same terms as in the *Nova Dilucidatio*, and finds the desiderated ground of explanation in a logical notion of *ens realissimum* conceived almost after the manner of Wolff. The discussion of the *Antimony of Pure Reason* does little to elucidate the relation between the contingent phenomenal world and the intelligible world in which the conditioned is grounded. The significant feature for our present purpose is Kant's resort to the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal causality. He argues that while the category of causality holds good for all phenomena, so that things belonging to the world of sense are throughout contingent, yet the phenomenal series may in its entirety rest upon an unconditional being, though, in his view, such Unconditioned would be merely intelligible and not knowable.

This conclusion is taken up into the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where the doctrine of a twofold causality is extensively developed. The determined sequence of phenomenal events does not, Kant contends, preclude the possibility that it itself may be grounded in a supersensuous noumenal realm. Indeed, the difficulty of finding either a logical or (on the subjectivist view) a dynamical connection between causally connected phenomena made recourse to an intelligible ground in the noumenal realm natural. The search for such supersensuous ground is rendered all the more necessary by the facts involved in the consciousness of moral obligation. Moral obligation implies freedom, and freedom involves a causality other than phenomenal determination. Moral acts are subject to causation of some sort (for to think otherwise would be to import an irrational lawlessness into moral action); yet they are not determined by prior events (for that would abrogate freedom). The acts of the self, so far

[1] *Kant's Conception of God* (Allen & Unwin, Ltd.), Chapter VI.

as the self stands under the conditions of time, are governed by phenomenal necessity. But determination through phenomenal causation does not exclude determination by *noumena* as ground. The acts of the self as noumenal are determined noumenally. The former kind of causation is described by Kant as causation without reason. The latter (freedom) is "causation by reason"; it is "a mode of causality of living beings so far as they are rational." We have no clear statement of the precise relationship of the two types of causality, but Kant evidently meant that the events of the empirical self, standing as they do under the rule of necessary sequence, are *in their totality* grounded in the "intelligible character" in the noumenal realm.

III

The two kinds of causality, phenomenal causality of a "mechanical" type and noumenal freedom, the one involving temporal succession, the other grounded in a timeless realm, remained, so far as the treatment in the first two *Critiques* goes, radically sundered. Kant could not long rest in such a dualism, and a significant feature of his treatment of the problem in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is the recognition of a type of causation (in the living organism) which is neither mechanical nor externally purposive. The self-developing, self-regulating organism is an instance of an entity whose parts are not externally determined (either by mechanism or by design), but owe their unique character to a principle of inner purposiveness. The elucidation of what is implied in this principle of purposiveness brings to light some of Kant's ripest thought on the problem we are investigating. It is not, he maintains, a principle of knowledge, but a maxim of appreciating (*Beurteilung*). An object cannot be determined as purposive, but can only be judged to be such. The characteristic feature of the organism is that it exemplifies a material purposiveness of an inner kind—"material" because it must be judged as purposive in virtue of its existence, and "inner" because its existence has no other end or purpose than itself. Nature, we are obliged to conclude, has produced it not by mechanical causes, but by causes which are purposive in their operations. Thus in the growth of a tree (Kant's own example), in the production and maintenance of its parts, we are presented with a natural phenomenon which is both cause and effect of itself. Everything in nature has its cause, and its causation is either mechanical (*i.e.* entirely due to external factors) or purposive; either *causa efficiens* or *causa finalis*. Kant's way of interpreting purposive causality is through the notion of the relation of parts to whole. The cause is here determined through the idea of the effect, and this idea is the notion of the whole, each part being determined through that notion, and owing its possibility to

its relation with that whole. Every single part is connected with all the other parts in the notion of the whole. They give rise to the whole reciprocally, and they therefore stand in reciprocal causality with one another; that is to say, they stand to one another in the relation of community (*Gemeinschaft*). Moreover, since each part exists not only by means of the others, but for the sake of the others, their relation is that of a purposive community (*Zweckgemeinschaft*). Further, because the several parts reciprocally produce one another, we must judge the phenomenon to be a self-organizing entity. The organism as a self-organizing entity must be judged, in accordance with the principle of inner purposiveness, to have arisen through ideal causes, for otherwise "we have no guiding thread for the observation of a species of natural things which we have thought teleologically under the concept of natural purposes."[1]

But how are we to conceive these purposively operating forces? Kant is aware of the dangers looming on opposite sides. On the one hand, to conceive them as resident in matter is a hylozoism which is "the death of all natural philosophy." On the other hand, to set them outside matter would involve us in an equally fatal supernaturalism. Kant maintains that our only course is to restrict the teleological principle to our observation or interpretation of nature, while leaving the ultimate nature of the purposively operating forces an open question, and in this respect, he urges, we are in the same position as in the case of mechanical causality; for Kant never departs from his conviction that the ultimate character of the causal nexus eludes human comprehension. When the attempt is made to pass beyond the "reflective judgment," or *Beurteilung*, to the metaphysical question of the way in which bodies originate and are produced, we are involved, he maintains, in antinomy. All that we are entitled to affirm is that only the mechanical origin of material things is knowable. In affirming this, we do not affirm the actual mechanical origin of all bodies, nor the possibility of knowing all mechanical objects. It might well be the case that there are certain bodies the mechanical origin of which is unknowable, and this is the case with organisms. What the thesis does involve is that any mode of origin other than mechanical (for example, their production through final causes) is unknowable.

Kant's well-known distinction between the determining judgment and the reflective judgment, or between constitutive and regulative or heuristic principles, becomes somewhat strained at this point. Maintaining, as he did, that knowledge in the strict sense is confined to the material of sense as determined in and through the *a priori* categories of the understanding, he had radically separated the spheres of natural science and metaphysics respectively. Accordingly,

[1] § 66; cp. §§ 70 and 72.

in regard to the notion of "natural purpose" he contends that that notion remains a stranger (*Fremdlung*) in natural science, and yet it is a notion which we are compelled to bring to bear upon our experience of organic phenomena. We must judge organic bodies to be purposively constructed. So far as natural science is concerned, "physics, keeping within its own bounds, abstracts itself entirely from the question whether natural purposes are designed or undesigned, for that would be to meddle in an extraneous business, namely, metaphysics." The term design "expresses only a principle of the reflective, not the determining judgment, and so introduces no particular ground of causality, but simply adds for the use of reason a kind of investigation different from that according to mechanical laws, in order to supplement the inadequacy of the latter even for empirical research into all particular laws of nature." The principle is one which we are obliged to use in our investigation of the organized products of nature, and as such it is "an absolutely necessary maxim for the empirical use of reason."[1] Moreover, "once such a guiding thread is admitted and verified, we must at least try the said maxim of judgment in nature as a whole," and since "we can form no conception of the possibility of such a whole save by thinking, in respect of it, a supreme cause working in accordance with design," we have no alternative but to adopt the principle of "designing causality" as a necessary principle for our reflective judgment. The same principle is "the highest formal unity of things"; it is the type of formal unity which things would be expected to exhibit if they sprang from the design of a supreme reason. It cannot be an object for the understanding, because it cannot be "given" to us in sensuous intuition. It is impossible to find any scheme in the intuition for such systematic unity. Our mode of apprehension is, according to Kant, to subsume intuitions under notions. We have no direct intellectual apprehension. Our notions without sense-intuitions are empty. Accordingly, the only way in which our understanding can apprehend a whole is as a complex of parts. And if an understanding such as ours should be compelled to posit a whole as the producing principle of the parts, *i.e.* as preceding the parts, it could never be a real whole, but only an ideal whole, or an idea of the whole. When our understanding is compelled to posit an "ultimate teleological unity" as the ground of explanation of the particulars, such unity is therefore no more than analogous with a scheme of sensibility; it is "idea," and not an object of knowledge in the strict sense. Kant thinks that for an intuitive understanding the mechanical and teleological modes of explanation would doubtless fall together. He further declares that an understanding different from our own might form a representation of such a unity as is

[1] § 75.

implied in the idea of a teleological whole without also making the idea a producing cause. That is to say, to view the systematic unity of nature as a teleological system does not necessarily involve that the idea of such a teleological unity is its producing cause.

Towards the end of his treatment of the problem Kant throws out his most mature suggestion, and it is substantially the same as Plato's. Supposing we regard empirical things as things in themselves. In that case the only unity which could serve as the basis of the possibility of natural formations would be the unity of space. But space is not a real ground of the generation of things, but only their formal condition. But if we may regard the phenomenal world as being grounded in a supersensible real (though for us unknowable) ground, then everything in the phenomenal realm would be judged or estimated in accordance with mechanical laws, "while Nature in its entirety as a system we should estimate in the light of teleological laws. Thus we should estimate nature by two kinds of principle. The mechanical mode of explanation would not be excluded by the teleological as if the two principles were contradictory" (§ 77). Furthermore, Kant is convinced that the two principles could not both enter consistently into one and the same survey of nature did they not cohere in some single higher principle—a view that comes very near Plato's conception of *νοῦς* persuading *ἀνάγκη*.

IV

Plato and Kant come, then, to very similar metaphysical views of the twofold nature of determination, the one a mechanical or quasi-mechanical mode, to which every empirical event is subject; the other not a determination of part by part, or event by event, but a determination of the parts by the whole. The distinction is a distinction between causality (in a narrow sense) and ultimate ground. The recognition of the relation indicated by the term ground and consequent is an expression of the demand for intelligibility with which we set out on the business of interpreting experience. It expresses our conviction that the multiplicity presented in experience is capable of reduction to a systematic unity. In it is implied the notion of a system of interconnected parts, each part being determined by its place within the whole. The consequent may be pressed backwards and outwards through other members of the system, but it is only fully appreciated when it is recognized as not simply a part but as a part related to and conditioned by the whole. So conceived the principle of ground and consequent is a principle of "reason in her most exalted mood," guiding her work of connecting all the items of experience into one intelligible whole.

The relation of cause and effect is a narrower relation. Its recogni-

tion, too, arises with the general demand for intelligibility and unity. What is the feature that differentiates it from the wider relation of ground and consequent? Kant's way of conceiving the relation of cause and effect involves the notion of an order in which one part is determined by reference to some other part—the notion of a connected system of interrelated parts, of which no one has any claim to existence on its own account, but exists solely as a member of the whole. It is true that Kant regarded temporal sequence as essential to both the causal relationship and the subject's consciousness of its own position in the phenomenal realm, and he was led into no little inconsistency thereby. It can scarcely be maintained that temporal sequence is the essential ingredient in causal connection, and it is obviously not in virtue of temporal relationship that events are connected as cause and effect. The differentiating feature may perhaps be said (following Lotze) to be that the relation of cause and effect expresses one form of the connectedness of things, namely, their connectedness as concrete existences. Lotze drew clear distinction between connectedness in our interpretation or representation of things and connectedness among things. The latter, the relation designated by the term cause and effect, implies reciprocal action on the part of related things. What we designate respectively the cause and the effect are not actually independent entities existing in isolation from each other. So to represent them would be to involve the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" and to render the fact of duration unintelligible. Nor is it possible to conceive of a predicate or quality separating itself from one subject A, and passing over to another B, for if on the one hand A and B are independent of each other, such "passing over" is impossible, and if on the other hand A and B are not absolutely independent, the "passing over" is unnecessary because their reciprocity implies (as Lotze argues) their common dependence upon an ultimate ground. The separation of cause and effect does not correspond with any actual separation in the realm of reality. Our apprehension, for its own convenience, discriminates certain qualitative differences and denominates them cause and effect, but for reflective thought it is impossible to discover any actual separation or break in what is fundamentally continuous. Cause and effect are phases of one unbroken whole of process.

I do not propose to follow Lotze's further contention that the ultimate whole must be defined as mind or spirit. That step, as Lotze takes it, seems to involve great difficulty. What these lines of consideration seem to me to indicate may be stated summarily after the following fashion. The systematic whole, which to our processes of discrimination and comparison appears in phases and parts, is the ultimate ground upon which all causal connection ultimately rests. The connections we discern among the parts, because of their

restricted and fragmentary character, cannot forthwith be taken to be final; their complete interpretation entails an ever-widening conception of the whole to which they belong. The "mechanism" and "necessity" which characterize the parts are left in mid-air, save as it is brought into relation with the whole, which is the rational basis of the interconnected parts. The causality of the parts is not the same as their ultimate ground, which is the whole; and although the nature of the whole is beyond our thought, since we, too, are parts within the universe, yet without a "limiting notion" of the whole as a rational system our interpretation of the parts will be vitiated by the fallacy of taking those things to be separate and distinct, which, in reality, are phases of one interconnected system of reality. And if the importation of purpose into natural science is the death of that branch of knowledge, so the importation of mechanism and necessity into the idea of the whole would probably be the death of metaphysics. In Plato's language, νοῦς persuades ἀνάγκη. In Kant's language, the phenomenal connections are grounded in an intelligible supersensuous realm. In the words of Lotze's *Microcosmus*, "we granted the authority of mechanism unreservedly in so far as concerns the examination of the relations between finite things and the origin and accomplishment of any reciprocal actions whatsoever, but we as decidedly denied its authority where it claimed acceptance as a *final* theory of things." Again, "We do not set up mechanism in opposition to the mind of the Infinite as an independent hostile power which it must needs subdue; on the contrary, we see in mechanism the means by which its ends are accomplished in the phenomenal world."

REALITY IN HISTORY

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The treatment of history by philosophers seems to have entered upon a new phase, as regards the questions both what kind of knowledge we are dealing with and what is the relation of the historic experience to reality. As Professor Guido de Ruggiero pointed out in the April number of the *Journal*,[1] this interest in the problems of history has not received much recognition in English thought at present. It is the purpose of the argument of the present article to maintain that whilst there are two methods of approach to reality, the one through knowledge and speculative thought, the other through history and practical experience, a philosophical interpretation is necessary to the understanding of history, though philosophies of history as usually conceived are not possible. The dualism of experience to which reference is here made is not identical with the dualism with which Professor de Ruggiero is concerned. The contrast for him is between thinking as orientated towards the problems of natural science and as concentrated upon the problems of history. It appears to be a dualism within knowledge—the same categories are used by both science and history, but in different ways. The fact for history is "something thought, something brought within the universal relations of thought." This seems to imply a rationalistic view of history. There is, as Professor de Ruggiero argues, a way of looking at the universe *sub specie historiæ* which is equally valid with the conception of it through the categories of scientific thought. With this position I should entirely agree, but not that the two opposed forms of thought "must end in a final reunion." For there are two aspects of experience as history which appear to preclude the possibility of any type of rationalization which accords with the type required by natural science. The one is the infinite in the individuality of history, the other the creative nature of the historic advance. And this conditions the irreversibility of the time series.

Our experience, then, it is argued, is fundamentally an experience of beings who are both historic and contemplative—members, namely, of a process of change which is historic through the activity of persons, and of a world which we contemplate as object of knowledge, and which is timeless as required by the knowing mind.

[1] The present article was all but completed before I had seen Professor de Ruggiero's important article.

That the two aspects are equally essential is revealed in the experience of value, since it arises in both and demands both for its interpretation. The transition between the temporal and the eternal seems indeed a condition essential to value. If, as M. Meyerson conceives,[1] reason cannot be satisfied without an explanation which resolves all differences into identity, the task of the thinker is ever frustrated, by the irreducible element of the irrational. But he is also member of a historic process, and as such compelled to admit a reality which cannot be fully rationalized as a system of relations for the logical understanding. On the other hand, the tragedy of experience as history, its resistance to all attempts at complete ethical interpretation of its course, is relieved by the consciousness that we can at any moment of the changing process think the eternal and the perfect.

Now, when philosophy has directed itself to the explanation of human experience, as involved in a ceaseless flux, in which the multiplicity of things and variable inconstancy of events are incapable of resolution into the systematic forms demanded for rational knowledge, it has, at least in some of its greatest exponents, inclined to the interpretation of this experience as something, if not unreal, possessed at best of only a low degree of reality. Such interpretations, however, either ignore the essential reality belonging to the temporal process as experience of persons, or treat it together with every other aspect of the process as such, as a shadow, or distorted reflection of the timeless nature of existence. Thus in the orthodox Hegelianism of Bosanquet, finite beings or persons are not in the end real, whilst in the transformed Hegelianism of McTaggart, for whom reality consists in the experience of selves, their whole experience in time is involved in misperception. Yet a consideration of the results which speculative thought can reach in complete abstraction from the historic experience seems to show that either it can only present a system of intelligible forms and relations of propositions true for all possible worlds, or it must include principles which have their original source in experience in its fundamentally historic form. Except in the case of the mathematical and pure logical ideas, the forms even of Plato's ideal world depend on experience for the occasions of their discovery, and, in respect to certain of the types, the whole of their significance. The metaphysic of McTaggart, as he himself recognizes, does not rest on *a priori* principles alone, but admits characters introduced from experience, values which are first found in the life of persons.[2] "Philosophy," observes Professor Whitehead, "always does violence to that immediate experience, which we express in our actions, our

[1] Cf. *Identité et Réalité*, and *De l'Explication dans les Sciences*.

[2] *The Nature of Existence*, vol. ii, bk. v, chap. xxxvi.

hopes, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis."[1] And his reference to the universal "interplay of the static vision and the dynamic history,"[2] as also the general tenor of his whole book (*Process and Reality*) in regard to the relation of the temporal and the eternal aspects of experience, show a more sustained effort than is found, perhaps, in any other modern work, to state the inseparability of these two modes, together with the irreducible distinctness of our experiences in respect of them.

The aspect of reality as historic experience, constituted by the activity of mind in finite beings, has then its own type of reality, or noumenal nature, which resists all attempts to translate it into a system of knowledge in which time and change as such do not count. History in this view must be idealistically conceived. This holds good whether we think of history in the usual significance of the term for the historian, or in a more universal and subjective sense, as meaning the experience of individuals in their relations with each other, and with the material of events, indifferent to value, *qua* unrelated to mind. For this experience is only history in so far as value and disvalue are found in it by the human agents. Otherwise stated, it becomes a process which is real for minds through the meaning they both bring and find in it. History involves a relation between events and persons; its actuality depends on the forms of good and evil which thus arise. It may be said that all individuals who act in the consciousness of freedom are taking part in the construction of history in this sense. The personalities whom we rightly regard as great are those whose lives are most constantly pervaded by the apprehension of meaning in the succession of events, so that no part of the process is indifferent to them, valueless. But this is because they are themselves creative of value. That spiritual quality, which they find in experience, it is the function of the real self or person to bring.

It does not follow that those epochs or concatenations of events which are regarded as historic in a great or special sense are always or usually those in which such personalities have been numerous, or recognized as dominating. The creative personality may be that of the historian. Whatever the meaning for humanity of the events of the Peloponnesian war, it is from the point of view of Thucydides that they have been informed with the greater part of that value which has made them a "possession for ever," an everlasting object of human memory. Also, as will be argued, our ignorance of the true historic process is too profound for any very sure insight into the dramatic moments, the real "turning-points" of history, and whether

[1] *Process and Reality*, Part II, chap. i, sect. v.
[2] *Ibid.*, Part II, chap. vii, sect. v.

they are discoverable in those fragments or "rags" (Dilthey's expression) of the past which have floated down to us.

An interpretation of history, to which that suggested in this article has some similarity, was expressed by Professor Radl of Prague at the International Congress of Philosophy, held at Oxford last September. The main contention of his paper, entitled "History without Evolution," was that "History and civilization, which is a product of history, cannot be reduced to nature." The concept of the "event" he treated as "fundamental in history—something done which cannot be undone, an island thrown up in the stream of eternal process and standing there fast, events and dates which are essential to them, but not to any theory of evolution—refer primarily to an idea, something which can be understood, but cannot be grasped by the sensuous organs." This seems essentially true, but it is further important to examine the nature of this fundamental historic fact, termed event. Another term is perhaps needed to express the primary historic object, that into which the active self has put the value which is personal and unique in him, and which the genius of the true historian finds again. "Event" hardly seems sufficiently to indicate the product of personality, it does not declare itself to be the thing of the person, its substance created by his act. The term "deed" might better fulfil this purpose. It is nearer than event to the agent, suggests more intimately his work. In the Greek *drama* or deed (δρὰμα), absorbing into itself the deep significance with which history and tragedy have informed it, the word seems to stand for the profoundest meaning of the deed, the irretrievability which has immediately upon action descended upon the free creative act.

The idea of value in the interpretation of history is used in various ways by different thinkers. Rickert (quoted by Professor Radl) signified by values what would be termed by certain others historical categories, "state, religion, science, morality, economy, war," etc. It is evident that very diverse historic ideas or forces are here brought together. It has already been suggested that originally, and prior to the interpretation of history by categories such as these, which should be distinguished as the objective view, the historic experience in which we find one great type of reality must be thought of as essentially subjective. It is therefore not directly communicable. Signor Croce's famous dictum that all history is contemporary[1] is illuminating in connection with this position. There is a sense in which the history of which the historian writes seems truly conceived in this way. Leaving aside the vast region of the prehistoric, and the problem of its reconstruction by the

[1] *Theory and History of Historiography*, Part I, sect. i, translated by Douglas Ainslie.

modern mind, even in relation to historic times, reflection shows the extraordinary fragmentariness of the data on the basis of which the historian weaves an artistic whole of events. For every well-conceived history is a work of art, even though it produce an overpowering impression of confusion and variety, lack of all discernible moral or rational meaning. This effect itself is art; the impression that there is no significance in a passage of life can only be for the mind whose nature it is to seek value everywhere.

We may think of recorded history as a theatre in which the historian presents personages who are unconsciously acting for posterity. But it is not in the green room behind the stage that they have attired themselves or learned their parts. It is posterity inspired by the historian that bestows upon these shadowy figures some substantiality, and hears them speak words appropriate to the plan of action assigned to them. At best the actors enact on the stage episodes in general brief, and even insignificant in relation to the real life they lived beyond these scenes. And the indefinitely greater mass of humanity were never on the stage at all.

The historic reality cannot be expressed in the pages of the historian, the written records with their often obscure significance. We are given by the historian a great panorama, drama, or collection of dramas which have an interest different in quality from the dramatic, because we perceive these events as occurring in the same universe of temporal and spatial existence as that to which our present experience belongs. We attribute existence to the personages, they do not merely "subsist," to use the logical distinction. Yet in respect to the meaning of their thoughts, feelings, deeds, the question of truth as historic reality, and not merely as an intelligible system of events conceived through categories, the inner truth and not alone the coherence, depends upon the thought of the historian. This is in part determined by the indefinable changing factor we term the spirit of the age, in part by the whole of his own spiritual experience. He endeavours, as Croce says, to re-live past experience, but he cannot make this to be more than an experience of his own, unless we allow the possibility of a special historic sympathy and intuition, by means of which he can share the point of view of the persons with whom the narrative is concerned.

Now, from the standpoint of the reality of history in its source in the experience of subjects, individuality seems all in all and infinite. Historic interpretation would be immensely simplified if we could agree with Croce that we ought to leave alone "that infinite which grows bigger the moment we first touch it." He argues eloquently from the impossibility of knowing more than a fraction of the histories of the past, Greek and Roman civilizations for instance, and the uncertainty of the interpretation of even those fragments.

Passing from great to little histories, what can be known even of any one individual? We must then, he insists, concentrate on that particular point which "constitutes living, active history, contemporary, and regard the lost and irrecoverable history as "the eternal phantom of the thing in itself."[1]

We may endorse Croce's view that the endless detail is unknowable as detail, without accepting his interpretation of this fact. This infinite nature of historic experience is not unreality, a spectre to be exorcised if we would make history intelligible. Such a view ignores the truth that history *is* unintelligible except as proceeding from the creative activity of persons, and that it is in the nature of personality that this infinity lies. Croce, however, conceives of history as the development of the one spirit. The infinite of history would on this view be a phantom called up by the false assumption that history is a chronicle of the past, consisting of a multiplicity of experiences. Since the spirit is for him all reality, he cannot allow to history that reality by which it is surely constituted, the individual processes of finite minds. The doctrine of history as the work of the universal spirit, of which individuals are manifestations and instruments, seems—not less than Hegel's philosophy of history (the *a priori* method of which Croce condemns[2])—to empty of significance the whole drama of humanity. His remarkable attempt to unite history and philosophy cannot escape the insuperable difficulty attending on an attempt to combine the philosophies of the one and of the many in the sphere of history. For neither is history made intelligible nor does knowledge attain unity and completeness, since "The work of the spirit is not finished, and never will be finished." A similar problem arises for the philosophy of Signor Gentile, which has affinities with that of Croce.[3] The paradox which results, if the reality of the process and the categories of practice are retained, together with rejection or subordination of the reality of the many individuals, is even more evident in Gentile's system, because he conceives the one mind as "transcendental ego," and ascribes to it the ethical functions of the individuals whose reality is resolved into this.

In these philosophies of the Italian Idealists we have then impressive, but as it seems necessarily unsuccessful, attempts to combine the concept of the spiritual process as the reality of history with the inherently distinct concept of universal mind. The truth, on the other hand, which is brilliantly revealed in these types of historic idealism is that the primary and essential reality of history is

[1] *Op. cit.*, Part I, sect. iii.

[2] *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, Part V, translated by Douglas Ainslie.

[3] *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, translated by H. Wildon Carr.

almost, if not wholly, incapable of presentation as object of knowledge in the historian's narrative. The ground for this may be found in the nature of historic experience, as consisting in the creative activity of selves. For since the self is always subject, there is no direct knowledge of that which proceeds from its inner life, the substance of its deeds. (In Croce's view, the reason is differently conceived, since it is not in the finite individuals as such, but in that which is universal in them that lies the source of history.) As regards the self that we conceive ourselves to know as object, we do not know this—even our own ego—by "acquaintance" but by construction. Space does not permit of a statement of the grounds for rejecting the view defended in recent metaphysics by J. E. McTaggart[1] that we do know in present imperfect experience or appearance one self, our own, by acquaintance, and in reality we have direct knowledge also of other selves. In the case, indeed, of self-knowledge there does exist a unique intimacy between subject and object, due to the fact that the object constructed is primarily a projection of the subject, elaborated and intellectualized, unconsciously and consciously, by constant reflection on the generalizations we make concerning the other selves also constructed. An analysis of the nature of autobiography would be found to support this interpretation of self-knowledge. It could be shown that the autobiographer is actually working from two points of view unconsciously combined. From the one he is treating his theme mainly as an object which he is peculiarly well fitted to know. From the other, the subject is universally present as fount and origin of that which constitutes the object. He is the source and very activity of the events or deeds both now as he thinks them and then as he acted them, and as having endowed with value truly or falsely the data of the natural process. He is the "I think," but also and originally the *I make.*

As regards other selves, *a fortiori* they are not known as subjects, except in so far as we allow the possibility of that understanding through historic genius, which would resemble æsthetic intuition. To this would correspond that knowledge of our fellow-beings which is possible for all through love. Since then even the selves of present experience with these rare exceptions cannot be in their reality directly known, how should such a knowledge—even without taking account of the fragmentariness of the records—be handed on in purity through the reinterpretations of successive generations and historians to a later age?

There is, however, a secondary form or type of truth which can be attributed to written history, and to the achievement of which it appears to have a claim similar in kind—though the standard is

[1] *The Nature of Existence,* vol. ii, bk. v, chap. xxxvi.

more difficult to reach in history—to the claim of the natural sciences to truth in their systems of laws, their correlations of data, and the ascription of reality to that which can be measured. Quantitative measurement, indeed, is not appropriate to history, and the human sciences in which it is applied are subject to the most abstract of the historical categories. But as the universal is the object of science, and the discursive method traces the interrelations of objects, the inner nature of which it cannot lay bare, so may history proceed in its treatment of the more general characters of human events, and arrangement of a mass of data under some one principle or category. The categorial treatment of history, though not always recognized as such, has appeared both to historians and philosophers to be its justification as a great department of knowledge. In the philosophical interpretations this does not, any more than in that of historians, necessarily involve denial of the ultimate reality of time, and the treatment of special forms of the process as reducible to logical forms, though such denial and reductions may seem to be the goal to which they point.

We may regard primarily as categorical all those methods in which history is treated as the theatre in which laws, principles, movements are manifested, the rise and fall of empires, nations, constitutions, the evolution of guilds, trade unions, and so forth. At their lowest degree of truth such explanatory categories are comparable to the slogans of political life, in their abstraction of some one facet of truth, where truth has innumerable facets, *i.e.* in so far as they treat this abstraction as though it corresponded to the whole actuality of the individuals from whose activities the history proceeds. At their highest they are near to the direct expression of these subject selves. The personages themselves, however, of categorical history are in a manner types, laws, categories in relation to the other persons in the background. For the narrative suggests that the meaning of an age or the rise or fall of a nation is summed up in them, their lives overshadow or interpenetrate the rest which appear as minor accompaniments, so to speak, to a symphony played by those personages, and have little other significance; their unique points of view and experience are lost.

In Gibbons's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* a vast mass of the fragmentary materials that have reached us, from the records of a considerable period of history, is surveyed under the concept drawn from a striking impression of the essence of the process. The category seems to provide the structure of a complete picture. However fractional in relation to the real experience of the human beings of those centuries, the history seems completely to fill the concept, the Roman Empire in its decay stands before us. The category has, in fact, enclosed within clear-cut limits something

which in its nature is infinite. Or, rather, in attempting this it has allowed the limitless reality to escape, and what is presented to us is a great work of art, which possesses also a secondary truth. But the human experience has vanished except in so far as it may be brought on to the stage, as contributory to the illustration of the idea. On a still more majestic scale this is the method of Hegel's philosophy of history, though here the idea completely dominates, and the empirical element is much less in proportion. The weakness of philosophies of history in general results from their treatment as their basis, of those categories which form the structure of the type of history which has a secondary truth as object of knowledge.

The search for one most universal category, the motive of which lies in our striving as knowers for a single uniting principle, seems incapable of termination in a valid historic concept. This was recognized by Wilhelm Dilthey, who appears to be regarded in Germany as the greatest historian in the sphere of history of the mind since Hegel. Reality as it is he finds "in the inner experience of given spiritual facts," whilst "nature presents herself to us as a mere shadow, cast by a reality hidden from us," and "The elements of the historical world are individuals."[1] He regards philosophy of history in Germany, and sociology in England and France (meaning sociology as conceived by Comte), as sciences which claim to be a knowledge of the whole of the historic actuality on the basis of the study of individuals in all their relationships. The error in both lies in the presentation of the singular and individual as mere raw material for the abstractions on which these sciences are based. The task of finding "a final simple word" corresponding to the true meaning of history seems to Dilthey meaningless, for it would involve the resolution of an immeasurably complex whole into its elements. From the standpoint of this article his view is undeniably just. The idea of a philosophy of history in the sense in which he rejects its possibility is invalid, for it signifies the application of the concept of the world as knowledge, pointing to the ideal of the non-temporal unity, to the aspect of the world as the process of creative personalities in time. In the domain of history as experiences of persons we cannot look for an ultimate unity, in the meaning that the whole process manifests the operation of a single idea. The only universal principle that is conceivable in this sphere would be found in the nature of personalities, since these are the sources of history.

From this point of view the meaning of history consists in the fact that it is a necessary condition for the creation and experience of value, or its manifestation in living beings. Thus that which, apart from the experience of value, is a process of nature becomes

[1] *Gesammelte Schriften*, I Band, p. 86.

history. Out of the values which emerge in the course of history there arise those that we think of as having an absolute character. For in spite of the seeming relativity of forms of value to changing purposes and historic situations, it is the demand of the individual in the transience of his experience for the absolute and eternal which is the source of his striving for value. Without this he is nothing—no self but a thing of nature. Therefore, since we are capable of the experience of knowledge we transfer our values to a timeless world, and find there reflected the experience attending on every moment of insight into the higher values, namely, that there is in it something that transcends change. If instead of history, in its characteristic form, we could possess genuine biographies of all those individuals, fragments or fleeting impressions of whose lives enter into the generalized accounts or large-scale narratives of some social or national episode, we should understand the passage from the essential experiences of their lives to the ideas of the great values, we should perceive how love, beauty, truth, become from subjective and inter-subjective experiences objective ideals of humanity. This indeed we do perceive in unwritten biographies, in ordinary lives at those moments when either some crisis or a slight seeming incident enables us to see the whole life from a certain point of view as it is seen by the true biographer.

The categories, on the other hand, belonging to history in the usual sense of written history, with its secondary form of truth, arise mainly from the attempt to treat history as object of scientific knowledge. The most important of them, however, are not without a basis in original experience. Thus when the history of a nation is written, the idea of nation is used as a category, since this history cannot include the real experience of all the selves referred to as constituting the nation. But the object we think of as nation is nearer to the reality of the individuals than the object we term, for instance, economic organization of society. The construction of the object is in one respect due to the need of the mind in making history intelligible. But the fact is already there before we think of it as nation, if only in inchoate form. It has arisen in the process in which the individuals demand some value in the events and doings to which they are first driven by life-needs, and which involve many complex forms of interrelation through co-operation.

A brief reference must be made—though the subject cannot be fully discussed in this article—to the bearing of this view of the reality of the historic experience upon the ethical value, the primary value of experience as history. Ethical theory appears to have suffered on account of the abstraction of its study from that of history, which has on the whole led to an over-simplification. The incomplete recognition of the real distinction between the two

aspects of experience, experience of the world as object of knowledge or intelligible system and as historic process, has led to an over-rationalistic concept of the ethical facts and principles. Abstracted from history, they are viewed under the form or category of some ideal system, analogous in the world of practice to the scientific system for knowledge. Such is Aristotle's concept of the pursuit of ends which again become means to further ends until the pursuit rests in the attainment of the highest end or chief good. From the standpoint of actual life, we may ask why must the movement rest in achievement? This is not true to the nature of human striving. But Aristotle cannot admit the notion of a pursuit which goes on without limit. It is inadmissible on logical grounds. In the history of finite minds, however, the law seems to be an unending striving towards a goal which ever recedes, an end which is never contemplated with the tranquil acceptance of the intelligible object of knowledge. This seems to be the principle of human nature, not discoverable, perhaps, in psychological analysis, nor by means of such types of ethical inquiry as probe the question whether the moral faculty is a kind of sense, or rational intuition, or reflective generalization, but exemplified throughout history, biography, and practical life. Without the postulate that there is in man's nature some principle or force which drives him to transcend his limits, human history in its greatness and littleness is unintelligible.

But the operations of this principle cannot be fully rationalized. A remarkable illustration is seen in Kant, the moral philosopher who has most profoundly stated the belief that reality is to be found in the practical life. It is in the consciousness of duty, the "ought," that he finds the fact whose certainty is so great that all the postulates required to justify it, God, freedom, immortality, must be admitted. But he can give no account of this reality, excepting by transferring it to the intelligible or transcendent realm, and thus creating for himself the insoluble problem of the relation of a timeless being to the temporal world in which all his actions take place. It is difficult, indeed, to understand how, endowed as he was with so intense a consciousness of the fundamental moral facts, Kant failed to perceive that ethics is inseparable from the condition of the irreversibility of the temporal order which cannot be represented in the intelligible world. It must also be admitted that Kant's lofty conception of the moral idea as the fulfilment of a law self-imposed does not fully satisfy the moral demand for creative morality, a pioneering advance towards further moralization of the historic process. Many other ethical systems seem to be weakened by too static or insufficiently dynamic a conception of their principles, and this is explicable as due to the undue influence of the unhistoric method.

The static standpoint in ethics is illustrated in some of the con-

siderations of the problems of right and good, which have been much debated in recent ethical discussions. Professor W. D. Ross argues[1] that an act may be right which is not morally good, because its rightness is to be judged in abstraction from its motive. Also it is not right unless the precise duty it is to perform is in fact fulfilled, however perfect the performance of his part by the agent. Frustration by unforeseen circumstances, over which the agent had no control, takes away its rightness. Such circumstances might be the breakdown of a train, the carelessness of a postman. This suggests the question whether there can be an absolutely right act, good under all circumstances. If we substitute for the post and transport facilities the general environmental conditions of the particular age, its machinery for practice, social intercommunication, etc., it results that the act which is right in one age and society is not right, because not possible, in another. No doubt it may be said that such conditions are external to the rightness of the act simply or universally considered, but they become in one form or another, according to the *de facto* instruments for performance, internal to the rightness of some one act. Such qualifications, however, open the door to a relativity which may affect the ethical content of the act so long as the separation between the right and the morally good is maintained. What is completely right in one situation is not so in another. In this example is revealed the difficulty of dealing adequately with the problem of moral conduct as a whole, if the rightness of particular acts is investigated apart from the question of the moral quality of the motive. Looking at the action as a whole, the act will be ethically right if it proceeds from the essential quality of the self rightly adjusted to reality.

How would the greatest moral problems of life be met on the principles of Professor Ross's method? It seems that any act in connection with these can only be judged in relation to the whole nature of the agent, conditioning the contribution he can make to the value of existence. Will it be better, for instance, to follow the impulse to play a missionary, reforming rôle in some direction in which there is scope, or to fulfil all the usual duties of the normal life if these alternatives are mutually exclusive? Not merely the understanding of himself and his social relations is required for an answer, but the sense of history and perception of what has been done for mankind by the men of "Leistung," who have a sense of a dedicated life.[2] Are their attempts worthless if they have failed? Or is there a value, and even one of the highest, in the fact that such men have shown what man can attempt, or widened the limits of human endeavour? A study of ethics, in closer relation with history,

[1] *The Right and the Good.*

[2] So characterized by Max Dessoir in his *Æsthetik.*

it is argued, would support the view that moral value proceeds from the principle of personality. In the severance of the subject from history a certain aridity seems to attach to many of the ethical discussions of the present as of earlier times, and a somewhat negative attitude as to the possibility of moral progress.

THE CONSTANT AND THE CONTINGENT IN HUMAN THOUGHT AND LIFE

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1. THE business of philosophy is "to think things together," so far as the reality of things and the capacity of thought allow. That reality presents many contrasts, physical, ethical, metaphysical, light and darkness, life and death, good and evil, right and wrong, the One and the many, the Infinite and the finite, the Eternal and the temporal, and what we mention as last, but not least, for our immediate purpose, Being and Becoming, the Constant and the Contingent. The contrasts need not be regarded as contradictions, negations one of another, as thought the Eleatics with their emphasis on Being, or the Heraclitics with their preference for Becoming. To our immediate scrutiny *all stands* and *all flows* may be irreconcilable oppositions; but Einstein is teaching us that there is *relativity* in all our interpretations of reality. We need not with Indian thought declare Brahma alone real, and all else *Maya*, illusion.

When we come to examine human thought and life we are confronted with the constant and the contingent; there is human nature, there are human experience and character. There is a constancy in the capacity of the human mind, there is a contingency in its contents. It is not wisdom with the realist to consider only phenomena, nor with the idealist to ignore them; for the constant is expressing itself in and is affected by the contingent. It seems worth while to follow out this relation in details.

2. When Comte formulated his law of three states or stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific, he fell into this error of phenomenalism, and failed to recognize that these are not contingent phases, but constant factors of human thought and life. When under the influence of Clothilde de Vaux, he added in his own judgment of himself the rôle of Paul to that of Aristotle, and placed his *Positive Polity* alongside of his *Positive Philosophy*, he did recognize that there was more in heaven and earth than he had at first dreamed of in his philosophy. When further, to get his social ideal going, he invented his Religion of Humanity, he recognized in the contingent theological phase a constant factor of human thought and life. Just as it is now generally accepted that the positive or scientific explanation does not exhaust the significance, and still less appraises the value of total reality, but that philosophy is necessary as a complementary interpretation, so do many thinkers still hold

that the final illumination can come only from theology as rendering explicit the implicit intellectual content of religion as faith in God. Even Herbert Spencer, on the basis of science, tried to formulate a synthetic philosophy; he could not ignore religion, but he tried to rid himself of any interference from theology with his philosophy of the Known, by relegating religion to the vaster but less substantial and satisfying region of the Unknowable. So deep rooted, so firmly fixed, so widely spread is religion in the constancy of human nature, that in recent years there have been several attempts at religion without God, religion without revelation, religion in which man enthrones himself as self-sufficing and self-satisfying, as all the god he can or need know.

3. While, to write frankly, the main motive of this essay is to claim for religion a place in human thought and life as a constant factor, and not a contingent phase only, the general purpose is wider, a quite untechnical examination of the constant factors, and their relation to the contingent phases, in human evolution. There are two *caveats* which at the outset may be offered. I do not accept either the biological assumption that man is to be explained mainly by his animal ancestry or the anthropological assumption that the savage of to-day shows us what primitive man once was. I have dealt with the conception of man, to which I have been led by reflexion and study in both of my recent books, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* and *The Christian Ideal or Human Society*, so that I need not here discuss the matter in detail. On both these points I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with so eminent a man of science as Dr. J. Arthur Thomson, who assigns to instinct a far more restricted function in human life than does Dr. McDougall, and who refuses to regard the primitive state as being as low as that of some savages. Only this need now be said. It seems to me we should use the word *instinct* only when there is a direct and constant sequence of impression, affect, and expression without any deliberation or decision. Man has inherited animal appetites, passions, impulses; but his treatment of them, as in sex and parenthood, is so varied, and so different from that of the lower animals, and the result in his experience and character so far removed, that it can cause only confusion to apply the same term to his conduct as to animal reactions, even when some intelligence and some volition therein may be conceded. What man has become in culture, civilization, character, society, institutions, morals, and religion is so far removed from what the lower animals have remained, that it is unreasonable so to magnify the significance of the *raw material* which appears common to man and other animals as to depreciate the value of the *finished article* which is so entirely different. Without denying the descent of man from an animal ancestry, the ascent of

man to human personality and all its discoveries and achievements has been such that we are justified in believing that in the evolution there emerged (to use the current term) something original and unique as man's natural endowment, so that the savage is a degenerate and the civilized a developed primitive man.

4. That there has been development goes without saying. Very lowly, crude, and rude were the beginnings, as far as we can trace them, of all man's capacities and relations. There was a childhood of the race, but how far we have travelled on the road to maturity only he could tell who saw both end and beginning of human history. Because the working of man's mind in some peoples is so different from ours does not justify Lévy Brühl's assumption of a *different mentality*; for a sympathetic reflexion can rethink these thoughts, and see a "method in their madness" as it may appear to a censorious critic. We cannot highly regard the man who ridicules the ways of the child; and even so, it is a mistake and wrong to try and discredit the constant factor in religion because the contingent phase in the less developed faiths have now been superseded.

(*a*) An illustration may here be given. Leuba distinguishes three types of behaviour, *the mechanical behaviour*, *the coercitive behaviour* or Magic, *the anthropopathic behaviour*, which includes religion.[1] He adds: "If science is to be provided with an ancestor, and only with one, it should be this first type of behaviour rather than Magic." He desires to preserve the credit of science, and to discredit religion as well as Magic. What is common to all three must not, however, be ignored; man recognized power or powers in nature, for his own good he desired to gain control of them. In regard to some phenomena, he discovered that he could have direct control; others, the unfamiliar, unusual, unexpected, he sought to control by formulæ or rites in the case of magic, by prayer to spirits or gods in religion. As his knowledge extended, much that had led to coercitive behaviour passed over to mechanical behaviour. What did not so pass, as beyond the natural order, might go over to religion, as concerned with what lies beyond nature. Magic was thus an intermediate sphere between science and religion, when their provinces were not yet defined. With science magic has in common the belief that there are causal relations, and that man can control these. With religion it had in common that it did not regard the mechanical behaviour as adequate to meet all human needs. It pointed to something beyond human knowledge, but as yet not beyond control; in religion that is recognized which is beyond human control. There is something in religion which has survived magic, because it is a constant factor, whereas magic was a contingent phase.

(*b*) Religion is not a knowledge of with a view to control over

[1] *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*, p. 12.

natural phenomena; it has been profoundly mistaken when here it has set up as a rival to science. It is a recognition, coming down from earliest times, of a reality beyond and above natural phenomena; and its lowly beginnings, no more than those of science, discredit the subsequent development. Of religion, as of science, the just judgment is not how it began, but what has it become. Yet it is the almost invariable practice of scientist or philosophers opposed to religion to identify its nature with its beginnings, or its rudest and crudest forms, in the present day. The path of science is strewed with discarded hypotheses; at the present moment science is busy, as such a book as Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World*, or Jeans', *The Universe Around Us*, shows, with revising its fundamental conceptions; but who would think of discrediting science because Einstein has compelled a reconsideration of Newtonian physics? And philosophy, too, has gone down side-tracks and been brought to a *cul de sac*, as was Locke's theory of knowledge in Hume's scepticism; it has got again on the main road of advance in Kant. But who would bar its onward march? It is to theology alone that some thinkers would never allow a place of repentance for the sins of its youth.

5. What, then, are the constant factors, often most inadequately expressed in their contingent phases, of human thought and life? For our present purpose we may begin with the three generally recognized ideals, Truth, Beauty, Holiness, or Goodness; but we must add, if we are to recognize the facts of human history, utility at one end (the lower) and religion at the other end (the higher). (*a*) As is well known, Croce has placed economics beside ethics as activities of the practical reason, and I think him right. While there cannot be the same uniformity in the supply of bodily needs as in the pursuit of any of the ideals, yet human thought has rightly in recent years concerned itself about human welfare in the widest sense, and the corporate as well as individual obligations it imposes. And this constant factor should have a place in study and reflexion proportionate to its practical importance. (*b*) As regards the ideal of truth it seems to me we ought, as has already been suggested, to recognize as complementary the explanation of science and the interpretation of philosophy; but no defence of such a contention should be necessary in these pages devoted to philosophical studies. One thing I must add, a great deal of philosophy seems to me to be too intellectualist, basing metaphysics too exclusively on science, and not recognizing adequately the approaches to reality in morality and religion. A philosopher who aims at a complete interpretation of reality has no right to ignore these data, so great has been the part they have played in the thought and life of man. If he does not allow them to influence his conclusions, he is bound at least to show adequate

reasons for the course he is taking. (*c*) As regards morality, I maintain that it must be accepted as a distinctive, original datum of human personality. There is a categorical imperative, only gradually disclosed, and in its application conditioned by the actual and the desirable. I cannot agree either with the positivist, who treats moral customs, standards, institutions, as only *facts*, inevitable products of a process of social evolution, or the *utilitarian*, that the obligatory is to be identified with the desirable as desired by man. There is no space now to justify this conviction. (*d*) The standards of Beauty are less variable than those of utility, but also less rigid than those of morality. But I am not prepared to subscribe to the judgment, *De gustibus non disputandum*. Is there not a constant factor as well as contingent phases of man's appreciation of Beauty, whether in Nature or in Art? Beauty is a constant feature in Nature, although the recognition of that beauty is not a constant feature of human culture. Art schools come and go, and it is the manner of the devotees of these schools to show their exclusive piety towards the fashions of the hour by arrogant disrespect to the fashions of a previous age. Nevertheless, there are masterpieces of Art that hold their unshaken sway over the æsthetic sense of many generations.

6. What development there is in any of these responses of the human spirit to the world around, which provides the environment which evokes them, is accepted not as a condemnation of the earlier by the later phases, but as a necessary and desirable advance from age to age. Why should religion then be made an exception, and the convictions of the modern Christian, who has no quarrel with the progress in any sphere of human activity, but has learned to take account sincerely and candidly of all in the thought of to-day which demands a restatement, be discredited as on the same level of intelligence as the savage, haunted by the fear of demons and ghosts? Religion, as a recognition of reality beyond and above nature and man, goes back to the very beginnings of human history; it is found among all races and in all ages. Individuals may feel no need of it, and hail their emancipation from it; but it has had so general and permanent a function in human society that it has an equal claim with these other facts of man's evolution. It has also the same right as these to adopt its expressions in creed and code, ritual and polity to the total conditions of thought and life in any place at any time. It is true that the exponents of religion, and even of the Christian religion, have been only too prone to identify its permanent content as a relation of man amid the temporal to the eternal with its transitory forms, and in an ignorant and unintelligent conservatism to oppose these transitory forms to the inevitable changes, intellectual, moral, social. The critics of religion are not justified, however, in seizing hold on these exponents as typical, and disregarding those who have

recognized the duty of harmonizing religion with other human activities.

7. The conclusions with which I desire to end this article are: (1) that religion, no less than science, philosophy, art, morality, as spontaneous responses of the mind of man to his environment, is a constant factor in human development; (2) that as in these other factors the contingent phases, partial and defective as they are, should not be used to discredit its enduring value; (3) that as there is a common human nature and one world as its environment, these factors are not in any necessary antagonism to one another, and that, where their phases are opposed to one another, a deeper scrutiny can disclose a reconciliation. Religion is not a substitute for, or rival of science, philosophy, or any other aspect of human activity. It relates man to what is *above* and *beyond* the world, with which these other activities are concerned, and even man himself, although the reality with which it is concerned is one that man can believe to be akin to what he knows to be highest in himself and even within all in which his reach of aspiration exceeds his grasp of achievement. As religion in its development anthropomorphises that reality, it recognizes no less its transcendence of than its immanence in the human. In a previous article in this *Journal* I tried to show that religion needs God, an object of faith, worship, devotion, in which man sees in infinite and eternal reality his ideals of truth, beauty, holiness; and if it rises to the level of Christian faith, so intimate a communion of God with man, and man with God, that it can add the ideal of love, perfect personality in God communicating itself to and finding its satisfaction in imperfect and yet progressive personality in man. Such a belief, while it must needs be a personal faith, may become a completion of all the other factors of human development. Accepting frankly and fully the conclusions of science, not necessarily of men of science, who have strayed into philosophy, it may give a personal meaning to the energy, all pervasive, to which physics is leading; it challenges no account of evolution as emergent, when it prefers to use the noun Creator for the adjective creative, as the power which can alone account for the process. No moral ideal is narrowed or lowered, when moral perfection is conceived as eternally real. What for the soul, hungering and thirsting for God, is the supreme value, is also the conservation of all other values. Man thus can be not an exile, but at home in the Universe, because akin to its Source and Goal above and beyond itself and him.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

GENTILE has published a book[1] whose title promises much more than it actually fulfills. It entices the reader with the promise of a history of Italian philosophy, which it then limits by a sub-title in smaller type to the period from Genovesi to Galluppi. Even with this restriction the promise is not carried out in the text, which resolves itself into a collection of critical and erudite researches on Neapolitan philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These researches had already been published by Gentile, about thirty years ago, under the more modest and appropriate title *From Genovesi to Galluppi, Historical Researches* (Bari, 1903). In the preface to the new edition he justifies the change of title in a strange enough manner, saying he was led to do it partly because he was " encouraged by the success of the first edition," partly because, outside the Kingdom of Naples, " the other regions in Italy during the century that divides Vico and Rosmini had no thinkers of sufficient vigour to be considered as carrying on the historical evolution of speculative thought." This is an extremely rash and arbitrary affirmation. In the period studied by Gentile, Northern Italy had thinkers such as Beccaria, Romagnosi, Verri, of far greater importance, and who have at any rate made a far more widespread impression on culture than have such thinkers as Melchiorre Delfico or Pasquale Borrelli, to whom Gentile devotes almost the whole of the first volume of his researches. The work does not carry out its undertaking even within the limits of a history of Southern thought, for it has crossed with one bound the whole of the Neapolitan encyclopædic movement, which had famous representatives such as Filangieri, Pagano, Galante, etc. To claim to give a history of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, and to omit illuminism, the acme of the period, is a somewhat strange pretension.

But leaving aside the unfulfilled promises, let us pass on to examine what the book actually does give us. As I have pointed out, it is composed of erudite researches, held together by the more or less extrinsic bonds of space and time, without the slightest attempt to reconstruct the intimate genesis of the Southern mind, after the style of Croce, for example, in his *History of the Kingdom of Naples*. Each author stands by himself, and since they are almost all of minor importance (except Galluppi and Colecchi) the interest of the book very often flags; the more so that Gentile with scholastic pedantry expounds their thought and imparts to each one a lesson in philosophy, discussing their mistakes like a conscientious pedagogue with his advanced pupils. It is an antiquated method of writing the history of philosophy, used and abused by Gentile in all his works. It has some pedagogic usefulness for those who are beginning the study of philosophy, but for those who are interested in the history of the human mind it has the serious defect of overlooking the intrinsic reasons for the separate orientations of thought and their relations with the feelings and exigencies of the time, and of centring all the attention on a monotonous dynastic succession of systems, succeeding

[1] GIOVANNI GENTILE, *Storia della filosofia italiana (dal Genovesi al Galluppi)*. Milano, Treves, 1930, 2ª ediz., 2 vol. pp. xv, 272, 270.

one another without pause, the last one being—for Gentile, Hegelian as he is—at once the measure of the value of the preceding ones and the temporary goal of the historical future.

Gentile's researches begin with Antonio Genovesi, better known as an economist than as a philosopher—and with good reason, for as an economist he founded in the Kingdom of Naples a branch of study, much neglected there but flourishing in the rest of Europe during the eighteenth century. If the economic doctrines of Genovesi were not very original, at least they helped to diffuse throughout Southern Italy the ideas of the French Physiocratic School, only with such modifications as the particular conditions of Neapolitan economics suggested, altering certain aspects of the Physiocratic teaching which were too radical. From Genovesi a large army of economists derived their spiritual origin, economists who illustrated with the spirit of realism, open to exigencies of reform amd renovation, the conditions of agriculture, commerce, and industry in the Kingdom of Naples. This side of Genovesi's work is not touched by Gentile, who confines himself instead to the more technically philosophical side, which incidentally is the side of secondary importance. In philosophy Genovesi was a disciple of Locke, and even here his own teaching left some trace. Empiricism and sensism were to some extent the official trends of Neapolitan thought during the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, until the eclecticism of Cousin introduced, with the new spiritualistic fashion, some hint of German philosophy. Writers such as Delfico, Borrelli, Bozzelli, to whom Gentile devotes chapter after chapter of extenuating prolixity, have no other importance beyond that of being a mouthpiece of foreign doctrines: an importance which, at the same time, must not be neglected, because at that period Italy was trying to insert herself in the great currents of European thought from which the Counter-reformation had cut her off; trying thus to regain possession of the original motives of the Renaissance, which, immaturely suppressed in Italy, had for the last two centuries been largely nourished by European thought.

The first fruits of this long and obscure labour of initiation matured in the first half of the nineteenth century with the philosophical work of Pasquale Galluppi (1770–1846), where, although traces of an incomplete assimilation are still easily recognizable, one can discern an effort towards fresh personal elaboration. Galluppi held himself to be a professed empiricist and firm adversary of the philosophy of Kant; and taking him literally, we must have considered him an epigone of eighteenth-century thought. Spaventa, however, had already shown that the indications were otherwise, that Galluppi's real contribution to Italian philosophy was something else, that beneath his supposed empiricism there lay in gestation a criticism not very different from that of Kant. Viewed thus, his professed and ostensible hostility towards Kant showed that Galluppi himself was unconscious of his speculative position, and that therefore the new mental exigencies proceeded spontaneously from the body of his empiricism. Gentile, taking Spaventa's thesis, has documented with minute care the presence of these spontaneous Kantian motives, and shows that Galluppi's criticisms of Kant, far from diminishing them, reconfirm them by the very fact that they are founded on misunderstandings, common enough at that time, of the Kantian *Critique*. In a word, Galluppi was defending himself from a false Kant in the name of exigencies which, without his being aware of it, were analogous to those of authentic Kantism. A recognition so reluctant was doubtless worth more than a servile adherence; but at the same time it carried with it the danger of all historical misunderstandings, that of isolating from one another two

analogous mental positions, and thus of impoverishing and rendering sterile the one which would most have needed the support of the other. From Galluppi, to Rosmini, to Gioberti, this defect of isolating, with its consequent rarefaction, went on increasing; and thus there was created in Italy in the nineteenth century that curious state of mind which in politics had its symbol in the motto, " Italy will act for herself," precisely when, in politics as in everything else, Italy was not acting for herself, or only for herself. Here is the root of the provincial nationalism from which, even to-day, Italy is struggling hard to free herself. In point of philosophy the path of freedom had long ago been shown, to begin with Spaventa, who, studying the philosophy of his predecessors, Galluppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, showed what they had lent, in spite of all claims to the contrary, to European thought in general, and explained that true originality does not consist in shutting oneself off from others, but in opening oneself out as much as possible, to find oneself again in a fuller and richer world.

With plenty of philosophical apparatus, but with little experience of art, this same Gentile has brought out a treatise on æsthetics,[1] with which he would supplant that of Croce. Running through his recently published volume, on each page one falls in with some acrimonious polemic argument, which, however, finds no justification in the effective novelty of the discoveries which he would substitute for those of Croce, and he explains himself only by extra-philosophical and passional arguments. Indeed, the very fierceness of the polemic reveals at first sight that Gentile is always, in spite of himself, dependent on Croce, like those dismissed servants who vent abuse against their masters, deluding themselves that thus they are free from subjection, in the very act which most patently shows it. To constitute the newness of a mental position, it is not enough to take pre-existing theses and handle them in a different way—the actual problems must be presented in a changed form. Now in Gentile's æsthetics you only find the problems of Croce's æsthetics, and there is not the very least trace of a new question arising from a direct and personal experience of the argument. There is nothing new in it except some philosophical denominations and the systematic arrangement. Of this last Gentile makes a great point: in his opinion Croce's æsthetics are merely descriptive, empirical, classificatory, devoid of rigorous deductions, and he himself would set on them, on his own account, the seal of a deduction in the Hegelian style, which should make things spring up as though by touches of a magic wand. It is an old conjuring trick, which hitherto had seemed to be relegated to the old iron of the "pure philosopher's" trade. The empty scheme of self-knowledge is taken, with its moments, subject-object-synthesis, in so far as they develop one from another through a position, a negation, and a re-affirmation, and to each stage of this process a familiar name is given: to the pure subject that of art, to the object that of religion, to the synthesis that of philosophy, and thus you are thought of necessity to have demonstrated and deduced art, religion, and philosophy. In reality nothing has been deduced but a scheme to which you can give some meaning or other (though only by approximation). Gentile, for example, gives us the meaning which his Crocian reminiscences suggested: thus the pure subjectivity of art is by him interpreted as a state of the simple and elementary spirit, prior to self-conscious reflection, as dream, form, pure sentiment, etc. At every step one of these new determinations sprouts out, through a processs no different from that used by a conjuror who causes a number of birds to fly, one at a time, from an empty cage.

[1] Giovanni Gentile, *La filosofia dell'arte*. Milano, Treves, 1931, 8°, pp. 377.

But if we approach a little nearer to Gentile's long artistic equations (art = subjectivity = form = nature = sentiment = . . .) we find that they are all lost in the same fog, which recalls the Hegelian maxim that in the darkness all cows are black. How there can ever be a pure feeling which by itself is already form, subjectivity which is nature, etc., are things which can only be affirmed by emptying these names of all the meaning which they have in our concrete experience and considering them as indistinct and evanescent schemes.

One point in which Gentile means substantially to differ from Croce is that which makes art identical with feeling, while for Croce it is the expression of a feeling, that is, a theoretical contemplative act, in which passional feeling becomes quiet and serene. Even here Gentile must juggle with the term feeling, to justify his deduction, but even then he will never succeed in convincing anyone, for example, that to fall in love and to sing of love are not two different things. Gentile speaks diffusely of catharsis, but since for him art is surpassed by philosophy—by the very fact that the pure subject only exists in the synthesis of self-consciousness—the cathartic moment ought for him to be extraneous to art as such and belong to philosophy. For the rest, it is useless to demand from Gentile precise concepts; for him everything is lost in the fog of inconsistent dialectics, as may be seen in the following extract: " In thought feeling becomes conscious of itself: it becomes ego which is beauty, but it is also thought which analyses the beautiful, knows it and theorizes, and thus reassumes and completes the being in its absolute reality. But nature is feeling alone, apart from thought. As pure feeling it is inactual; its reality is in the thought, in the ego. But in its inactuality, as feeling, far from being deprived of beauty, it is beauty itself; for it is the nature of the spirit, moved and stirred by the dialectics of the spirit, like that feeling *in nuce* which each of us finds within him" (pp. 261–262). There one sees that the same entities appear reduplicated, once in the self-consciousness, once outside it. What meaning and what value could be owned by a nature, a beauty, outside consciousness? And to which of the two beauties ought our critical judgment to be deferred? These are questions for which it would be difficult to find a plausible answer.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by* CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

NOTHING of interest so far as philosophy is concerned seems to have happened in Russia during the last six months. The vague symptoms of something like a philosophical awakening have been successfully suppressed—for the moment, at any rate. Losev, whose work has often been mentioned in these *Surveys*, and Shpet, one of the few pre-war philosophers still left in Russia, have been exiled to the far north. Cruel as their fate is, it is nothing to wonder at, since they are both men of real philosophical culture and attainments, entirely out of sympathy with the Marxian creed; the wonder is, indeed, that they have not been put out of the way sooner. But a totally unexpected fate has befallen the accredited 'red' philosopher, the leading exponent of dialectical materialism—Deborin. All his life he attacked with

the most exemplary zeal 'idealistic' thinkers of every description—and now he is himself accused in the Soviet Press of a tendency towards idealism! The campaign against him was conducted so vigorously that poor Deborin has had a mental breakdown and been put into an asylum. To be accused of idealism after having always championed the cause of the crudest materialism must certainly be very disconcerting, but however sorry one may be for the victim of such an injustice, it is only fair to say that Deborin's collapse is no loss to philosophy in Russia.

The most interesting event in the Russian philosophical literature abroad is the publication in Paris of Professor Lossky's book on *Value and Existence*. It is worth while to give a detailed account of it.

Lossky begins by saying that value is all-pervasive, determining the meaning of the world as a whole, of every person, every event, and every action; the smallest change introduced into the world by an agent has an aspect of value and is undertaken on the ground and for the sake of something that has value. All that in any sense forms part of the world not merely *is* but is justified or not justified in being what it is: we can say of everything that it is good or bad, right or wrong, that it ought or ought not to exist, and so on. Just because the characteristic of value is omnipresent, it is extremely difficult to differentiate it from other aspects of reality, and it is only natural that in most theories it should be confused with some characteristic which does not really form part of its content, and that there should be many conflicting conceptions of value. To illustrate this, Lossky gives a brief summary of the views of Ehrenfels, Kreibig, Meinong, Heyde, M. Scheler, N. Hartmann, and Gurvitch, and then proceeds to examine more closely the 'psychologistic' theories according to which values are purely subjective. After repeating the usual arguments against hedonism, Lossky points out that the same criticism applies to all theories which identify value with the feeling of appreciation, with desire or striving, with the consciousness of ought, and so on. They all mistake the psychological processes involved in the awareness of value for value as such. Thinkers like Heyde, who maintain that value is a relation between the object and the subject's appreciation of it, also make value dependent upon subjective feeling, since obviously, if there were no feeling of appreciation on the part of the subject, there could be no value. In truth, however, value is something over and above the subjective processes involved in the apprehension of it, and though it certainly does stand in a certain relation to the conscious subject it cannot be identified with that relation.

Passing to the consideration of theories according to which values are objective, Lossky examines M. Scheler's view that values are a special kind of qualities, and points out that qualities such as 'noble, lofty, good, wicked,' etc., cannot be detached from the bearers of them: it is the actual existents taken in their concrete wholeness that have value. The *esse* is not merely 'being' but also value. All being is a positive value as compared with non-being. But non-being is merely a limiting conception, and cannot be given in experience; there can only be a greater or lesser approach to it. So that in considering the value of any given existent we must think of it not in relation to non-being, but rather in relation to the absolute fullness of being, and ascribe positive value to it in so far as it approaches that ideal. A concrete entity, A, may be destructive of other existents, and thus tend to impoverish the world; in that case it will be a negative and not a positive value. Leibniz was right in distinguishing between *bene esse* and *male esse*.

The absolute fullness of being is not a merely limiting conception: in religious experience it is revealed as God. It may therefore be said that positive value is existence in so far as it approaches or leads to the divine fullness of

life, which is absolute perfection—something that not merely is, but deserves to be. It is the Good not only in the moral but in an all-embracing sense—the principle which Plato called *τό αγαθόν*: there is in it no division between existence and value. The only way we can define good is to point to the Good itself. It is absolute positive value, and there is no going beyond it. All the small derivative goods are good only through participating in It. In so far as they share in the Good they deserve to exist, are justified in existing. This positive value finds expression in an endless number of positive feelings —pleasure, delight, hope, and so on. All that hinders the realization of the perfect fullness of life does not deserve to exist, and is accompanied by negative feelings of pain, disgust, fear, etc.

The truth of this view is confirmed, Lossky thinks, by the fact that no other conception of value can be thought out consistently. Briefly reiterating the argument of *The World as an Organic Whole*, he points out that relatedness, apart from which there can be no existence, presupposes a creative source of events and relations, and such a source can only be conceived as a substantival agent, a concretely-ideal, supra-temporal, and supra-spatial entity. The existence of a number of such agents necessarily involves the thought of their Absolute ground or God. Being endowed with freedom, they can choose either to remain in loving union with God and be members of His Kingdom, or to break away from Him, striving for unlimited self-assertion. In doing so they give rise to the realm of enmity or the psycho-physical world, in which, through a long series of experiences, they learn at last that the true fullness of life means a return to the Kingdom of God. Each member of that Kingdom exists for the whole, and the whole exists for each; indeed, each member *is* the whole viewed under some particular aspect of it, and is unique and individual.

God and His Kingdom are the source and condition of all values: everything that exists has positive or negative value according to whether it furthers or hinders the realization of the absolute fullness of life. Value cannot be subtracted from existence, but is an integral aspect of it. It is always related to a subject, since subjects, *i.e.* substantival agents, real or potential individuals, are the only reality; all other contents of the world—abstract ideas and events—are either their characteristics or the results of their activity. But this does not mean, of course, that values are subjective: they are conditioned by the relation of the subject to that which transcends all subjectivity, namely, to the absolute fullness of being. Values may be absolute or relative: the first are self-justified, good from every point of view, in every respect for every one; the second are good in some respect for some subjects only, while in other respects and for other subjects they are an evil, or at any rate are necessarily connected with evil. Relative values are only possible in the psycho-physical world, the members of which are in a state of mutual conflict and opposition. In proportion as the conflict is overcome in and through the process of spiritual evolution, the relative values are gradually replaced by the absolute.

In a series of extremely interesting chapters Lossky discusses the relation between the different kinds of value, showing that our conflicting standards are not an argument against the existence of absolute values, and that the subjective processes of valuation are simply the means of discovering that which is objective and universally binding.

The book would have gained had it been longer: its hundred and thirty-five pages do not give the author a chance of developing in full his contention that values must have their source in God, and that no other conception of value can be consistently thought out. Through lack of space many of his assertions

inevitably sound rather dogmatic. It is to be hoped that in time Professor Lossky will have an opportunity of working out in greater detail the profound and illuminating ideas contained in this little book.

Two interesting books on the history of philosophy have been published recently, one in Paris and the other in Prague—G. Florovsky's *The Eastern Fathers of the Church in the Fourth Century*, and D. Tchizhevsky's *Sketches of the History of Philosophy in the Ukraine*. Florovsky's book is a scholarly and able exposition of the line of thought pursued by the great Christian thinkers of the fourth century, who had to grapple with some of the fundamental problems of metaphysics. Florovsky shows that so far from being of merely theological interest their ideas form an integral part of many philosophical systems of later day, and cannot be ignored by any serious student of the history of human thought. The Fathers of the Church have worked out, in some cases with great depth and clearness, the conceptions of the 'Divine Nothing,' of consubstantiality, of personality, of qualitative multiplicity, of the non-spatial nature of the soul, of causation in time as distinct from non-temporal dependence—and a great deal in their treatment of these ideas is of permanent philosophical value.

D. Tchizhevsky's book is a spirited attempt to make something out of nothing, or, to put it more mildly, out of very little. The fact is, there is no such thing as Ukrainian philosophy. Some gifted men of philosophical attainments were born in the Ukraine, but they were so much part of the spiritual and intellectual life of Russia as a whole that it is simply childish to treat them as representatives of a national school of thought. The author is so hard pressed for 'Ukrainian philosophers' that he actually includes among them the great Russian classic Gogol (native of the Ukraine), who certainly was in his later years deeply interested in moral and religious questions, but could not possibly be called a philosopher in any definite sense of the term. Tchizhevsky's book is a typical instance of the patriotic zeal of an Ukrainian separatist, and its political bias mars what might have been a valuable contribution to the cultural history of Russia.

NATALIE DUDDINGTON.

NEW BOOKS

The Religion of Man. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 239. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The interest of this volume of *Hibbert Lectures for 1930* is mainly personal, for not only is the author a poet with a world-wide reputation, but many parts of it are frankly autobiographical. He does not claim to be a scholar or a philosopher (p. 90); but he is the poet presenting his own personal experience, "his deepest thoughts on human life in its relation to the divine," and because of this human approach "his own original ideas concerning the nature and being of God." There is a background of wide culture—modern science, industry, secularism, internationalism are all touched. The presentation has necessarily been affected by Indian culture and religion; but the philosophy or theology, implicit in this record of a human soul in search for God, is not characteristically Indian. There are passages which might give an impression that the author is a humanist, and finds in the world nothing beyond and above man; but there are others in which he confesses himself a theist. His approach to God, however, is always through man; the individual man, on his personal as contrasted with his animal side, is a manifestation of universal Man. This conception seems sometimes to be hypostatized, but the relation of Man to God is left in some doubt. I have felt the same difficulty in following the author's treatment of this relation, as I have in studying Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* in regard to the reproduction of the spiritual principle in the individual consciousness. The author is, however, no pantheist, as his emphasis on the value of human personality precludes such an absorption of the human in the divine, and his description of the relation of man to God as love includes him among those "whose prayer is for dualism, so that for them the bond of devotion with God may continue for ever" (p. 202). In this respect he is not distinctively Indian, but shows the influence of the West, although nowhere is any indebtedness to Christianity confessed (the Index contains one reference to Christ, which, however, I have failed to find). I believe that I have stated his general position accurately; but what is one to make of a sentence like this? "My religion is in the reconciliation of the Super-personal Man, the Universal human spirit, in my own individual being" (p. 225). It must be admitted that the exposition is not altogether consistent, and suffers at times from vagueness. As the volume does not present a close-knit argument, it is not necessary to attempt a summary of its contents; but some characteristic statements may be selected. The world around man is a Universe, that is, it discloses amid all its variety a unity. "Whatever name may be given to it, and whatever form it symbolizes, the consciousness of this unity is spiritual, and our effort to be true to it is our religion" (p. 16). In this unity man is central. "The idea of the humanity of our God, or the divinity of Man the Eternal, is the main subject of this book" (p. 17). Are God and Man identical? In giving his personal experience, the Vision which came to him, he does make a distinction. "To this Being I was responsible; for the creation in me is His as well as mine. It may be that it was the same creative Mind that is shaping the Universe to its eternal idea; but in me as a person it had one of its special centres of a personal relationship growing into a deepening consciousness" (p. 96). To this Being he addresses one of his poems: "Thou who art the

innermost Spirit of my being, art thou pleased, Lord of my life" (p. 97). This still is vague. We may turn to a more definite statement. "It is *definite* (this is surely a misprint for infinite) and finite at the same time, the Eternal Person manifested in all persons. . . . Whatever character our theology may ascribe to him, in reality he is the infinite ideal of Man towards whom men move in their collective growth, with whom they seek their union of love as individuals, in whom they find their ideal of father, friend, and beloved" (p. 165). He has endeavoured to give practical expression to his ideal in education: "I tried my best to develop in the children of my school the freshness of their feeling for Nature, a sensitiveness of soul in their relationship with their human surroundings, with the help of literature, festive ceremonials, and also the religious teaching which enjoins us to come to the nearer presence of the world through the soul, thus to gain it more than can be measured—like gaining an instrument in truth by bringing out its music" (p. 180). The end of such an education is spiritual freedom. "Bondage in all its forms has its stronghold in the inner self, and not in the outside world; it is in the dimming of our consciousness, in the narrowing of our perspective, in the wrong valuation of things" (p. 190). While appreciatively describing the Hindu doctrine of the Four Stages of Life, he, as has already been indicated, does not accept absorption in God as the goal. Without denying the voices of his own land, he is inclined to listen to other views: "Let us have faith in the testimony of others who have felt a profound love, which is the intense feeling of union, for a Being who comprehends in Himself all things that are human in knowledge, will, and action. And He is God, who is not merely a sum-total of facts, but the goal that lies immensely beyond all that is comprised in the past and the present" (p. 206). Here we seem to reach Theism, but cannot be sure that the Religion of Man is intended to lead us to God in the full sense of Theism.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

The Living Mind. By WARNER FITE. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1931. Pp. ix + 317. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The essays constituting this volume, and, with the exception of the first, reprinted from various magazines mainly between 1912 and 1918, are delightfully written and are a pleasure to read. They show how clearly and effectively abstruse and difficult philosophical problems can be handled. At first sight the essays seem to arrange themselves into two sets—those dealing with contemporary practical questions such as Psychoanalysis, Birth Control, Advertising, and Bahaviourism, and those dealing with abstract epistemological questions. But though the practical essays may be read with interest and profit, there is yet a thought running through them all which links them up with the others and gives unity to the volume, and which shows that philosophical problems lurk in the most practical questions of the day.

Professor Fite undertakes the task of defending consciousness from the attacks which he considers have unjustifiably been made upon it. His argument is essentially a criticism of and a protest against the emphasis put upon scientific method with its supposed quality of impartiality and objectivity, whether in the physical sciences, moral and social studies, or in psychology. The realism of Russell, Moore, and the New Realists, and the extreme development in psychology known as Behaviourism, are the chief delinquents in this respect. In reacting from realism and rejecting the scientific prejudice he is at the same time anxious to avoid falling into the unduly subjective attitude of pragmatism. His own theory is an attempt to construct a *via media*

between these unsafe philosophical pathways. He calls himself a believer in "critical intelligence." It is the critical motive which is so distinctive of idealism, and which realists, behaviourists, and mathematical and scientific intellectualists so painfully lack. And the result which he propounds is a doctrine which satisfies the pragmatic demand that truth is always being made, and is the satisfaction of our needs, and the realist demand that truth is independent of the knower and of his needs.

The "critical motive" takes account of the fact that "any object that is known is known by a person and may be expected to have a character which reflects the point of view of the person who knows it." "The world of consciousness is no world of impersonal 'objects,' rather a world which, like the paintings of a master, reveals in every detail the personality of the conscious agent." Realism, on the other hand, both in philosophy and in literature, "stands for the doctrine that consciousness makes no difference," and its underlying motive is "a distaste for consciousness."

The weight of Professor Fite's arguments rests upon the initial, and what is for him a fundamental, distinction between the agent's and the observer's points of view. What he says about the distinction may be admitted, and it is important enough in so far as it calls in question the adequacy of a psychology built on the basis of purely external observation, but its relevance to the physical and natural sciences is not so clear. His discussion of the distinction gives the impression that the two points of view are necessarily those of two distinct persons, when as a matter of fact each person is now an agent and now an observer; and Professor Fite's own theory requires that this should be the case. But if so, there is or should be no pure agent-consciousness and no pure observation.

In consequence, what is argued for remains by no means clear. There is a lack of clearness in Professor Fite's statement as to what the realist exactly wishes to do with consciousness, as to what is meant by "consciousness making no difference." There are several distinct positions. First, consciousness may be wholly denied; second, consciousness may be admitted as a condition of *knowing*, but not as a condition of the character of what is known; third, it may be regarded as determining the character of what is known. The first position apparently is that of behaviourism, though the somewhat harsh statement of its own attitude may be apt to mislead and requires philosophical examination to discover what has happened to consciousness; for it may be that behaviourism dispenses with consciousness only in the sense that by presupposing it as a continuous condition of the phenomena which it investigates it does not need to take it into account as a factor in all its specific causal explanations.

The second position is that which realists can and do maintain. It is consistent with a great deal for which Professor Fite argues. In his examination of various practical questions, he emphasizes the importance of consciousness. Even in psychoanalytic theory the Unconscious, in spite of the causal agency assigned to it, is yet subordinate to consciousness when its character is known; and in economic life man is subject to the dominion of economic law only in so far as he remains ignorant of the laws. This is an important truth; but most scientists and most philosophical realists, unless infected with the fatalistic view of Russell, could agree. This is not, however, to say that consciousness makes no difference; but there is a big step from this to the third position which Professor Fite is anxious to defend. The realist position, according to him, would make consciousness merely photographic, and he protests against this.

In the development of this third position there is an ambiguity in his own

discussion. His treatment of the distinction between the agent and the observer suggests that he is identifying consciousness solely with the intimate personal experience of the agent, and is denying that consciousness is implicated in the experience of an external observer. He seems to identify consciousness with what is peculiarly private and inaccessible to outside observation. This is contrary to the rôle assigned to consciousness in his analysis of practical questions. Nor can it be said that he has very convincingly accomplished his purpose. His own analysis of what is involved in the "personal relation" in all knowing, and the analogy which he uses in this connection, reveal the difficulty acutely. There are two real independent terms—the knower and the object; and this is a realist contention which he admits. Where, however, the realist says that truth is being discovered or reached, Professor Fite says that truth is being made; and the only argument for his saying so is that the knower must come with a question to be answered, and will find his question becoming clearer as his investigation continues. Realism can admit all this, but will deny that the question is in any way subjective in the sense in which pragmatism speaks of interest and of truth as a satisfaction of interest. In fact, according to realism, so far as the question contains any subjectivity, it will to that extent not obtain an answer, and will have to be remodelled.

B. M. Laing.

The Logic of Discovery. By R. D. Carmichael. (Chicago-London: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1930. Pp. ix + 280. Price $2.)

This book has grown out of a series of articles, all dealing with some aspect of thought, and the title of the first article gives the title to the book. The result is that, taken as a book on the logic of discovery, it is a little unsystematic, containing a fair amount of repetition. But for all that, it can be commended to the attention of readers who, having little or no knowledge of mathematics, desire to know something of the significance for philosophy of modern developments of logic inspired by mathematics. Mr. Carmichael writes clearly and persuasively, and he has used a good deal of illustrative material that has grown up out of attempts in America to expound these developments in a simple and popular way.

The central part of his book is an endeavour to make clear to the ordinary reader the way in which, in logic or mathematics, systems of postulates can be elaborated, from which deductions can be made, without the entities about which the postulates are concerned being themselves defined. The deductions from the system depend on the postulates, and not on the nature of the entities with which they deal. The result is that when a set of entities is discovered which do obey the basic postulates, all the propositions deduced from the postulates are known at once to be true of these entities; and where several different sets of entities can be found which obey the postulates, several different bodies of doctrine can be at once enunciated.

This exhibits the nature of a purely deductive science, and the rôle of the subject-matter (numbers, geometrical relation, movements, forces, etc.) thereof: the subject-matter entering only as giving a particular interpretation to the basic postulates of the science, and not at all as enabling conclusions to be drawn from the postulates. There is, of course, nothing new in all this, and it has been explained often enough (for example) by Mr. Russell; but Mr. Carmichael puts it all very persuasively and clearly, and in a somewhat different light. A system of postulates with its deduced propositions (or,

rather, propositional functions), in which the entities with which the system deals are mere undefined x's and y's and z's, has been called by Professor Keyser, of Columbia University, a "doctrinal function," after the analogy of Mr. Russell's "propositional function": "x is a man" is a propositional function; when x is given a significant value, say "That dark object," a proposition results. In the same way, when the x's and y's and z's of a doctrinal function are given values which satisfy the postulates, a body of doctrines results.

What Mr. Carmichael seeks to show, then, is the usefulness of doctrinal functions in the work of discovery, not merely in pure science, but in relation to matters of fact.

For this purpose it is necessary to look at a body of doctrines from another point of view. It often happens that propositions are known in relation to a particular subject-matter before they are conclusively proved. Euclidean geometry is a case in point, which secured its proofs by making assumptions which carried it over various awkward places. The task of bringing these assumptions to light, and of reducing them to as small a number of independent postulates as possible, was the work of analysis. So far the postulates dealt with entities which were interpreted spatially; but once this spatial system was completely elaborated, the spatial interpretation could be dispensed with, and a pure doctrinal function set up in its place, capable not only of a spatial, but of various non-spatial interpretations. It was possible also to modify certain of the postulates, and to develop the consequences of this modification, so as to conceive the possibility of alternative systems of geometry, which might perhaps be more (or at any rate not less) in accordance with fact than the Euclidean.

A similar process is theoretically possible in relation to any body of experimental facts (e.g. about moving bodies, or inherited characteristics, or association of ideas). The problem is to systematise the facts, and to discover new ones. If a system of postulates can be elaborated from which the facts already known can be deduced, and from which propositions relative to facts not yet known can be deduced, we have a means of carrying our investigations further; for if investigation confirms the deduced propositions we have strengthened our faith in the system of postulates, and can go ahead with new deductions; while if investigation shows that the deduced propositions do not hold in fact, our problem is to find a suitable modification of our postulate system so as to include the new facts. We can also work out the consequences of various possible modifications of our postulates without waiting for the stimulus of fact, and widen and generalize in various ways. This is, of course, the well-known method of the formation of hypotheses; but linked with the notion of a doctrinal function, the old method receives a new significance, and gives rise to new problems both of logic and of epistemology. And Mr. Carmichael pleads for an extension of the method of postulation to fields such as economics, psychology, and ethics, where it has been used spasmodically in the past, but not systematically.

Mr. Carmichael illustrates and discusses some of the new problems arising. He is, of course, aware of the way in which a system of interpretation gives a colour to the "facts" in the system, so that in science we are rarely if ever in presence of hard and fast facts. He is aware also that interpretation in terms of postulates is the result of considerable intellectual construction, which to a very large extent could have taken a different turn, and often indeed takes one turn at one epoch of knowledge, another at another. And while all this makes him see that a logic of discovery is not necessarily a logic of proof, it makes him also alive to the fact that hypotheses cannot lightly be treated as "mere" helps for the gathering of facts, since the "facts" gathered tend to be

coloured very considerably by the hypotheses by whose aid they were gathered. And if he has no final solution to offer, he is at any rate clearly aware of the various aspects of the problem and of the implications involved in them.

L. J. Russell.

The Sivādvaita of Srīkantha. By S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, M.A., B.Sc. (Madras: University of Madras. 1930. Pp. x + 393. Price 5 rupees; 10s.)

Sivādvaita Nirnaya. An Enquiry into the System of Srīkantha. By Appayya Dīksita. With an Introduction, Translation, and Notes. Edited by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. (Madras: University of Madras. 1929. English Introduction, Pp. 64; Sanskrit Text, pp. 93; Translation, 1–161. Price 2 rupees 8 annas; 4s.)

The Sāmkhya Kārikā of Isvara Krsna. With an Introduction, Translation, and Notes by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. (Madras: University of Madras. 1930. Pp. xli + 130. Price 2 rupees; 4s.)

The first two books treat of a monistic system of Āgama, called Shivādvaita (not to be confused with the Tamil Shaiva Siddhānta), expounded by Srīkantha, a commentator on the Vedānta Sūtras, whose date is uncertain, but who, in the opinion of the author, was probably a contemporary of the great Vedantist Rāmānuja. Srīkantha's work was the subject of a commentary by Appayya Dīksita, who flourished in the latter half of the sixteenth century. The author is of opinion that from the metaphysical point of view Srīkantha occupies a position midway between Samkara and Rāmānuja. He says that the Commentary of Srīkantha shows numerous affinities with that of Samkara. These two books are thus a particular form of Shaiva Āgama. But what is an Āgama, and what are its relations to Veda? Some years ago, in dealing with the Shākta Āgama, which contains the *Magna Mater* worship of the Hindus, the reviewer suggested that Hinduism was composed of two lines of religious thought and practice, namely, Vedic and Āgamic, the former being the religious culture introduced by the incoming Aryans, whose major deity was Indra, and whose nearest representatives to-day are the Smārta Brāhmanas and Ārya Samājists. The latter form of religious culture was that of the non-Aryan Dravidians and others, whose chief divinities were those of "the five-fold worship" of the sectarian communities, Sun-worshippers, worshippers of Ganesha, Vishnu, Shiva, and Shaktas, the object of whose cult was the great Mother-Power of the universe. Many important questions are involved in a discussion as to the nature of Āgama. Are they dependent or independent of Veda? Srīkantha's view is that the Vedas and the Shaiva Āgamas are of equal authority, as both proceed from the Lord, the only difference being that the latter may be studied by persons of all castes, whilst the study of the former is restricted to the first three castes. The author regards the various historical questions which arise in an inquiry as to the Āgamas as being outside the scope of his work, though he shortly alludes to them on pp. 1–11, and at p. 81, where he cites the view that the Āgamic rites were fashioned on the Dasyu rites, current from pre-aryan times. An inquiry, however, into the authority of the teaching of these books is relevant and called for. We express the hope that the author may some day undertake these historical inquiries. We are here told of Srīkantha's system.

After some general considerations, the author deals with the preliminaries to and presuppositions of Brahman knowledge, and then, after some criticism of various rival theories, treats of Brahman and the world he creates. As regards

cosmic evolution, it is to be noted that a doctrine is taught similar to that found in the Tantras of the Shākta Āgama. The Brahman is regarded from two aspects, one static, which is that of the Power-holder, Shiva, and the other is active, as *Shakti*, or power. This Power is, as Chit-Shakti and Maya Shakti, both efficient and material cause of the universe. All change takes place in Shakti, Shiva being changeless. But the Power-holder and Power are one. The next topic is the embodied Spirit of Jīva, here and hereafter, followed by a discussion of release considered both as means and state, the author concluding with a general estimate. He observes that "the major considerations of morality and religion receive a full measure of attention at the hands of Srīkantha. The reality of the world and the individual, the relative freedom of the human will, the essentially ordered nature of the world, are the dominant ideas of Srīkantha's theism." "To interpret the Vedānta Sūtras as teaching a system of Theism, which had also independent support in the Shaiva Āganas, that was the service of Srīkantha to Vedantic thought" (p. 309). There are lastly Appendices and a Glossary, both of which will prove of great utility. Of the former, the first gives readings unique to Srīkantha, readings common to Srīkantha and Rāmānuja, readings common to Srīkantha and Sankara or others, but not to Rāmānuja. Appendix 2 notes doctrinal affinities to the Sruti-Sukti-Mala of Haradattacarya. Appendix 3A sets out resemblances between Srīkantha's commentary and Rāmānuja, and Appendix 3B collects together the resemblances between Sīrkantha's commentary and that of Saṁkara. Appendix 3C deals with topics distinctively treated by Srīkantha, and the last Appendix 4 gives extracts from the commentaries of Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, and Srīkantha on certain of the Vedānta Sūtras.

The first two volumes should prove of considerable value to advanced students of the Āgama and the Vedānta.

The third volume is prefaced by the statement that there is need for a fresh translation of the Sāmkhya Kārikā, and that the adoption of the work as a textbook in several of the Indian Universities has made the need all the greater. The author is himself Reader in Indian Philosophy in the University of Madras, and the work, as also the last two on Srīkantha, have been published by that University. These facts are a guarantee of the worth of the author's labours, if any were needed.

JOHN WOODROFFE.

The Structure of Thought: A Survey of Natural Philosophy. By LUDWIG FISCHER. Translated by W. H. Johnston. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 366. Price 16s.)

The strangeness of this strange book begins in the title. In the traditions of our speech "Natural Philosophy" means Physics: if here it is a translation of "Naturphilosophie," this is the usual German word for the Philosophy of Nature, or, more narrowly, for the philosophical examination of the principles and results of the natural sciences. In the book before us it has none of these meanings; it is made to mean "the philosophy of the natural order of Thought," which turns out to be a dialectical study of the categories of experience.

Although the book is full, monotonously full, of repetitions, I cannot pretend to have understood it. The author's technical expressions are simple in definition, but lose their definiteness in use; and so far as I can see the fault does not lie with the translator, who must have had an extraordinarily difficult task, and appears to have discharged it well.

The general attitude, however, is clear. Herr Fischer is inspired by the

mathematical ideal of knowledge in the form it has reached in the nineteenth-century transformation of geometry. Every student is familiar with the form that ideal took in Plato—ascent through concepts of progressive universality to a supreme concept, and then a descent in which all the lower concepts are shown to be deducible from the supreme one. The total result would be the setting of the entire realm of concepts in a hierarchical organization, picturable as a pyramid. In Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz the ascent is suppressed, and only the deductive process exhibited. They assumed that by discovering a self-evident starting-point, and by proceeding from it by steps so infinitesimal that each was self-evident, they would be able to unfold a complete, and completely demonstrated, system of philosophical truths. They were, of course, under the fascination of Euclid. Now the Euclidean system has been found to have a serious fault, which the geometers of the last century undertook to remove. The defect was the presence of too many initial axioms and postulates; in other words, the deductions of Euclidean geometry in its traditional form were drawn from a plurality of apparently equal or ultimate, and so far unrelated, premises. Spurred by the ideal of a single starting-point, of a deductive system depending from only one undeduced and therefore ultimate proposition, modern geometers are trying to reveal relations of superiority and inferiority among the Euclidean axioms and postulates, and have achieved some success, though they have not yet derived them all from one.

Herr Fischer clearly has the above considerations at the back of his mind, and his work may be best described as an attempt to do with philosophical concepts what the modern geometers have done with the concepts of space. He seeks a "fundamental axiom" from which to deduce all our categories and first principles. His procedure naturally reminds one of the logistic method. He admits that his system of categories was first worked out logistically. If so, I can only conclude that his lack of rigour or clarity (for philosophical clarity is primarily rigour of reasoning) is due to his well-intentioned desire to translate his logistic equations into the looser form of words; though I suspect that another cause is at work, namely, an oscillation between two quite distinct conceptions of the dialectic of the categories, the logistic and the Hegelian.

The author's deductive derivation of the categories is preceded by what he calls the propædeutic system, in which he seeks his starting-point for the system proper. A category, of course, is an ordering conception. He therefore looks for the main forms of order in experience. He finds three—space, which is the order of co-existence; time, which is the order of succession, and which in the notion of the present or actual includes all space; and knowledge or consciousness, which involves both space and time, and is thereby the highest order of all. Each of these, he maintains, is seen on examination to be a manifestation of an utterly prime idea, the idea of opposition in unity, a relation whose terms, though opposite, imply and determine each other and consequently form a unity. This idea he expands into his "fundamental axiom," which he states as follows: "The Whole of human experience is one, and at the same time it is a multiplicity, and the whole of it is ruled by order. The prime form of all the reciprocal relations within this whole is opposition; this severs and resolves itself in the ultimate form or limit." And from this axiom he unfolds, by steps which remain dark to me, all the categories.

The above occupies only the first half of the book. The second half gives what is called a philosophy of philosophies: it runs through the entire history of philosophy and claims to show that every notable system has grasped, and from its peculiar point of view worked out, the notion of reciprocal opposi-

tion. It is obviously impracticable to review such a survey; but I must protest that it is wearying and unilluminating to be conducted through the centuries and have nothing pointed out but the recurrence of the relation of the One and the Many in its various forms. It leads Herr Fischer to take the most abstract similarities as significant, and all particularizing content as insignificant. For example, he allows himself to assert that the system of Descartes "is a repetition, exact almost in each detail, of the fundamental ideas of Augustine."

It may be added that the author has no room for what is called a transcendent metaphysic: philosophy is nothing but the study of the order of experience. This position is, of course, defensible, but when it is reinforced by the assertion that "the whole of thought is exhausted in the content" (p. 55), it seems to me to be nothing short of paradoxical. The emphasis on experiencing is surely involved in the emphasis on experience.

T. E. Jessop.

The Science of Life. By H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley, and G. P. Wells. (London: Cassell & Co. Pp. 895, 339 illustrations. 1931. Price 21s. net.)

This is, of course, a very good book, and it is opportune in its appearance. We have had a multitude of books on physics and mathematics, and many of these have become exceedingly popular, so that the world-conception that the non-scientific reader tends to adopt is shaped out by what he has read about stars and atoms, electrons, notions of space, and the idea of physical becoming as dependent on the increasing randomness of the things in the universe. The conception that biology might enable us to formulate would be a very different one, and it is well that the data of the science of life should be presented to the non-technical reader (as it is in the book under notice) in an attractive form. That can hardly be said about any big book on biology hitherto published in our times. This book is, of course, agreeable in the presentation of its subject-matter. It is compendious, beginning with speculations as to the nature of life, and ending with some account of ectoplasm and the trickeries of people like Eusapia Palladino. It puts the whole pageant of life, as disclosed by palæontology and systematic biology, before the reader, but it includes also full accounts of biological processes. Throughout its 900 pages the evident enjoyment of the writers in their task never fails, and that means also that the general reader can take up the book with a confident expectation of sustained interest. The style of treatment has, of course, its defects. It is impossible to avoid emphasis on the fashionable lines of biological investigation, and it has not been practicable to state everywhere all the cautions and qualifications that would have been expressed in detailed expositions—of the "A.B.C. of Genetics" for instance. Here, and with regard to some other controverted biological problems the authors have to skate lightly over thin ice or (varying the metaphor) they flit delicately over many flowers of debate. Some things are stated too literally, let us say. There are about 3,000 genes in the chromosomes of *Drosophila* (which has been *the* domestic animal of genetic study). A gene is simply that which carries hereditary qualities, but, also, it is said that the gene of *Drosophila* has about 100,000 chemical atoms in its constitution. Perhaps, after all, the genes in the chromosomes of man are very much the same kinds of things—in respect of their numbers and physical constitution, of course. Now the methods and results of genetical study are still too full of perplexities and anomalous and contradictory findings to justify such statements, but it is difficult to see how,

in this connection and elsewhere, the authors could have dealt otherwise with their subject in a book of this nature.

The volume measures 11 by 8 inches, has about 900 pages, weighs 6 lbs., and is printed on shiny paper. It cannot be held with any comfort. Why could it not be reprinted (when the time comes) in about half a dozen small volumes? It is interesting enough, even for professional scientific men and women, to entice one to slip it into a pocket or travelling bag on a journey. It is well illustrated, and the pictures (which are quite essential) would reduce without any detriment. The book may be recommended without any qualification whatever.

JAS. JOHNSTONE.

The Origin and Nature of Man: an Inquiry into Fundamentals. By G. SPILLER. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1931. Pp. xiv + 393. Price 15s. net.)

Mr. Spiller is already widely known as a writer and lecturer on scientific and philosophical subjects. His new book is a notable contribution to the general study of human life, and, though its point of view is definitely biological, it is of sufficient philosophical interest to call for a short notice here. It is dedicated to the memory of Charles Darwin, and this serves to indicate the general attitude that is represented by it. Those who follow Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, Joad, and others in emphasizing the conception of "emergence" may regard it as being hardly up to date; but others may welcome a thoughtful treatment of the subject free from speculative presuppositions. It can hardly at least be maintained that Mr. Spiller minimizes the gulf that separates man from all other living beings on our planet. He does not, however, regard the gulf as unbridgeable; and his book is mainly concerned with the consideration of the factors by which the transition has been effected. His general aim is stated as being that of "scientifically reconciling man's lowly animal origin with the potential nobility and grandeur of man"; and I think most readers will feel that that aim has been successfully achieved.

He urges (pp. 73–84) that what, from a purely biological point of view, differentiates man from the other members of the animal kingdom is that he is emphatically a "tool-using animal"—tools being distinguished as material and mental. On this basis, the great laws of human development are stated as being: (*a*) the law of limitless increase . . . of diversity in cultural or tool-made products, together with the secondary law of the gradual development historically of error, of anti-progressive habits and customs, and of cultural and social inequality; (*b*) the law of limitless improvement . . . of the cultural or tool-made products which tend to satisfy ideally mankind as a whole, together with the secondary law of the gradual elimination historically of error, of anti-progressive habits and customs, and of cultural and social inequality; (*c*) the law of the limitless growth, among peoples generally and through the ages, of co-operation, together with the secondary law of the historic development and subsequent elimination of the spirit of exclusiveness; and (*d*) the law of the limitless perfecting, among peoples generally through the ages, of the individual as a whole, together with the secondary law of the historic development and subsequent elimination of individual imperfections.

In what follows these laws are illustrated in a detailed and interesting way.

Although the treatment is in the main biological and historical, the work of philosophical writers in the interpretation of social development is not ignored. The contributions of Hobhouse and Sir Henry Jones, in particular, are duly recognized and appreciated. On the other hand, as against Professor McDougall,

stress is laid (p. 92) on the natural originality of man—especially in his co-operative activities. Mr. Spiller's emphasis on the social factors in human development leads him perhaps to underrate a little the contributions of exceptional individuals. He seems inclined, for instance (p. 363), to question the generally recognized superiority of Shakespeare in comparison with his dramatic contemporaries—or at least to attribute his apparent superiority to his greater diligence. I am afraid literary criticism is not Mr. Spiller's strong point. But, in general, his work appears to me to be sound, thorough, and well balanced within the limits that are set by his method of treatment.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

Some Problems in Ethics. By H. W. B. JOSEPH, M.A. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1931. Pp. vi + 135. Price 5s.)

Students of Ethics will be grateful to Mr. Joseph for publishing these lectures, given last year at Oxford; indeed, their only regret will be that he has compressed their matter within such modest limits. His theme, the relation between Right and Good, is much to the fore in contemporary discussions; and he handles it with the subtlety of discrimination, penetrative insight, and precision in argument that always mark his writings. He moves forward to his solution dialectically, on the time-honoured Aristotelian method; and it is sometimes hard to discover whether a given statement represents a view put forward for examination or his own conviction. The book is not easy reading; but the author's entire freedom from dogmatism and scrupulous anxiety to do full justice to the views he criticizes make it singularly illuminating and attractive. He tells us (26) that there may be self-evident propositions in Ethics, but adds the words, "I find myself accepting much that is not so, as what, where I have not reached knowledge, seems to me nearest the truth." Moreover, he is keenly alive to the metaphysical issues that arise in the course of his inquiry; in this respect his book compares favourably with Mr. Ross's recent volume on the same subject.

The need for a metaphysical foundation is established in the two opening chapters. Ethics has to make its account with two types of doctrine, each of which is a menace to its autonomy. There is, first, the view, of which Mr. Joseph takes Behaviourism as an extreme example, that human conduct can be interpreted on the principles of uniformity and mechanical determination which have proved so fruitful in the physical sciences. The refutation of this view is clinched by an exposure of its self-contradiction, in that it not only robs morality of meaning, but abolishes the possibility of its own truth. "If thought *is* laryngeal motion"—as Behaviourism logically implies—"how should anyone think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true or false" (14). In the second chapter the claim of Psychology to furnish a groundwork for Ethics, in independence of metaphysical criticism, is shown to imply a similar breach of self-consistency. Here Mr. Joseph takes as his illustration Professor McDougall's republication of Hume's doctrine that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. Reason, it is alleged, cannot create desire; all action is due to instincts, provoked into energy by perception; the intellect comes into play merely as regulating the development of instinctive desires. But how, asks Mr. Joseph, can it come into play at all? The doctrine in question "allows no sources of energy in the mind except to many distinct but complicable instincts. Each instinct is aroused by the perception of some object. A complication of instincts is not an object

of perception; . . . the desire to achieve it cannot be an expression of any one of the instincts whose complication is desired, nor of their complication. Though our intellectual faculties therefore might work in the service of this desire when once it had arisen, yet, unless they can give rise to it, it cannot arise" (23).

With the way thus cleared, Mr. Joseph passes to his main problem, starting, as in duty bound, with the concept of Right (chapters iii–vi). He examines first (chapter iii) the distinction between a moral act and a right act. It is admitted, both by Utilitarians like Professor Moore and by those who, like Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, build on Kantian foundations, that a right act, done because of its rightness, has moral value (*i.e.* goodness) as the expression of a good will. But the goodness is dependent on the rightness, not *vice versa*; for, *ex hypothesi*, the act is done for the sake of its rightness, not for the goodness that is manifested in so doing it. Now, what is this rightness for the sake of which the act is done? It cannot be the rightness of doing it. "We ought to do certain actions because they are right. That does not mean because we ought to do them; what then does the action being right mean?" (37). Mr. Joseph here finds himself confronted by two answers, neither of which is he able to accept. On the one hand, Professor Moore and the Utilitarians hold that a right act means one that is causally related to good. This answer covers many cases of obligation, but not all, and makes the goodness of a right action merely consequential. "Is there no intrinsic goodness in acting rightly?" (26). On the other hand, Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross maintain that right is ultimate and indefinable, and that, though the rightness of an action belongs to it because of its specific nature, "that nature need neither lie in its being causally related to any good consequence nor be good itself" (31). This involves the denial of value to right action, "except so far as, if it be done from a sense of duty, the world is better for that expression of a good will" (*ibid.*). "Is not duty," asks Mr. Joseph, "in such a case irrational?" (26). The difficulty is graver still when the right act is done from a motive other than a sense of duty. Not only is a gulf fixed between a right act and a moral act, but the rightness is declared to be independent of any goodness whatsoever. Mr. Joseph offers a solution on the following lines. Starting from the distinction between the obligation to do an act and the rightness of the act we ought to do, he seeks (*a*) to determine the nature of the latter rightness and (*b*) to determine it in terms of good. In cases where the act is productive of good results, Professor Moore's doctrine may be accepted; the agent, seeing its conduciveness to good, finds herein the reason why he ought to do it. "If, seeing this, he does not do it for that reason, he will not be acting morally, and there are motives which would make his act immoral; nevertheless, the act would, in a defensible sense, have been right" (28). Where, however, the rightness of the act is not grounded on its conduciveness to good, "it must have intrinsic goodness, which goodness must involve the agent's motive" (*ibid.*). Everything here depends on our being able to include *in* the action "some motive, being moved by which, or the manifestation of which is good" (37). Now this is just what Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in company with many others, believe to be impossible; holding that motives are not in our power and cannot be constitutive of what we ought to do, that their inclusion involves a vicious regress *ad infinitum*, and that "from whatever motive a man does what is right, it is still what is right that he does" (*ibid.*). We cannot here follow out Mr. Joseph's detailed and convincing refutation of this position (in chapter v), or his positive argument (in chapter iv) to show that an act, taken apart from the motive, is, from the standpoint of Ethics, an illegitimate abstraction. "No act exists except in the doing of it, and in

the doing of it there is a motive; and you cannot separate the doing of it from the motive without substituting for action in the moral sense action in the physical, mere movements of bodies" (38). The error springs from the failure to see that human action is a self-realizing process. "An intention does not lead to an action as the discharge of David's sling-stone led to the death of Goliath. . . . In any self-realizing process, that which is ultimately realized is somehow involved in the determination of the process by which or in which it is realized" (55). Mr. Joseph concludes the first half of his inquiry by pointing out the ambiguity in the word *Right*. "A right act may mean either an act which I ought to do, or an act having a rightness (a sort of goodness) in virtue of which I ought to do it" (59). It was, he argues at length in chapter vi, the neglect of this distinction that led Professor Prichard, in his Inaugural Lecture on *Duty and Interest*, to charge Plato with misconceiving the problem which he set himself to answer in the *Republic*.

It is high time that a thinker of Mr. Joseph's distinction should have come forward to dispute the doctrine that the motive with which an act is done is irrelevant to its rightness. Our only doubt is whether he has gone far enough in his rejection of it. He appears to make an exception in the case of those acts whose rightness can be grounded on their conduciveness to good. This double-barrelled concession, to Professor Moore's Utilitarianism on the one hand and to Professor Prichard's exclusion of motive on the other, is surely unjustifiable. An act may be conducive to good, and I may be aware that it is so; yet if I do it, not for that reason, but from an unworthy motive, can it be said, in any "defensible sense," to be right? The principle that "no act exists save in the doing of it, and in the doing of it there is a motive," is applicable all along the line. It must hold also of acts done for duty's sake. These can no more be judged right in abstraction from the motive than acts prompted by benevolence or loyalty. Is it reasonable to maintain that if I pay my debts for fear of imprisonment or social obloquy, I have done my duty, in any sense in which the term duty is "defensible" in Ethics? The issue is a large one, and cannot be discussed here; it affects the validity of the distinction, on which Mr. Joseph lays so much stress, between the rightness of doing a right act and the rightness of what it is right to do. Hard as it is to question this distinction, to accept it seems harder still. How can an act be right and not morally right, or be morally right when taken in abstraction from the motive?

Building on this distinction, Mr. Joseph proceeds in the second part of his book (chapters vii–x) to consider the question "whether there is any character common to right acts, in virtue of which it is that we think we ought to do them" (73). He finds this common character of rightness (save when it is *instrumental* to good) in "a form of goodness to the realizing of which the actions belong" (104). In calling it a *form*, he means, negatively, that it is not a *quality*; positively, that it is a unity of a manifold, at once identical with and distinguishable from what is good, "as a unitary or single character is distinguishable from the diversity in and because of which it is present" (83). In the argument in chapter vii, directed against Professor Moore's position that good is a simple, unanalysable quality, Mr. Joseph is at his very best. He quotes the scholastic doctrine that God is not to be called "good," but "goodness," since "his goodness cannot be thought of as a quality, which he might get or lose, like the yellow of a Magnum Bonum plum, as it ripens and then decays. There is nothing in the being of God which does not contribute to, and indeed is not needed for, his goodness; he is good as a perfectly healthy body is healthy, through and through. But none the less goodness in him is one as health is one; only it is not simple, any more than

God or health is simple" (78). This, be it noted, is no merely theological doctrine; it holds of goodness in any form, *e.g.*, of the goodness of a poem or a human life. The chief difficulty is to find this structural form in particular goods which are not "organic wholes," such as certain pleasures, sounds, colours, and simple duties. Mr. Joseph argues at some length (in chapter viii) that these simple goods are found on examination to be good, not in themselves, but as elements in a more comprehensive system, whose goodness possesses the required complexity of structure. We have to look beyond them, not to their effects, but to their context; *e.g.*, to the rule of action of which the particular duty is a manifestation, and, further, "to the whole form of life in some community, to which all the actions manifesting this rule would belong, and ask, whether it, or some other form of life is better, which would be lived by the community instead, if this rule were not helping to determine it. If we judge that it is better, then the particular action is right, for the sake of the better system to which it belongs" (98). So, when faced by the alternatives of letting a friend enjoy a holiday or of taking it myself, though I may not be able to differentiate between them in respect of goodness within the scope of the actions, I may well be able to do so when they are viewed in the wider context of the plans of life to which they respectively belong. The moral is that we should use large maps in determining our simplest duties. The Kantian instruction, to universalize your maxim, does not go far enough; the criterion required is the "goodness in that form of life which the rule requiring this action would determine, if this rule had expression in the lives of others also who make up the community that lives this form of life" (100). Mr. Joseph does not need to be reminded that Kant himself came very near to this position when he elicited from the Categorical Imperative the "very fruitful" conception of a kingdom of ends, of a rational order harmonizing the wills of the members of a moral community. The Kantian appeal is to an other-worldly form of life, whereas Mr. Joseph restricts his outlook to life lived under actual historical conditions. In his closing pages (133–135) he is troubled by the practical difficulty of devising a form of good life for *a large* community, *e.g.*, for a supernational human society, "that shall give to the private desires of each such satisfaction as will make the whole seem to resolve itself into, and be the unity of, the lives of all its members, in each of which it dictates some partial and particular form of good life." There ought, he says, to be such an absolute good; but are we not carried, as was Kant, in the search for it, to the thought of an ideal order that transcends the bounds of man's spatio-temporal history?

Mr. Joseph's two last chapters (ix and x) deal with questions ancillary to his main doctrine of the ground of obligation. In opposition to Professor Moore, who finds a contradiction in the phrase "my own good" and to Professor Prichard, who finds a contradiction in the phrase "a common good," he insists that the goodness of the whole form or system of common life "would be present in the goodness of each man's life; it would be his not exactly in the same way as, yet not less truly than, the goodness of his own life would be his; and it would therefore be a common good" (119). In chapter x he vindicates the possibility of a man acting at once from a sense of duty and from desire for what he judges to be good, against the two objections, (1) that a man acting under a sense of duty is often acting contrary to all his desires, and (2) that, since a man is not responsible for his desires, in acting from desire he is not free. His answers are convincing, and give rise to very interesting elucidations. Our only surprise is that he thinks the last-mentioned objection deserving of serious discussion. To deny a man's responsibility for his desires, on the ground that they proceed from his nature, is to jettison the most im-

portant part of the moral life. The theologian, indeed, tells us that the divine initiative is requisite "to put into our minds good desires"; but is it not equally needed "to bring the same to good effect"? If, on the other hand, it is maintained on purely secular grounds that control of desire forms no part of moral obligation, we can only reply by asking, What does?

Our purpose has been to sketch in outline the course of Mr. Joseph's argument, rather than to cast doubts on its validity. His book not only offers an original solution to one of the hardest problems in Ethics, but is throughout a masterpiece of logical thinking. With much of what he says we are in cordial agreement. But there is one quite fundamental matter on which he leaves us questioning. His main ground for insisting that the rightness of an act must be justified by its goodness is that otherwise the act is destitute of value. The champions of the autonomy of rightness, like Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, seem prepared to acquiesce in this conclusion. They do more than acquiesce: they glory in it. We venture, in all modesty, to doubt whether it is true. It depends on the identification of value with goodness. But has rightness no value merely as rightness? When I judge an act to be obligatory or right, apart from any thought of its intrinsic or consequential goodness, I am surely indulging in a valuation. The two motives, sense of duty and the desire to realize a good, may indeed, as Mr. Joseph points out, go together; but when they do they still remain specifically different motives, implying specifically different standards of valuation. If this be so, the question, "What is the common character of rightness that makes all right acts obligatory?" is unanswerable, because illegitimate. The only possible answer is, "the common character of rightness." Are we not landed in the same impracticability on Mr. Joseph's theory, only a stage farther back, if we ask him "What is the common character of *goodness* exhibited in all good systems of life?" We shall doubtless be told that the view we are suggesting leaves us with a dualism of practical values, both within the purview of Ethics. We can only reply (1) that the facts of moral experience, *i.e.*, the evident diversity of the two types of conduct, doing our duty and acting *sub ratione boni*, compel us to admit the dualism; and (2) that if a synthesis of the two standards is to be found anywhere, it must be in the field, not of Ethics, but of religion. There the Moral Law, as God's will to right, is the expression of the goodness which, as Mr. Joseph has shown so well, is identical with his whole being. But we do not dare to hope that this alternative solution of the problem will commend itself either to Mr. Joseph or to any other authoritative writer on moral philosophy.

W. G. DE BURGH.

L. T. Hobhouse, His Life and Works. By J. A. HOBSON and MORRIS GINSBERG. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 360. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book is divided into three parts. The first by Professor Hobson gives the story of Professor Hobhouse's life. The second by Professor Ginsberg gives a comprehensive account of Professor Hobhouse's major publications. The third part contains an essay by Professor Hobhouse on the social-economic situation in the post-war world and a few of the articles contributed by him to the *Manchester Guardian*. The articles selected show the wide range of his interest in the practical affairs of life and also his appreciation of literature.

Professor Hobson is very successful in his sketch. He enables the reader to trace the development of the character and personality that endeared Professor

Hobhouse to his friends. Descended on his mother's side from an old Cornish family, he may well have inherited the emotional temperament that rendered him sensitive to subtle situations. Although Hobhouse took a first in Moderations and in Greats and became fellow and tutor at Corpus, he found something uncongenial in the life of a University don. He was profoundly moved by the social conditions in the '80's and '90's. His interest in politics and a certain impatience with the intellectual idealism in vogue in Oxford made him welcome the offer of a position on the staff of the *Manchester Guardian*. Here he found an outlet for his advanced liberal views. To this period of his life belong the vigorous articles on the questions raised by the South African war. His occasional breakdowns date from this time of strain. He carried a double load, working hard for the paper while continuing his philosophical researches. In 1902 came the move to London and the formation of the Sociological Society. Secretarial work, lecturing and writing filled the next few years. For little more than a year he was political editor of the brief-lived liberal paper the *Tribune*. In 1907 he accepted the Martin White Professorship in Sociology at the London School of Economics, a position for which both his public work and his philosophical training pre-eminently fitted him. Professor Hobson is particularly happy in his chapter entitled "1914 and After." He portrays Hobhouse's sympathy with Lord Morley, and his loyal acceptance of national organization, and recounts his fine work on the Trade Boards. No account of his life could be intelligible that failed to show the source of inspiration and strength that Hobhouse found in his own home. With his wife and children he enjoyed to the full the happiness of family life. The death of his wife in 1924 robbed him of his greatest support. From then onwards he was depressed and handicapped by ill-health. None the less his death in the summer of 1929 was unexpected, as the illness from which he was suffering was not regarded as dangerous.

It is difficult to give an estimate of the man apart from some account of his philosophy. Professor Hobson does not wholly surmount this difficulty. There is thus some overlap between his concluding chapter and the subject-matter of Part II.

Professor Ginsberg brings to his task special qualifications. He was the pupil, assistant, and friend of Hobhouse. He gives the reader a survey of Hobhouse's philosophy which is written with insight and appreciation. He traces the influence of Spencer's evolutionary doctrines and Comte's positivism and humanitarianism on Hobhouse's thought, and thus enables the reader to see that to build up his social philosophy Hobhouse needed in the first place an examination of the facts of evolution in the animal world and in man (*Mind in Evolution*, 1901, supplies this). Hobhouse's next step was an inquiry into the goal of development in the light of the criteria deducible from the conception of a rational order. (*Morals in Evolution*, 1906; *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, 1911; and *Social Development*, 1924, belong to this inquiry. With these works we may also group *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, 1918; *The Rational Good*, and *The Elements of Social Justice*, 1921.) As a synthesis of his teaching he put forward a metaphysical theory, applying the notion of development to the whole world order (*Development and Purpose*, 1913, revised and re-written 1927). From his studies of comparative psychology Hobhouse draws the conclusion that the essential function of mind is correlation. By his search for the criteria of moral and social progress he is able to relate phases in the growth of the social fabric to phases in the growth of mind. It is in *Development and Purpose* that the reader sees the conceptions governing Hobhouse's philosophy. He believes that the world order is shaped by both teleological and mechanical causation. In so far as the events which go to

make up reality have determinate consequences and are indifferent one to the other, they follow the principles of mechanical causation. But there is at work a conative correlating activity which shapes the separate mechanically determined effects with reference to the requirements of the whole. Such a co-operation of teleological and mechanical principles is found in every organism. The teleological principle is Mind. Mind works in the lower organisms as blind striving, growth; in animals as instinct, and in man as conscious purpose.

It is no part of his scheme to furnish a criticism of Hobhouse's views, but Professor Ginsberg clearly realizes that this metaphysical theory and the social philosophy in which it is incorporated rests ultimately upon Hobhouse's belief in the reliability of a rational reconstruction of experience. Everything depends on his conception of the function of reason. Hobhouse's theory of experience and knowledge was set forth in his earliest book, *The Theory of Knowledge*, 1896. Written when he was Greats tutor at Oxford, the book is coloured by the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet, and yet, as Professor Ginsberg points out, it is in many points an anticipation of critical realism. Hobhouse recognized that the idealists were right in stressing the fact that truth lies not in isolated items of knowledge but in the system of ideas. The difficulty for idealism is to pass from the system of ideas to the reality of particular existents. He admired J. S. Mill's use of empirical methods and asks himself whether man can reach knowledge by these methods, or whether he must fall back on intuition or feeling. Like the critical realist of to-day, Hobhouse insists on the objective reference of even simple sensuous apprehension. Something is asserted thereby, and there is truth or falsity in such assertion about reality. The reality asserted can be further scrutinized and relations discovered by analytic attention. It is mind that discovers the relations and builds the constructions, but it is not mind that makes the relations. It is the function of reason to connect, to discover grounds or conditions. "Every datum of experience has its ground." Given the ground, then the consequence follows universally. If we ask whence comes our knowledge of this principle of ground, Hobhouse's reply is in essence the same as Mill's. Our knowledge of it has the same source as our knowledge of any other principle or law. The principle of ground, which is the basis of all induction, is regarded as itself established by consilience of inductions. Deductions from generalizations confirm the inductions on which they are based. For Hobhouse there are no *a priori* truths, only *a priori* conditions of mental activity. The axioms of reasoning are found by analysis of our spontaneous methods of inference. They are in this sense "inferred" principles based on the given. "It is only as the formulation of 'successful' methods that axioms have logical weight" (*Theory of Knowledge*, p. 593).

Now if we are to accept Hobhouse's social philosophy and his view of Mind in the world order, we must accept this theory of rational knowledge. Can we do so? If one looks at a deductive system of knowledge, e.g. mathematics, one does not find that the validity of its conclusions owes anything to consilience of inductions. Its validity is not attested by success but by demonstration. The conclusions are reached from the definitions and initial propositions with which the deduction started, no successful application can prove these definitions and propositions to be true. Similarly, no successful application can ever prove the truth of the axioms of reasoning. To the reviewer it seems that Professor Hobhouse failed to recognize the fundamental difference between the formal validity of a deductive system and the experiential evidence reached by consilience of inductions. He transfers to the latter the demonstrative validity of the former. He does so in virtue of his belief that the given not only admits of the exercise of man's reason, but is itself rational.

Reality for him is a system to which man's reason can find the clue because the system itself is formed and developed by a rational urge, by a Central Mind. The success of every step forward in the interconnection of fact is for Hobhouse proof of the belief. His theory of knowledge must be valid if his metaphysical theory is to be true, but his metaphysical theory must be true if his theory of knowledge is to be valid.

His view of the function of reason in the sphere of knowledge has as complement a parallel doctrine of the function of reason in the sphere of conduct. "Just as two rational judgments must not contradict one another, so two rational purposes must not conflict with one another" (*Rational Good*, p. 78). From this principle of formal consistency we pass to consilience of inductions and reach the doctrine that harmony of impulses in the individual and harmony of the purposes of individuals within society build the rational good. Now, though in fact the actions of an individual or the institutions of a society which we recognize as good are comprehensive in character and are such as harmonize many purposes, is it this that makes them good? In other words does consilience of inductions prove the truth of the hypothesis on which each induction is based, viz. that the good is a harmony of feeling and experience?

No criticism of Hobhouse's conception of the function of reason can blind one to the value of his work. His attempt to see social philosophy as a whole in its relation to metaphysics gives a special significance to his teaching. Considered on their own merits, apart from his system of philosophy, his contributions to sociology would win him a high place among his contemporaries. For Hobhouse social institutions are a means to an end; they possess nothing that renders them sacrosanct apart from the purpose they fulfil. His criticism from this point of view in *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* was both far-sighted and timely. As Professor Ginsberg points out, Hobhouse was a pioneer in comparative psychology and in the comparative study of morals, and his observations in both fields of research have been confirmed by later workers.

To appreciate and to understand any philosopher one must turn to his own writings, but it is safe to say that Professor Ginsberg's exposition of Hobhouse's work will enable a student to take up any one of Professor Hobhouse's books with a far greater ability to appreciate and understand it than would otherwise be possible. He enables the reader to see the originality of Hobhouse's line of thought and to survey the width of the field covered by his work.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Personality and Will. By FRANCIS AVELING, M.C., D.Lit., D.Sc., Ph.D. The Contemporary Library of Psychology. (London: Nisbet & Co. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1931. Pp. x + 245. Price 5s.)

One of the great merits of this book is its recognition of the truth that the problem of personality can only be adequately dealt with if the psychological method is completed by a philosophical treatment. In this subject, at least, it seems clear that no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between psychology and philosophy as concerned with the real. In Professor Aveling's view, as he has elsewhere argued, it is the facts themselves which the psychologist examines that lead us to reality. The effects of this standpoint are seen throughout, from the historical survey of philosophic theories, to the interpretation of the facts discovered in the special hunting-ground of the experimental psychologist. The author explains his aim to be that of reasserting "much that has been

left out in recent works on psychology." It is especially the intimate association between will and personality which he is thus led to emphasize, both as throwing light on the true nature of will, and as pointing to the truth that personality is not a *deus ex machina* to be brought in, to account for the otherwise inexplicable fact of conscious freedom, but is present in all essentially human activity. Personality is expressed in activity, it is indeed a kind of energy.

The noegenetic interpretation of the origin of the idea of God as subject of the ontological argument is interesting. But I feel a certain difficulty in regard to the positions that the notion of the existence of God is derived from our experience of ourselves as existing, and our conception of His nature reached by analogy and negation, unless the meaning is that intellectual operations are performed upon a notion already present, and having a different historical origin. The view, however, appears to be that the notion of God is first formed by unconscious mental processes, which are consciously made explicit later in the rationalistic arguments. Is this supported by anthropological investigation?

I cannot do more than refer to the admirably lucid treatment of ancient, mediæval, and early modern theories of the self, and their value from a philosophical standpoint. The most original constructive contribution of the book, however, is found in the account of the experimental work on volitional processes, and the conclusions based on it. It is perhaps difficult for the layman to conceive how light can be thrown on the problem of the strength of will in what appears to be the highly artificial conditions of the laboratory. He may ask whether such investigations have been completed or tested, as it were, by experiments performed on the human agent ceaselessly by life itself, and sometimes faithfully reported by the biographer or poet,

> "Between the acting of a dreadful thing
> And the first motion all the interim is
> Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream."

Will-force is tested by the success shown in overcoming the tendency to react only in one way, where, for instance, two-syllabled nonsense words have through learning by heart become inseparably attached, so that when one syllable is shown the other comes to mind by irresistible tendency. Can this be an index to will-force in actual life? It is all the more interesting to find that the result of such tests, removed from the practical arena in which character is formed, prove to be in harmony with the principle to which both introspection and philosophic reflection on the postulates required to make practical life intelligible, are pointing. It is in the will that personality is above all found. All the experiments point to an immediate presence of self-activity. The view which emerges, and the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated, is that "the self can modify its own nervous system and innate tendencies."

The distinction which Professor Aveling makes between will and conation appears to be new, at least in the form in which he expresses it, and suggests a very different analysis of the act of will from those of earlier modern psychologists. "If Ach's analysis is correct, the thought of the end to be attained, together with the sensations of tension and the effort, is to be distinguished from the 'I truly will,' which is the real characteristic of volition." What seems remarkable is the view that the experience of willing which initiates the striving may be itself quite effortless, that there may be no effort in the intention, whilst there is great effort in carrying it out. Was there no

effort in Brutus' "first motion," but only in his "acting of a dreadful thing"? Dr. Aveling's view is supported, as he tells us, by researches of Ach and Michotte, and it is obviously crucial, from his standpoint, that the sense of effort should be separated from the will which is inseparable from the self, whilst the latter is something over and above the physical feelings. The problem of the relation of value to personality receives an interesting treatment, and the observation that it is only in the light of the conceptual values that we can discern value in the physical world at all seems profoundly true. A logical priority is thus accorded to the ideal values. Is this entirely consistent with the noegenetic theory of their derivation from experience, "by the process of correlate formation"? It may be suggested that the noegenetic interpretation masks the creative activity of personality.

The heart of the doctrine of personality lies in the conception of our knowledge of the self, completing on the side of knowledge the experimental work, which revealed in the realm of practice that the living intuition of the self as subject is an essential part of the experience of resolving. This subject-self, of which we are conscious in knowledge, is the noumenal being. We seem to be very near to Berkeley with his "notion" of the self, or "spirit." The soul and body problem is conceived by Professor Aveling in terms of a relation of different types of energy, the energy of self or substance activity, in relation to all the physical energies which enter into a higher organic unity systematized by the self. Thus the violent dualism of the historic theories would disappear. Or is the problem only concealed by this substitution of different types of energy for different types of substance? The discussion of the problem of freedom in the form given to it by the conception of the self and the reality of its immediate experience is of great interest.

The conclusions in regard to the power and freedom of mental energy are of the highest value at the present time, when contrary views are widely prevalent both in the study and the market-place.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

Number; The Language of Science. By TOBIAS DANTZIG, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1930. Pp. viii + 260. Price 10s.)

The object of this book as described by the author is "to present the fundamental issues of the science of number without bringing in the whole intricate apparatus of the science," and in this difficult enterprise Professor Dantzig has been remarkably successful. The book somewhat resembles Whitehead's *Introduction to Mathematics*, but is on a larger scale. As the title indicates, the book is confined to those branches of mathematics which deal primarily with number, *i.e.* arithmetic, both finite and transfinite, algebra and analysis, the non-numerical branches of mathematics, such as projective geometry and theory of groups, being omitted. The treatment is on historical lines and is thoroughly clear and interesting. There are a few errors of detail, such as the statement[1] that "only the small letters of the Greek alphabet were used as numerals. The Greeks had at their disposal the capital letters which they could, and indeed did, use as symbols"; whereas the use of Greek letters as numerals is much older than the distinction between small and capital letters. But in spite of such slight blemishes the book can be thoroughly recommended to any student who wishes to understand the outstanding principles and results of modern mathematics sufficiently to realize their bearing on philosophical problems but cannot afford time for a strict mathematical training.

[1] P. 79.

Such a student, however, would need to exercise especial caution in reading Professor Dantzig's treatment of the problems of infinity. The question is, of course, a difficult one, and Professor Dantzig, rightly anxious to emphasize the difficulty, sometimes overemphasizes it and uses language which might mislead an unwary reader. For example, when he says:[1] "The domain of natural numbers rested on the assumption that the *operation* of adding one can be repeated indefinitely, and it was expressly stipulated that *never shall the ultra-ultimate step of this process be itself regarded as a number.* The generalization to real numbers not only extended the validity of indefinite repetition to any rational operation; it actually abandoned the restriction and admitted the limits of these processes as *bona fide* numbers." He ignores the distinctions which Bertrand Russell draws so carefully between positive integers and signless integers and between real numbers and rational numbers.[2] These distinctions, of course, bring their own difficulties, but merely to ignore them, as Professor Dantzig does, produces a misleading representation of the question.

Or when, desiring to stress the greatness of the advance made by Cantor, he quotes as follows from Gauss:[3] "I must protest most vehemently against your use of the infinite as something consummated, as this is never permitted in mathematics. The infinite is but a figure of speech; an abridged form for the statement that limits exist which certain ratios can approach as we desire, while other magnitudes may be perimtted to grow beyond all bounds," and talks of "Cantor's open defiance," the reader might well think that Gauss was simply wrong. But Gauss and Cantor were speaking of different things, and each was perfectly right in regard to the matter with which he was concerned. The difference may be put roughly as follows: Gauss was dealing with statements about *any* or *every* number, Cantor with statements about *all* numbers. Gauss's meaning may be illustrated thus: $d(x^2)/dx = 2x$ means that for *any* or *every* value of ϵ it is possible to find h so small that $-\epsilon < \{(x+h)^2 - x^2\}/h - 2x < \epsilon$, but there is no quantity dx so small that $\{(x+dx)^2 - x^2\}/dx$ is actually equal to $2x$; and this statement cannot be interpreted in terms of all numbers or of Cantor's transfinites, but is perfectly correct.

Neglect of these considerations appears to have misled Professor Dantzig when he comes to consider the connection between physics and mathematics. He says:[4] "Whether we use a ruler or a weighing balance, a pressure gauge or a thermometer, a compass or a voltmeter, we are always measuring what appears to us to be a *continuum*, and we are measuring it by means of a graduated *number scale*. We are then assuming that there exists a perfect correspondence between the possible states within this continuum and the aggregate of numbers at our disposal; we are tacitly assuming an axiom which plays within this continuum the rôle which the Dedekind-Cantor axiom played for the straight line. Therefore, any measuring device, however simple and natural it may appear to us, implies the whole apparatus of the arithmetic of real numbers." This would imply that laboratory readings are always taken to an infinite number of decimal places! All instrument readings are of course not continuous but discontinuous. When a scientist gives a length as 10·3 millimetres, the most that he states is that it lies between 10·25 and 10·35, and he would not be convicted of error if it were proved that the length was 10·28 or 10·33. To this a limited arithmetic is clearly adequate. But do the mathematical processes to which the measurements are subjected imply continuity? The ordinary operations of algebra, addition,

[1] P. 236.
[2] *Principles of Mathematics*, particularly pp. 150 and 275.
[3] P. 211.
[4] P. 243.

subtraction, multiplication, division, even exponentiation and the solution of equations, need not detain us long. If we operate in any of these ways on a set of quantities, each of which is known to lie between definite limits, the result will also lie between definite and calculable limits, and the careful physicist will take this into account and give his result with the accuracy which the particular experiment and *calculations* warrant. To this again an arithmetic of a finite number of real numbers would be adequate, and our ordinary procedure by means of a notation adapted to the continuum is really no more than a convenient device of terminology. When we come to operations involving the infinitesimal calculus the question becomes more complicated and interesting. An operation in the infinitesimal calculus is, as pointed out above, a statement that every one of an infinite class of inequalities is true. But our experimental evidence is not concerned with the whole of that class, but only with a part of it. If, to return to the previous example, we are operating with the formula $d(x^2)/dx = 2x$, we are only concerned with cases where the ϵ's are large enough to be perceptible, and the assumption made is that in these cases the h's are large enough to have a physical meaning; what happens below these limits is of no concern to the matter in hand. What we do, therefore, is to state a class of propositions, and assume that not all, but only those that matter, are true. The investigation of the limits thus assumed would be as possible theoretically in this case as in that of the algebraical operations, but would be more complicated, and is not made in practice. Nevertheless our procedure does not imply that there is no limit to the numbers with which we are dealing, but only that, if there is a limit, it is beyond anything with which we are concerned in the particular case. Moreover, it is always possible to construct numbers which will satisfy the conditions required in any particular case; there may be some doubt as to the nature of the entities to which these numbers apply, but this is a question of physics and not of mathematics. In Mill's phrase, "as much of the premises is true as is needed to support as much as is true of the conclusion." It would seem then that the difficulties of infinity and continuity are not relevant to ordinary mechanics and physics.

Nevertheless, there is much to be learnt from Professor Dantzig's speculations and suggestions on the epistemology of mathematics in his last chapter, and this also is well worth reading by anyone interested in the subject.

H. Wallis Chapman.

Mysticism. By Evelyn Underhill. (London: Methuen & Co. 1930. Pp. xviii + 515. Price 15s.)

This is the twelfth edition of a book which is recognized as a classic on the subject. Since the first edition in 1911, the author has worked on steadily upon the literature of mysticism, so that the new issue, which has been completely revised, is a monument of learning and a credit to English scholarship.

The hearty welcome given by the public to this and other studies of mysticism is of happy augury. It is now generally recognized that mysticism is religion in its most concentrated form; that it is not a name for abnormal states of consciousness; that the phenomena of trance and ecstasy are not the most important parts of the subject; and that the mystical experience

par excellence is the act of prayer. No writer has done more to promote a sound understanding of mysticism than Miss Underhill.

The book is stronger on the historical, psychological, and religious sides than on the philosophy which may be held to underlie the whole theory and practice of mysticism. Indeed, I am not confident that Miss Underhill has strengthened her philosophical position since the first edition. It is plain, both from the introduction and from the body of the work, that she has recently been influenced chiefly by modern Roman Catholic writers, such as von Hügel, Cuthbert Butler, Chapman, and even Maritain. In the preface there is a quaint and unconscious echo of von Hügel's uncouth and ponderous style. Von Hügel, Butler, and Chapman are names to be mentioned with great respect; indeed, the first-named was one of the deepest religious thinkers of our day; but I am disappointed to find Miss Underhill surrendering so easily to the supernaturalistic dualism of orthodox Catholicism, a theory which is intended to rehabilitate nature-miracles, and which draws a line across the field of experience, dividing "natural" events from those which are "supernatural," directly caused by the intervention of a power beyond nature. The author thinks, wrongly in my opinion, that this theory, abandoned by all independent thinkers in the last century, is now coming back into favour. Perhaps she has hardly faced the consequences of intercalating a so-called supernatural order within the natural. The most representative thinkers of our day are not prepared to accept a theory which would throw all the sciences into confusion, nor do I think that Miss Underhill fully accepts it.

It is easy to see what influences have driven the author into this camp. The psychologists, many of whom have made elaborate and scientific studies of mysticism, have practically, though not explicitly, ruled out the hypothesis that the mystical experience is anything more than subjective. Thus from first to last they remain quite outside the mystic's own standpoint, which is always absolutist through and through. The mystic cares nothing for states of consciousness; his experience is of something objectively real, or for him it is nothing. This Miss Underhill sees, and also that the philosophy which underlies psychologism is what she calls naturalistic monism. Such a view of reality virtually condemns the mystical quest.

But it is more than questionable whether supernaturalistic dualism is the only alternative to subjectivism. The whole Platonic school, which has been always most sympathetic to mysticism, would answer in the negative. Unfortunately, the author is markedly out of sympathy with the one philosophy which could save her from subjectivism without reverting to a kind of dualism which our knowledge of nature seems to have definitely discredited.

Indeed, she is no friend to those who approach the subject from the intellectual side. "Metaphysics and science," she says on page 45, "seem to offer to the intellect an open window towards the truth, till the heart looks out and declares this landscape to be a chill desert in which she can find no nourishment." Such an attitude would leave most people a prey to mere *Schwärmerei*.

The philosophy of mysticism is thus the one branch of this great subject on which we shall not get much help from this volume. Not thought, but feeling, is for the author the vehicle of revelation. This omission does not seriously impair the value of an admirable book, if we once realize what we must *not* look for in it.

W. R. Inge.

With the Door Open. By J. ANKER LARSEN. Translated by Eram and Pleasaunce von Gaisberg. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1931. Pp. 112. Price 6s. 6d.)

This little book, which is translated from Danish, is recommended to all interested in the deeper aspects of immediate religious experience. It is a short autobiography indicating the way in which the writer was led by the necessity of his nature to discover the Eternal, and contains a vivid description of the blessedness of the experience. The book is virile in tone and of pellucid clarity, and no one who has read it can fail to be convinced of the genuineness of the events related. We are introduced to a realm which by most of us, harassed by the cares and problems of life, is but dimly if at all discerned. And yet this eternal realm would seem to environ us all, waiting to be discovered and enjoyed by simple hearts. On closing the book the reviewer could not but feel regret that he knew so little of this realm which the mystic enters as his natural home, and strongly suspects that the arduous life of the intellect is not the path along which it can most effectively be attained.

The author from his youth was compelled by an inner compulsion to search for the "pearl of great price": "I was young, and the world was beautiful, but I kept looking for a sunrise which was to make everything more alive." He first sought it in the Theological Faculty, but with no success: "To a thirsting soul, this is like a desert." Next, Metaphysics was essayed, but with no greater success. The years passed, years which were by no means easy ones, and no dawn as yet of the sunrise. From time to time the author took a glance at what he calls the "Family Documents," the writings of the mystics of all ages, who all speak of the same thing, whether they are Chinese, Indian, Persian, African, or European. It was the actual experience which these had enjoyed that the author felt he wanted. Theoretic knowing was not enough: he must get at the reality itself. And so he waited in expectancy for the revelation which was to make all things new. At length a hint came to him: "Except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter into it." This hint had been preceded by certain experiences, in hours of rest and just before going to sleep, of visual pictures from the author's childhood, mostly of landscapes, but sometimes of human beings, leaving him with a feeling that there lay hidden away in those forgotten experiences of childhood a profound happiness. Soon after this there began a series of events which step by step introduced the author to the eternal realm which is the unconscious goal of all the great mystics. These experiences he named "lightning" flashes which came of their own accord and apparently sprang out of "a direct perception of reality." They increased in frequency. "It was like the beginning of spring rains; the first drops are followed by others, and one may expect a steadily flowing stream in the dry river bed." At this stage the author began to feel strongly that "Providence" had appeared on the scene and that he was being guided. He was only too ready to conform to this will of Providence which he sensed since it agreed with his own inner urge. From this time onward a new series of events was experienced. The author began to see objects and scenes which belonged to his past as actually present. These events were not memories, but a new state of inner being, in which the past was genuinely in the *now* of present experience. There was no doubt in the writer's mind that at this stage of his pilgrimage he had found something "foundational." For example, Space and Time declared themselves to be not what they seemed.

The "flashes of lightning" which are called by the author "the bells of eternity," ceased to be lightning; they began to last. Time and Space loosened their handcuffs, and gradually things revealed themselves in their true reality —as aspects or modes of the eternal! And when the light became lasting, the

author was compelled to name the experience "God," because something mighty and good had come to him—love, strength, security.

The latter part of the book is concerned with what the author finds very difficult to explain—*the meeting with eternity.*

During the latter steps of his pilgrimage Time and Space had loosened their hold, and yearnings and painful longings—whether towards places or people to which he had become attached—were diminished. At length the supreme experience, compared with which his earlier ones were but introductory, came to him:—

> "I was sitting in my garden one day after working. . . . It was still and peaceful around me and within me. Too good, in fact, to allow me to think much about anything. I just sat there: then it began to come—that infinite tenderness which is purer and deeper than that of lovers, or of a father towards his child. It was in me, but it also came to me, as the air came to my lungs. . . . This deep tenderness which I felt, first within myself, and then even stronger around and above me, extended farther and farther—it became all-present. I saw it, and it developed into knowing, into knowing all; at the same time it became power, omnipotence, and drew me into the eternal Now."

Here are some interesting remarks which the author makes about the Eternal which he regards as ultimate Reality. It is a Now which *is* and a Now which *happens*. There is no beginning and no end. It is a timeless Now. In the everlasting Now there is neither Space nor Time, neither limitation nor distinction. If we ask what is the Now which happens? the answer is—"the continuously active creation with all its birth throes: Time and Space are but instruments or functions of this creation. They came into existence with it, and they come to an end."

It was said above that the Now of being, and the agonizing Now of happening, are ultimately one and the same. The end of man is to actualize this truth by experiencing within himself both the eternal and the temporal nature of being, and achieve their fusion. In such a practical life all theories of life disappear like a fog; reality lies in the clear light of day.

The author has written his book inspired by the belief that eternity is grounded deep in human nature, and that men are endued with the same capacity for experiencing the Eternal as the fleeting events of Time. For men of simple direct natures the road to the Eternal lies open, and once there true freedom may be enjoyed, since we are then emancipated from all narrow hopes and fears. Even the fear of that last enemy, death, vanishes, for death and life are, from the point of the Eternal, seen to be not at all what they are generally believed to be. "He who has experienced the eternal Now does not see a fathomless abyss between "life" and "death." The eternal Now is *being*; Time is *existence*. He who converts existence into *being* has nothing more to do with life and death."

There is much more of interest in this small volume than I have space to deal with. I will only say in conclusion that the translation has been well done, and that the sympathetic reader will not only find a refreshing well of spiritual water for his soul, but will experience delight in the literary charm of the book.

S. E. Hooper.

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CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON'S THEORIES

Dear Sir,

I am glad that Professor Reichenbach realizes that my polemic against Sir Arthur Eddington is not really personal. But since the personal element seems to have misled him (and therefore probably others) concerning the real issue, may I try to state it in strictly impersonal terms?

Can a distinction be made between the experimental and theoretical elements of physics? Professor Reichenbach will not deny that there is a difference between (say) measuring the spectrum of a substance and interpreting the measurements in terms of atomic structure; in practice the two elements are so distinct that they are often the work of quite different people. But he may deny that, as I assert, they are wholly separable. I admit fully that they are not actually separated by the prevailing use of the words "law" and "theory," and that therefore I may have been unwise to use those terms. I admit further that in all scientific propositions, as usually stated, the two elements are confused to some extent; in particular, theoretical terms are habitually used to describe experimental facts. But I maintain that the elements can be separated; that the experimental element can be isolated by stating all "laws" in the form that certain experiments, not necessarily describable in words, can be demonstrated; and that the part so isolated contains all of physics that has any practical "authority." I recognize that imaginary experiments (Gedankenversuche) present a difficulty, but I believe it can be overcome. I am not sure whether Professor Reichenbach would agree with me so far, but almost all physicists who have actual experimental experience would.

If the distinction is admitted, the question of the relation of the two elements arises. Sir Arthur Eddington would probably hold that they differ only in degree; that a theory concerns exactly the same "reality" as a law, but is a fuller, more profound, and truer account of it; that it differs from a law in somewhat the same way as an adult's account of some complicated event differs from a child's. (*Law* and *theory* are here used in my sense, of course.) On the other hand, I hold that they differ in kind, in somewhat the same way as the statement that Brutus killed Cæsar differs from the statement that Brutus was right to kill Cæsar, and that therefore they must be carefully distinguished in considering the philosophical implications of science. Which of the two views is right can be determined only by a careful study of the relation between the experimental and theoretical elements in some typical branch of actual physics. My own solution of this problem is contained in my *Physics: The Elements* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1919), though naturally now I should amend it slightly. My quarrel with Professor Reichenbach and most other philosophers of science is not that they have given a different solution, but that they have ignored the problem altogether.

Yours faithfully,
Norman R. Campbell.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON'S THEORIES

Sir,

It is of much interest for me to hear from Dr. Campbell himself that my interpretation of his opinion was true, and that his article really was based on the conception of a precise disjunction between experimental and theoretical physics. Though this is only one point of my former letter, it seems to be the basis of the

difference between Dr. Campbell's opinion and mine, and therefore I may add some words now.

I do not deny that there is a difference between facts and theories, but what I deny is that laws are of the form of facts: they are nothing but theories of a more narrow form. And I must add that what a physicist calls a fact is a theory too: the real facts are sensuous impressions like blue and green and rigid, and to say that there are things of certain physical character is going further from facts to theories. Thus proceeding from absolute facts to propositions about "external" things is a way marked by the steps "physical facts," "laws," and "theories," but there is no sharp *frontière* between these steps. What can only be said is that the probability of the proposition gradually decreases as we proceed. The physicist is not always conscious of this: he takes an "observed" spectral line as a "fact," and a relation between observed lines as a "factual law," as for instance the law of Balmer. But what he could only maintain here as a fact is that he saw some dark and light spots on a photograph—he never sees spectral lines, but must deduce them from the observed spots by theoretical construction.

The instance given by Dr. Campbell is not of the form of transition occurring in physics. "Brutus killed Cæsar" is of the character of a "physical fact," that is, it is deduced from facts (like the sensuous data in reading ancient chronicles) by theoretical construction. "Brutus was right to kill Cæsar" is no statement at all, because it states nothing about the world, but only informs us about a certain feeling of the speaker, his feeling of justice. In the whole of physics there is no proposition of this kind at all.

This view of facts being a principal train of my theory of knowledge (*e.g.* in my *Ziele und Wege der physikalischen Erkenntnis*, *Handbuch der Physik*, Bd. 4, 1829. Verlag J. Springer, Berlin), why should I be charged with having ignored the problem of facts? I think every theory of knowledge must deal with the given view of facts, if it wants to give account of what an experimental physicist *does*, and not of what he *thinks he does*.

Yours faithfully,

August 1, 1931. HANS REICHENBACH.

NOTICE

THE first volume of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, scientist, logician and founder of pragmatism, has just been published by the Harvard University Press. This volume is entitled *The Principles of Philosophy*, and is composed mainly of papers previously unpublished. It contains his system in outline, and his more important papers on the methods and classification of the sciences, phenomenology, or the doctrine of the categories, ethics, and æsthetics. It will be sold at $4.50. The entire works will consist of about ten volumes; those subscribing to all the volumes will be entitled to a discount of 20 per cent. The second volume dealing with traditional logic, signs, methods of discovery, induction, and probability will follow very shortly. Nearly all the members of the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, as well as other friends of Peirce, have devoted much time to these manuscripts of these papers. The final work of arranging the papers and preparing them for the press has been done by Dr. Charles Hartshorne and Dr. Paul Weiss.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Sixth Ordinary General Meeting of the Institute was held at 35, Porchester Terrace, London, on July 22nd. By the kind invitation of Sir Herbert and Lady Samuel, the meeting was preceded by a Reception, at which a large number of members and friends were present.

A resolution for the adoption of the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended March 31, 1931, proposed by the Chairman and seconded by Sir Herbert Samuel, was carried unanimously.

The Chairman in the course of his remarks referred to the crisis through which the Institute had passed during the past six months, and congratulated members on their successful efforts in rescuing the Institute from the danger in which it found itself in the early part of the year. By their loyalty and generosity an increased solidarity had been brought about, and if each would in the future do what was in his power to introduce new members, the work of the Institute could not only continue the useful work it was doing, but expand its field of service to a community which greatly needed guidance from philosophy in the troublous times in which we were living.

Sir Herbert Samuel said he felt the Council had conferred a great honour upon him by electing him to be President in succession to the late Earl Balfour. In the latter years of his long political career he had come increasingly to feel the importance and need of philosophy as a background to his work. In saying this he was only repeating what had long ago been taught to the world by Plato. One could not be a good statesman without taking the long and deep view of the events of the world which it was the special task of philosophy to bring to light. He urged the members to do all in their power to increase the influence of the Institute. There never was a time in which the ordinary citizen needed the light which philosophy could throw on the numerous problems which perplexed him more than at the present.

PHILOSOPHY

MICHAELMAS TERM begins on October 9th and ends on December 16th.

The following courses of lectures have been arranged to begin in the Michaelmas Term of the Session 1931–32.

"PHILOSOPHY AND EVOLUTION," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor LEONARD J. RUSSELL, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., on Fridays, at 5.30 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 9, 1931. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE," a course of six weekly lectures by C. R. MORRIS, M.A., on Tuesdays, at 5.30 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas Term, beginning October 20, 1931. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 14th; Lent Term, January 20, 1932. Fee for the course, £1 1s. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The full syllabus for the Session can be obtained on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

The first of the Evening Meetings for the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C. 1, on Tuesday, October 13th, at 8.15 p.m., when Sir James Jeans, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., will give an address on " The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe."

It is hoped to form one or two reading circles at University Hall, Gordon Square, during the Session. Those desiring to join one of these should communicate with the Director of Studies.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

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Those desirous of becoming members of the Institute are invited to apply for further particulars and forms of application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

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